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Africa occupies a unique place in British consciousness. The rationale for Africa’s centrality in 
post-Cold War British foreign policy has prompted much scholarly debate, revealing a tension 
between explanations emphasising Britain’s desire to project power in the world and those 
focusing on Britain’s attempt to project moral identity through concern for Africa. 
 
Arguing that national identity is discursively constructed, this research explores the role of 
British prime ministers’ discourses of Africa in the construction of British national identity. It 
examines continuities and discontinuities in British prime ministers’ speeches that reference 
Africa, covering the premierships of John Major, Tony Blair, Gordon Brown, and David 
Cameron (1990–2016). Through a 4-step mixed-methods approach, comprising quantitative 
tools, thematic content analysis, and critical discourse (Discourse-Historical Approach) 
analysis, this research identifies four content-oriented themes and 11 sub-themes in the 
speeches. Through these it identifies four discourses about Africa, signifying different visions 
about Britain’s national identity and place in the world: ‘paternalism’, ‘tutelage’, ‘partnership’, 
and ‘insecure former empire’. The central finding is that British prime ministers’ discourses of 
Africa reveal two concurrent but contradictory British national identities. One represents an 
attempt to forge a new soft-power British national identity whilst the other signifies a 
reluctance to entirely renounce Britain’s colonial identity.  
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Africa came to play a central role in Britain’s history, foreign policy, self-image and public 
imagination during the nineteenth century – and more prominently so following the 1884 
Berlin Conference and subsequent ‘Scramble for Africa’. Over the course of colonisation, 
decolonisation, and more recent history, Africa has had a substantial impact on Britain – 
manifesting itself in a variety of ways, from arts and culture to shaping British identity and 
place in the world.  
 
In 1960, at the end of his six-week tour of ‘British Africa’, Harold Macmillan delivered the 
landmark ‘Wind of Change’ speech to the Parliament of South Africa. In this speech, he 
stated: ‘The wind of change is blowing through this continent. Whether we like it or not, this 
growth of national consciousness is a political fact’ (Butler and Stockwell, 2013: 1). The 
process of decolonisation in Africa progressed rapidly under Macmillan, and by 1970 only 
Rhodesia and South West Africa remained under British control (Brown and Louis, 1999: 
348). 
 
Decades after Macmillan’s speech and the rapid decolonisation of Africa, the continent 
continues to occupy a significant role in Britain’s consciousness. In 2001, Tony Blair told the 
Labour Party conference ‘the state of Africa is a scar on the conscience of the world. But if 




deeper and angrier’ (Gallagher, 2013: 11). Half a decade later, in a speech to News Corp., 
Blair stated: ‘I know some of my fellow leaders think I am trifle obsessed with Africa. It’s 
true. I am.’1 In 2007, David Cameron travelled to Rwanda to take part in the Conservative 
Party’s social action project, Project Umubano. During this trip, his parliamentary 
constituency was affected by severe flooding. Despite receiving criticism in the press and 
threats of a vote of no confidence in his leadership, Cameron chose to remain in Rwanda 
rather than return to the UK (Beswick, 2019). The rationale for Britain’s continued 
engagement with Africa has been the subject of much discussion in UK-Africa literature. At 
its core, this literature reveals a division between explanations that emphasise Britain’s desire 
to project power in the world and those that focus on Britain’s attempt to derive a moral 
identity through concern for Africa. 
 
This thesis examines how discourses of Africa have been used in the construction of British 
identity by British prime ministers in the post-Cold War period. The period of study covers 
four prime ministers: John Major (1990–1997), Tony Blair (1997–2007), Gordon Brown 
(2007–2010), David Cameron’s coalition government (2010–2015), and the remainder of 
Cameron’s premiership leading a Conservative majority government (2015–2016). This time 
period was selected for a number of reasons. During the Cold War, the strategy of 
containment by ‘first world’ powers against the communist expansion of the ‘second world’ 
provided the most convincing explanation for their interactions with the non-aligned ‘third 
                                                 




world’ (Schmidt, 2013). After the end of the Cold War, however, this no longer explained 
external engagement with Africa. Therefore, beginning this period of focus at the end of the 
Cold War allows for the comparison of four consecutive prime ministers in this post-Cold 
War period, in which the context is similar enough to allow for meaningful comparison. It 
also allows for the comparison of two Conservative prime ministers and two Labour prime 
ministers. Furthermore, it provides an opportunity to compare Blair, who is the focus of a 
large body of UK-Africa literature, with two prime ministers who are often overlooked in 
this regard, Major and Brown, as well as with Cameron, who is the focus of a small but 
growing body of literature. In doing, it also provides an opportunity to assess claims in this 
literature about the continuities and discontinuities regarding the role of Africa in British 
foreign policy during these premierships. 
 
 The central research questions this thesis seeks to answer are: 
1. Through their speeches, to what extent and in what ways have British prime 
ministers in the post-Cold War era invoked different discourses about Britain’s 
relationship with Africa? 
2. Are there noticeable patterns in the use of different discourses over this time (for 
example, by political administration, or by social/political/economic circumstance in 
Britain) that may explain the use of such discourses?  
3. What does this tell us about the way discourses about Africa – and UK relations with 





Building on a conception of national identity as discursively constructed, this research seeks 
to understand the role of discourses of Africa in the construction of British national identity. 
This is achieved through an analysis of British prime ministers’ speeches collected from 
online archives, as well as from the Conservative and Labour Party archives. The whole 
corpus of speeches contains 273 speeches (see Appendix A), however only selected speeches 
are analysed.  
 
Using a four-step mixed-methods approach, this thesis analyses speeches by British prime 
ministers across this time period in order to reveal the ways in which Africa is used to 
construct particular discourses of British national identity. Quantitative tools are used to 
ensure the breadth of information in the corpus of speeches is appreciated by deriving 
‘themes’ (1) and ‘sub-themes’ (2) that capture the overt content of the speeches. Qualitative 
analysis is then used to understand the implicit content and discursive construction of British 
national identity. A thematic content analysis (3) and critical discourse analysis based on the 
Discourse-Historical Approach (4) are used for this.  
 
This research makes a number of important contributions to knowledge. At its core, this 
thesis finds that British prime ministers discourses about Africa reveal two concurrent but 
contradictory British identities. One represents a Britain at ease with its post-Empire status, 
whilst the other signifies a Britain reluctant to entirely let go of its imperial identity. In 
response to the three research questions, this thesis finds that British prime ministers’ 




British prime ministers’ references to Africa are about British history, security, morality, and 
economy. These are further divided into eleven ‘sub-themes’, which signify important 
nuances within these themes: ‘commonality rooted in colonial history’, ‘the Commonwealth’, 
‘sport’; ‘Africa’s underdevelopment as a security threat’, ‘peacekeeping’, ‘force projection’; 
‘moral posturing’, ‘Christian values’, ‘party political messaging’; ‘Africa’s economic prosperity 
as mutually beneficial’, and ‘Africa’s economic prosperity as a (missed) opportunity for 
Britain’.  
 
Through an analysis of these themes and sub-themes in prime ministers’ speeches, four 
discourses about Britain’s relationship with Africa emerge, which highlight different visions 
of British national identity. These are: ‘paternalism’, ‘tutelage’, ‘partnership’, and ‘insecure 
former empire’. The themes, sub-themes, and discourses found in this thesis reveal two 
competing but coexisting notions of British national identity. On one hand, over the period 
of this research, 1990-2016, British prime ministers’ conception of British national identity 
shifts from one of paternalism towards Africa to one of partnership. One way in which this 
can be seen is that references to Britain’s colonial history in Africa and the Commonwealth 
diminish over time. This change in identity in relation to Africa can be explained by variety 
of factors – including prime ministers’ party affiliation, their individual personalities, and 
broader changes over time – such as increasing African agency, and post-Cold War optimism 
about the triumph of liberal values and the turn to a rights-based approach. On the other 
hand, some discourses of Africa’s place in British foreign policy have remained continuous 




British assistance is required to maintain security in Africa, and that Africa is a moral cause 
for Britain. 
 
This thesis makes several other significant contributions. It maps the literature on the 
rationale for Britain’s post-Cold War involvement in Africa in Chapter 2, and then engages 
with, develops, and challenges key debates within this. It does so primarily by expanding the 
timeframe beyond those prime ministers that receive most attention in the literature, 
allowing claims of continuity or discontinuity to be assessed. For example, this research finds 
many similarities between the framing of Africa by Blair and Cameron; both frame Africa as 
an explicitly moral cause, and refer to is as an arena in which to project British hard power. 
In doing so, it develops the argument about the uniqueness of Blair’s focus on Africa, such 
as that made by Gallagher (2013). Another such example is that this thesis supports the 
finding of Abrahamsen (2005) that Britain’s engagement with Africa post-9/11 was evidence 
of the securitisation of Africa, however it makes an important contribution by presenting 
examples of the discourse that Africa presented a security threat years prior to 9/11. 
 
In addition to contributing to UK-Africa literature, this research provides potential 
explanations for these findings and opportunities to build on this research. These 
explanations include factors personal to prime ministers, such as their party affiliation, as 
well as broader changes, such as increased African agency, and optimism about the capacity 
of politics to transform the world and the move towards a rights-based approach at the end 




Moreover, this research makes contributions through the data collected and the approach it 
uses. The data collected for this research is original and can be made available to other 
researchers interested in UK-Africa relations. The corpus contains 273 speeches, totalling 
668,281 words. This dataset took a number of months to compile, and required searching 
through online archives and physical archives. The approach taken in this thesis represents a 
unique take on existing methods, and in doing so develops an innovative way of approaching 
national identity construction using large datasets such as this. It builds on the Discourse-
Historical Approach by combining it with quantitative tools and thematic content analysis 
which can support a larger quantity of data, and which provides a framework that can be 
borrowed and built on in further research. 
 
Having provided an overview of this thesis, the next chapter turns to focus on the literature 
pertinent to this research. This is divided into three areas. The first part of the literature 
review focuses on national identity and how it is constructed. The second looks at the role of 
political elites and political speeches, and in particular why studying British prime ministers’ 
speeches can help understand British national identity. The third section of the literature 
review assesses competing explanations for Britain’s continued engagement with Africa after 
the Cold War, as well as why Africa occupies a unique place in British consciousness and 





In order to address the central research questions set out in Chapter 1, it is helpful to break 
them down into even smaller interlinking questions in this literature review. These questions 
help guide the structure of this literature review, and help situate it within debates in the 
literature. The first section of this literature review focuses on the nature of national identity, 
the second turns to political elites and their role in shaping and propagating national identity, 
and the third centres on why Africa is important in the construction of British national 
identity. 
 
Firstly, drawing on the disciplines of political science and international relations, what is 
national identity? Where and how does national identity ‘exist’, and to what extent are there 
alternative – even competing – conceptions of national identity? How are these formed, 
shaped, and propagated, and which institutions and actors are central to this? This thesis 
builds on the idea that nations are imagined communities, and that national identity is 
constructed through discourse. There is no single national identity; identities are discursively 
constructed according to context. National identity can be discursively constructed through 
everyday actions and routines that reify the existence of a nation, such as through the use of 
a common language. This is known as ‘banal nationalism’ (Billig, 1995). However, national 
identity can also be constructed by political elites such as prime ministers and presidents 
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because their office offers them the platform to speak on behalf of the nation.  This research 
is focused on this latter construction of national identity.  
 
Secondly, with particular reference to the communication studies and political science 
literature, how are political elites involved in the formation and propagation of particular 
conceptions of national identity? What methods do they use, and why are political speeches 
of particular importance? The literature review finds that whilst there is a wealth of literature 
on the role of the US president in defining what it means to be American, there is currently 
limited research on the British context. Indeed, rhetoric and political speech-giving are so 
central to the US presidency that Tulis (1987) coined the phrase ‘the rhetorical presidency’. 
One method US presidents have used in their speeches to define national identity is to 
exclude certain groups by implying they do not possess the ‘proper’ American ideals 
(Beasley, 2004). Importantly, the literature review also finds that whilst the study of political 
speeches is frequently the starting point for the study of American national identity, there 
has been little systematic research into the place or function of political speeches across the 
study of British politics (Finlayson and Martin, 2008).   
 
Finally, looking at the fields of international development, international relations and 
political science, what role has Africa played shaping ideas about Britain’s place in the world 
over time? To what extent have British prime ministers in the post-Cold War period 
considered the continent a priority and why? What is it about Africa that makes it 
particularly useful for studying the construction of Britain’s national identity? The third 
section of the literature review finds that Africa has occupied an important place in British 
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consciousness and national identity as far back as the nineteenth century. The literature on 
Africa’s place in British foreign policy post-Cold War can broadly be split into two groups. 
One group emphasises the idea that Africa represents an arena in which Britain can project 
power in the world, whilst the other views Africa as a mirror in which Britain derives a moral 
identity for itself. These different views are set out in detail in section 2.3, and are perhaps 
most succinctly summarised by Reid (2014) and Harrison (2013) respectively. Reid (2014) 
argues that international engagement with Africa has been, and remains, fundamentally 
economic and military in nature. By contrast, Harrison (2013) contends that British 




2.1 The Construction of National Identity 
In order to understand how discourses of Africa are used in the construction of Britain’s 
identity by British prime ministers, it is important to firstly understand what national identity 
is and how it is formed. There is a debate in the literature as to whether the nation is 
modern, invented, and socially constructed – or whether it is primordial with ethnic, cultural, 
and historical linkages to the pre-national cultural unit. This then raises questions about 
where national identity exists, how it is propagated, and for what purpose – which will also 
be explored in this section. This research is based on the former idea; nations are imagined 
by those who believe themselves to be part of a community. It was the fall of sacred 
languages, which had previously represented privileged access to truth, alongside the 
invention of the printing press and increased literacy that allowed large numbers of people 
who did not know each other on a face-to-face basis to be able to consider themselves part 
of a single community (Anderson, 1983). This national identity is constructed and conveyed 
through discourse. 
 
2.1.1 What is National Identity? Where and How Does it ‘Exist’? 
Building on the early work of the French historian Ernest Renan, the idea of the nation in 
the political science literature is largely discussed in terms of a distinction between two 
paradigms: Willensnation and Kulturnation. That is, the political nation by an act of will 
(Willensnation), and the nation defined by culture (Kulturnation), which is often linguistically 
defined and ethnically based (Wodak et al., 2009: 18). These conceptions have been discussed 
using different terms in the discussions in English – but the underlying ideas are the same. 
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Instrumentalism views the nation as a vested interest in common pursuits, similar to 
Willensnation. Primordialism or perennialism, in contrast, conceptualises the nation as an 
instinct of individuals born into specific linguistic, racial or homeland communities such that 
the bond between the individual and the community is seen as so innate that it is primordial 
– and is therefore comparable to Kulturnation (Bačová, 1998). 
 
Renan noted this distinction in his 1882 lecture Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?, in which he claimed 
that there had hitherto been a confusion between nationhood and racial, linguistic, and 
religious groupings. Renan (1990: 14) dismisses the racial basis for a nation saying ‘to base 
one’s policy on an ethnographic analysis means to establish it on a chimera. The noblest 
countries – England, France and Italy – are the ones where the blood is most mixed’. 
Language, meanwhile, ‘invites us, but does not force us, to unite’, whilst ‘religion has become 
something individual; it concerns the conscience of each person’ (Renan, 1990: 16, 18). 
Instead, Renan contends that a nation is based on having a common past and a common will 
in the present. He elaborates:  
 
A nation is a soul, a spiritual principle. Two things, which in truth are but one, constitute this 
soul or spiritual principle. One lies in the past, one in the present. One is the possession in 
common of a rich legacy of memories; the other is present-day consent, the desire to live 
together [...] To have common glories in the past and to have a common will in the present; 
to have performed great deeds together, to wish to perform still more - these are the 




One of Renan’s main insights and contributions to understanding the construction of the 
nation is his appreciation of the role of collective memory. However, his argument is 
incomplete because it does not explain how such collective memory becomes linked to 
specific places and territories. Indeed, Bauböck (1991: 43) argues that such subjective 
definitions as Willensnation and Kulturnation are inadequate because they ‘tautologically 
determine in advance what is to be explained – the formation of a national idea of 
community’.  
 
Nevertheless, Anderson (1983: 15) makes the compelling case that a nation is an ‘imagined 
political community’ building on the concept of Willensnation. That is, a nation is a socially 
constructed community imagined by the people who perceive themselves as part of that 
group. This is not to say that a national community is not real, but that any community so 
large that its members do not know each other on a face-to-face basis must be imagined to 
some degree. Nations are imagined as limited because even the largest of them has finite 
boundaries beyond which lie other nations (Anderson, 1983; Couture and Wojahn, 2016). 
This thesis builds on Anderson’s concept of the nation as an imagined political community. 
 
The evolution of the nation is important in understanding how they are constructed, and this 
will briefly be covered here drawing on Anderson’s work – before moving onto criticisms 
and alternative understandings of how the nation has come into being. Anderson accepts 
that the modern nation is rooted in the religious communities and dynastic empires that 
were connected to one another by ‘sacred languages’ such as Latin and Arabic, as well as 
through texts passed down through centuries. In the 17th Century, kingdoms that had 
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hitherto been defined by religious ideals, started to collapse in Europe, and in their place, 
legitimacy was shifted into territories separated by laws.  
 
Importantly, however, modern nations did not just appear from these religious communities 
and kingdoms; a paradigm shift in common people’s understanding of the world was 
essential for them to comprehend the idea of a nation (Wodak et al., 2009: 22). Anderson 
argues that two major factors led to this paradigm shift. The first was the fall of Latin as the 
‘sacred language’, which had up until then represented privileged access to truth (Anderson, 
1983). The second was the spread of the printing press and the increase in book printing in 
the 16th Century, which led to the increased importance of local languages after the small 
market for Latin books was saturated (Wodak et al., 2009: 22). This also meant that the wide 
varieties of spoken dialects and languages were combined into a few written languages.  
 
The written word and language acted as a catalyst for booming populations to consider 
themselves and relate to others in a fundamentally different way; these languages formed the 
basis of communicating between ordinary spoken languages and the sacredness of Latin 
(Anderson, 1983: 40). The supply and demand for new books printed in the smaller number 
of written languages created a hierarchy because some spoken dialects were more similar to 
the languages that were printed. Anderson argues that although this was inadvertent, it later 
became a model that could be drawn on and employed in nation-building. Anderson (1983: 
122) therefore claims that written language created the concept of the nation. This thesis not 
only builds on Anderson’s concept that nations are imagined political communities, it also 
pays specific attention to the importance of discourse in this.  
 
15 
It is useful, however, to briefly acknowledge competing conceptions of the nation and why 
these are less compelling. In contrast to Anderson’s focus on the role of print-capitalism, its 
role unifying language and creating a cultural consciousness between speakers of the same 
language, Gellner (2006: 6-7) argues that cultural and voluntaristic definitions are inadequate. 
Gellner instead argues that  ‘population explosion, rapid urbanisation, labour migration, and 
also the economic and political penetration of previously more or less inwardturned 
communities’ created new boundaries – meaning that nations are the result of late 18th 
Century industrialisation (Gellner, 2006: 41). In contrast to both Anderson and Gellner, 
Smith (1995) emphasises the importance of pre-existing territories. He argues that the 
modernist approach of Anderson and Gellner ignores ‘the persistence of ethnic ties and 
cultural elements in many parts of the world, and their continuing significance for large 
numbers of people’. Smith therefore submits that a nation is ‘a named population sharing a 
historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass public culture, a common 
economy and common legal rights and duties for its members’ (Smith, 1995: 56-57). Smith’s 
argument is based on ‘ethnies’, which were broader cultural units in the premodern era. 
Therefore, Smith argues that whilst nations are modern, they are inextricably rooted in those 
pre-existing ethnies.  
 
Yet these criticisms by Gellner and Smith do little to diminish Anderson’s core argument. 
Gellner’s definition does little to explain why, for example, two people from different 
backgrounds living on opposite coasts of the US believe themselves to be members of the 
same nation. Additionally, as previously noted, Anderson concedes that the nation has roots 
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in pre-existing religious communities and dynastic empires, but argues that these did not 
automatically form the basis of modern nations.  
 
Using Anderson’s definition of the nation as an ‘imagined political community’, a second key 
area to address is: where does national identity exist and how is it propagated? Wodak et al. 
(2009) argue that idea of the nation is constructed and conveyed in discourse, primarily in 
discourses about national culture. Echoing Anderson’s argument about the imagined basis of 
the nation, Hall (1996) submits that nations are not just political institutions, they are also 
systems of cultural representations through which an imagined community is interpreted. 
Hall (1996: 612-613) argues:  
 
people are not only legal citizens of a nation; they participate in the idea of the nation 
[…] A national culture is a discourse – a way of constructing meanings which influences 
and organises both our actions and our conception of ourselves. […] National cultures 
construct identities by producing meanings about ‘the nation’ with which we can 
identify; these are contained in the stories which are told about it, memories which 
connect its present with its past, and imagines which are constructed of it. 
 
This view is echoed by Calhoun (1997). He argues that the nation is a meaningful notion in 
everyday life because people talk about it; they make discursive claims for, about and in the 
name of the nation. ‘Nations are constituted largely by [these] claims themselves, by the way 
of talking and thinking and acting that relies on these sorts of claims to produce collective 
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identity, to mobilize [sic] people for collective projects, and to evaluate peoples and 
practices’ (Calhoun, 1997: 5).  
 
As well as building on the idea of the nation as an ‘imagined community’, this research builds 
on the notion that national identity is a discursive construct. Discourse analytical approaches 
to the study of nationalism centre on the ways in which understandings of the nation are 
constructed and conveyed through discursive acts (van Dijk, 1984; Wetherell and Potter, 
1992). These discursive acts do not just describe social reality; they simultaneously construct 
that reality, willing into existence that which they name (Bourdieu, 1992: 223). Importantly 
for this thesis, as Wodak et al. (2009) argue, there is no such thing as one national identity. 
Rather, different identities are discursively constructed according to context – such as the 
audience and setting. 
 
2.1.2 What Elements Comprise the Discursive Construction of National Identity? 
So far, this thesis has explored how the nation can be seen as an ‘imagined community’, and 
that it is constructed through discourse. This section begins by exploring some of the 
elements identified in the national identity literature as being important in understanding 
how the nation is constructed. It then moves on to discuss discursive strategies, which 
encompass a range of devices such as metaphors, stereotypes, and allusions, and are more 
implicit in their role in constructing national identity. The section after (2.2) will expand on 
the role of political elites and how they use these to construct national identity – which is 
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vital in understanding how British prime ministers have referenced Africa in their speeches, 
and how this constructs British national identity.  
 
There are competing ways of understanding the discursive construction of national identity. 
Some scholars emphasise the role of everyday discourses and bottom-up approaches to 
understanding the construction of national identity. That is, the nation may be constructed 
through explicit and active performances, rituals, and mass ceremonies in which the nation is 
actively produced and propagated in the public sphere (Uzelac, 2010). National holidays, for 
instance, involve mass ceremonies of nationalism being performed for the public, 
(re)producing national identity (McCrone and McPherson, 2009; Hayday, 2010). However, 
national identity is also constructed through the use and exchange of even the most simple, 
everyday semiosis (Wodak et al., 2009). ‘Banal nationalism’ is achieved through simple 
routines and everyday actions that reify and reproduce the existence of the nation which can 
include, for example, using the national language (Billig, 1995).  
 
Fox and Miller-Idriss (2008: 553) argue that the ‘the broad brush strokes favoured by macro-
analytical approaches to the study of nationalism blur (and sometimes obscure) the finer 
grains of the nation that are embedded in the routine practices of everyday life’. They 
contend that it is not possible to properly appreciate the importance of the nation in 
everyday life by only studying its state-sponsored construction in a modern context or 
through elite manipulation. That is not to argue that everyday nationhood should be studied 
independently of these phenomena, but that nations are not just constructed from the top 
down; they are simultaneously the creation of ordinary people engaging in mundane 
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activities in their everyday lives (Fox and Miller-Idriss, 2008: 537). Although this thesis 
focuses on the top-down construction of national identity, it is important to understand the 
role of everyday semiosis and banal nationalism in constructing other identities from the 
bottom up.   
 
Another principal way in which the nation has been legitimised throughout history by 
sharing a common language, as discussed previously with reference to Anderson (1983). 
Indeed, sharing a common, national language is often considered one of the hallmarks of a 
nation. Machin and van Leeuwen (2007) contend that many populations are convinced they 
belong to a unique national community largely because they read, listen to, and watch the 
same material – in particular, material from the national news media. Androutsopoulos 
(2007: 207-8) argues this trend was intensified with the emergence of the mass media: ‘the 
mass media contributed to the constitution of national languages and gave rise to the 
linguistic ideal of public discourse in the monolingual nation-state: a language as 
homogeneous as the nation it represents’. However, this argument is to some extent 
undermined by bilingual or multilingual countries such as India, Switzerland, Zimbabwe, 
South Africa, and Canada. This aspect of national identity relevant to discussions about 
British national identity in relation to Africa when considering the widespread use of English 
in Africa, and references to members of the Commonwealth being united by a shared 
language. 
 
Rhetoric about the role of history in the construction of national identity – the notion that a 
people’s shared past experience encourages cohesion – is also identified as being important 
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in the literature on nationhood. However, Deutsch (1966: 19) contends that ‘instead of being 
automatically united by a shared history, men at least under some conditions cannot share 
the historical events through which they live, unless they are already in some sense united’. 
That is, the notion that something is ‘common’ is predicated on an initial sense of cohesion 
and having been inculcated with certain ‘truths’. The assertion of an historical truth might be 
another’s ‘history’, full of falsehoods or fabrications to rationalise claims of cultural or 
national exceptionalism. ‘What ultimately matters is not what is but what people believe is’ 
(Connor, 1994: 37). Crucially, a consideration of history and its role in the construction of 
national identity is not an attempt to objectively understand which events have shaped a 
nation’s identity. Rather, it is about competing narratives, with actors attempting to dominate 
certain events and use them to aggrandise or individualise certain histories. This is 
particularly pertinent to later discussions about Britain and Africa, and the narration of 
Britain’s history in Africa during colonialism, where particular attention must be given to 
attempts to highlight or diminish particular histories.  
 
Importantly for this thesis, a notable addition to the role of history in the construction of 
national identity is the role of ‘forgetting’. In his 1882 lecture, Renan argued that 
‘forgetfulness, and [even] historical error, are essential in the creation of a nation’ (Renan, 
1990: 11) meaning that nations are based as much on what people jointly forget as well as 
what they remember. He gives the example that ‘every French citizen has to have forgotten 
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the massacre of Saint Bartholomew’.2 However, Anderson (1983) points out that there is a 
contradiction here; Renan argues French people must have forgotten the St. Bartholomew's 
Day massacre, yet does not explain what it is. In doing so, Renan assumes that his readers 
will remember the very massacre he says they have forgotten. Anderson notes that many 
French citizens of Renan’s time knew of the massacre because it was taught in state-run 
schools, meaning the state itself preserved knowledge which needed to be forgotten for 
national identity (Poole, 2009). As such, Anderson contends that not only does nationality 
rely on the communal act of forgetting, but, paradoxically, that the very act of forgetting 
affirms the national site of memory. The act of forgetting is a matter of the national will – a 
ritualised performance of the will to forget (Gourgouris, 1996). In this paradoxical act, 
Anderson (1983: 202) argues there is ‘the reassurance of fratricide’ – that nations are fond of 
interpreting – and thus instituting – life-threatening encounters with an external enemy as 
foundational internal conflicts; fratricidal occasions that sanctify the topos of national origin 
and are thus ineradicable, which is precisely why they must always have already been 
‘forgotten’ (Brownlie, 2013). This ties into later discussions in the literature review about 
British prime ministers discourses of Africa (see section 2.3).  
 
The construction of identity through foreign policy and international relations has been 
explored by a number of authors, and is of particular importance to this thesis. Edward 
Said’s Orientalism, for example, although about the Near and Middle East, is a useful 
                                                 
2 The St. Bartholomew’s Day massacre of 1572 occurred during the French Wars of Religion (1562-
1598), and was a targeted attack by French Catholics against Huguenots (French Reformed / 
Calvinist Protestants) which led to thousands of deaths (Knecht, 2002). 
 
22 
framework in understanding the early narratives of Africa that entered British consciousness 
and persist to some extent to this day. Said (1978: 300) proposed a binary whereby the West 
(Occident) created a romanticised identity of the East (Orient) to justify colonial and 
imperialist intentions. This Occident-Orient binary centres on the Western construction of 
the East instead of any truths about it. Said argues that the Western construction of the 
Orient is based on four ‘dogmas’. First, the absolute dichotomy between the Occident, 
which is rational, advanced, and compassionate – in contrast to the Orient which is 
immature and inferior. Second, that generalisations about the Orient, particularly those based 
on literature depicting a stereotypical Oriental culture, are preferable to proof about the truth 
of modern Oriental cultures. Third, the Orient is perpetual, unchanging, homogeneous, and 
unable to define itself, and that therefore vague terminology for defining the Orient by the 
Occident is objective. Fourth, the Orient is an entity to be afraid of or to be mastered (Said, 
1978).  
 
This Occident-Orient binary is an elite construction, created and propagated by those who 
have the status and power to shape discourses. The phenomenon described by Said has also 
been called ‘identification through differentiation’. Discourse analysts have examined how 
national discourses can be based around stereotypes which create a division between ‘us’ and 
‘them’, and such discourses can be employed in order to justify discrimination or exclusion 
of outgroups (Gillespie, 2007).  
 
Said’s theory was developed by Mudimbe (1988) in his book The Invention of Africa. Both Said 
and Mudimbe address the phenomenon of ‘the other’ in Western consciousness and 
 
23 
Western empire – and that the Orient is viewed as exotic, intellectually retarded, emotionally 
sensual, governmentally despotic, culturally passive, and politically penetrable (Mazuri, 2005: 
68). One notable difference between Said and Mudimbe, however, is that whilst Said insisted 
that the Orient does not exist and has never existed outside the consciousness and 
imagination of the West, Mudimbe believes that the invention of Africa is a prophecy in the 
process of self-fulfilment (Mazuri, 2014: 277). Mazuri (2005: 69) does, however, add the 
caveat that it is possible to accuse Said and Mudimbe of ‘reverse Otherness’; that is, of 
stereotyping the West in their stereotyping of the Orient. 
 
Continuing with the focus on the construction of national identity through foreign policy 
and international relations, it is important to note that over the course of the twentieth 
century, dominated by the two World Wars, Europe (and Germany in particular) became 
central in shaping Britain’s identity. The construction of certain ideas about what it means to 
be European or German co-constructed what it meant to be British. This section briefly 
touches on some of the ways this was achieved, as these will provide useful context for the 
study of Britain’s national identity in relation to Africa. Wallace (1991: 70) argues ‘the myth 
of Anglo-Saxondom is as old as Shakespeare, matured through the experiences of the 
English Civil War and the struggles against the threat of Catholic absolutism, first from 
Spain and then from France: a free England defying an unfree continent’.  
 
This view of the exceptional character and moral greatness of the Anglo-Saxon peoples 
continued through the First World War, and the Second World War further reinforced the 
idea that Britain and the US were the champions of freedom and democracy against a 
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totalitarian threat to the resistance in occupied countries (Wallace, 1991: 71). This history has 
continued to influence British national identity in the contemporary era. The language in 
prime ministerial speeches and parliamentary exchanges on Europe, for example, has been 
deeply ideological, conjuring up elements of the English national myth: Magna Carta, 
parliamentary sovereignty, the continuity of Britain’s 700-year-old parliamentary traditions, 
its island status, ‘the British people’, ‘the nation’ (Wallace, 1991: 69). These are all elements 
that later came to play a role again around the vote of Britain’s membership of the European 
Union in 2016, as discussed in the final part of this thesis. These discourses around freedom 
and sovereignty can help inform a study of British prime minister’s speeches in relation to 
Africa in that they highlight a discourse of British exceptionalism.  
 
In contrast to these approaches focused on the role of everyday nationhood, common 
language, history, and international relations, there are other ways in which the construction 
of national identity can be considered. According to Hall (1996: 613-615) the propagation of 
ideas about national identity can be broken down into five parts, which he calls ‘discursive 
strategies’. Firstly, there is the narrative of the nation, which is prevalent at both a national 
level and in everyday life. Secondly, there is a notion of the foundation, continuity, and 
eternal character of the nation. Thirdly, the invention of tradition transforms historical 
defeats and embarrassments into something understandable by glossing over inconsistencies. 
Fourthly, the idea of the foundational legend regarding the origin of the nation. Fifthly, the 




However, as Wodak et al. (2009: 24) point out, it is difficult to separate out national identity 
in this way, and that Hall’s second, third, fourth and fifth discursive strategies could easily be 
interpreted as characteristics of the first. Kolakowski (1995) derives a similar, sometimes 
overlapping, approach to Hall’s, and is therefore also problematic for the same reasons. 
Instead, Wodak et al. (2009) derive an approach that is based on the contents, discursive 
strategies, and the means and forms of realisation. Their discursive strategies are less 
prescriptive, so do not fall foul of the constraints of the approaches taken by Hall (1996) and 
Kolakowski (1995). A discussion of the approach is detailed in Chapter 3, as it forms the 
basis for the critical discourse analysis used in this research.  
 
As this analysis of the literature demonstrates, national identity is best understood as being 
discursively constructed by people who imagine themselves to be part of a national 
collective. National identity is shaped by explicit and active performances, such as by state, 
political, and media actors, as well as through everyday social practices. However, as this 
thesis is solely focused on the capacity of political elites in constructing national identity, the 
next section of this research moves on to explore these political actors in more detail, and 




2.2 The Role of Political Elites, Political Speeches, and the Audience 
This section focuses on how political elites, such as British prime ministers, are able to 
narrate and propagate certain discourses – and in turn shape national identity. Before 
focusing on British prime ministers specifically, however, it is helpful to look at the literature 
on political elites and national identity more broadly. Much has been written about the US 
context and the role of the US presidency in shaping national identity, in what Tulis (1987) 
describes as the ‘rhetorical presidency’, in contrast to the lack of focus on the British prime 
minister. There are, of course, notable differences between the institutions of the British 
prime minister and the US president. In Britain the roles of the head of state and head of 
government are divided between the prime minister and the monarch, whilst in the US both 
roles are occupied by president. Nevertheless, the literature on the US context is still useful 
to review as it serves to highlight some broader points that are applicable to political elites 
such as prime ministers and presidents in general. 
 
2.2.1 What Role Do Political Elites Play in the Construction of National Identity? 
According to Mumford and Selck (2010: 295), language has increasingly come to be 
considered a useful indicator of a given political context – and that besides actors’ behaviour, 
their words reveal a lot about them. Finlayson and Martin (2008: 445) argue that systematic 
investigation of speech in British politics can shed light on political institutions, ideologies 
and strategies. They contend that a major political speech is ‘the proverbial grain of sand 
through which, if we are prepared to look closely and for a while, we may glimpse some of 
the turns taken by a political universe’.  
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Here we will start by looking specifically at the US context and the role of the US 
presidency, before moving on to other examples of political elites and their role in shaping 
national identity. Lowndes (2013: 469) contends that beyond the official powers and duties 
set out in the Constitution, the US presidency is an institution that is meant to embody the 
American people. Presidents serve as identificatory figures, representing what their 
supporters hold sacred about the nation. A similar argument is made by Beasley (2004), who 
studies the role of the president in shaping US national identity. As one of the most diverse 
countries in the world, the job of uniting such a range of places and people is difficult. 
Beasley (2004) argues that as the only national leader – the head of state and the head of 
government – it often falls to the president to attempt to define what is meant by the term 
‘American’.  
 
Beasley’s methodology involves studying presidential inaugural addresses and State of the 
Union addresses in order to identify how presidents have defined the term ‘American’. She 
argues that from the time of Grover Cleveland in 1885 to George W. Bush in 2002, there 
has been much continuity in the way presidents have constructed national identity in these 
addresses. This is accomplished by associating identity with civil religious themes, which has 
enabled presidents to sometimes exclude certain people – such as immigrants and women – 
from the national community and national identity because they do not possess the ‘proper’ 
American ideals (Beasley, 2004). 
 
Continuing to draw on the US context, Stuckey and Hoffman (2006) expand on how the 
rhetoric of the US president helps frame national identity. Although apparently innocuous, 
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and appearing in both ceremonial and policy addresses, they find that ‘presidential language 
concerning national identity helps shape the context, and thus sets the terms for more 
substantive, issue-laden debates’ (Stuckey and Hoffman, 2006: 69). They study the capacity 
of presidents to define national identity by comparing the public rhetoric of William Taft 
and Richard Nixon. They find that both Republicans, although in office in very different 
socio-political contexts, display continuity in their strategies for defining national identity – 
which is centred around the fundamental importance of liberty and the belief that every 
citizen occupies a natural place in the hierarchy of society. In concurrence with the argument 
put forward by Beasley (2004), they conclude by suggesting that the president’s ability to 
shape national debate and identity is helped by the broad audience afforded to the president. 
 
Meanwhile, van Noije and Hijmans (2005) provide an example of the role of the French 
president in shaping national identity. They conduct a discourse analysis of thirty-six New 
Year’s speeches delivered by five French presidents to understand how cultural identity was 
dealt with in the context of increased globalisation. In contrast to the continuity of US 
presidents in the studies by Beasley (2004) and Stuckey and Hoffman (2006), they find that 
the attention placed on various aspects of national identity fluctuates with each president, 
even if nationalist rhetoric appeared to be important for all of them. Additionally, they 
identify three broad framings, which they describe as ‘sense of belonging’, ‘the myth of 





2.2.2 The Importance of Political Speeches 
These examples from the US and France show that scholars who are interested in national 
identity often use political speeches to investigate political elites’ capacity to narrate and 
define national identity. Speeches are also useful to study because political leaders are able to 
set the agenda on their own terms. In a study of American presidential speeches, Andrade 
and Young (1996: 592) argue that speeches ‘provide the president with the best opportunity 
to influence the public because the president maintains complete control of the location, 
subject, and audience’ – echoing the conclusions of Stuckey and Hoffman (2006) above. 
They add that ‘there is reason to believe that measuring speech content directly taps into the 
more general concept of the president’s agenda’. However, speeches cannot guarantee that 
subsequent behaviour or policy will reflect the content; they are indicators. Yet, as Mumford 
and Selck (2010) note, the fact that speeches may not reflect subsequent policy choices or 
behaviours does not present a methodological problem because the intent of this research is 
to study the discourse itself.  
 
It is important to note that it cannot be assumed that the ‘animator’, the politician who 
delivers the speech, is also the person who actually wrote (Wodak et al., 2009, citing 
Goffman, 1981). In fact, it is highly unlikely given the workload of politicians – especially 
holders of the highest offices.3 However, this is not important because the person who 
delivers the speech is always solely responsible for its content. In this way, politicians are the 
                                                 
3 There are some exceptions to this. For instance, Tony Blair spent a lot of time writing and re-
writing speeches a number of his own speeches (see Campbell, 2011) 
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‘principals’ of their statements (Goffman, 1981). Additionally, it is the role of political 
speechwriters to develop a rhetoric that reinforces the myths that assist in creating a 
politician’s image; speechwriters only choose words that fit the politician’s image. Rhetoric 
can only communicate effectively when it complies with the myths of a unique political 
image that is ‘owned’ by the politicians (Chartris-Black, 2005). The role of speechwriters is 
therefore to support the marketing of a ‘brand’ that is created by the individual politician and 
so it is the politician who must be considered the author of his or her speeches (Chartris-
Black, 2005). This means that whether the speech was written by a politician or not is largely 
irrelevant; what is crucial is that politicians own and are responsible for the words they say.  
 
While their principal job would appear to be introducing (or opposing) a legislative agenda, 
politicians spend much of their time speaking.4 This can include press conferences, prime 
ministers questions, TV and radio interviews, official statements, announcements, and 
parliamentary debate. The extent of speech-giving would seem to make a good case for 
making their investigation central to political studies. Although political science research 
often uses such debates and speeches as a source, there is little systematic research into the 
place or the function of speeches as such within British political life (Finlayson and Martin, 
2008). Despite their ubiquity in politics, Finlayson and Martin (2008) bemoan that there is 
                                                 
4 For example, Gordon Brown became prime minister on 27th June, 2007. By the end of that year he 
‘had delivered 22 set-piece speeches, given 19 formal statements to the press, and participated in 20 
press conferences. This amounts to 71 speech occasions not including media interviews, 
parliamentary speeches or statements, speeches made in his capacity as leader of the Labour Party 
and unrecorded speeches – such as those given to the PLP or within closed government meetings’ 
(Finlayson and Martin, 2008: 445). 
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still not a systematic approach within political studies that seeks to relate the general 
phenomenon of the political speech to political activity and institutions more broadly. This is 
surprising when compared with the US context – which, as has been outlined, is well 
established and highly developed, particularly when it comes to what Tulis (1987) called the 
‘rhetorical presidency’.  
 
Further examples of the breadth of speech analysis in the US context include the Christian 
epic narratives in Martin Luther King’s I’ve Been to the Mountaintop (Keeley, 2008), and the 
choice of words in the 2008 Democratic and Republican Presidential Primary compared to 
famous political figures such as Martin Luther King, Reagan and JFK (Sacerdote and Zidar 
(2008). Finlayson and Martin (2008) note that in the UK the general nature and function of 
politicians’ speech activity remains obscure, and is worth exploring in more detail. This gap 
in the literature is one that this thesis seeks to contribute to through its focus solely on prime 
ministers’ speeches, and by comparing discourses of four consecutive prime ministers. 
 
Having focused on other contexts, particularly the role of the US presidency, it is worth 
turning to the British context. Despite the relative lack of analysis of speeches, there are still 
some important examples that are illuminating. If we look at some of the most memorable 
and historic speeches in British politics given by members of the political elites, we can start 
see how these have become woven into narratives about British identity. Shadow Defence 
Secretary Enoch Powell’s infamous Rivers of Blood speech, for example, was delivered in 1968 
– continues to shape discussions around immigration in the UK nearly half a century later. 
Perhaps the most famous line from Powell’s speech is ‘Like the Roman, I seem to see the 
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River Tiber foaming with much blood’ (Hillman, 2008: 83). In his analysis of the speeches of 
leaders such as Hitler, Bismark, and Mao, Connor (1994) found a uniformity of expression in 
a number of these speeches – with particular emphasis on familial links such as ancestral, 
fraternal, sororal, maternal, paternal, and blood. Connor argues that these speeches were able 
to mobilise masses because of their appeals to primordial attachments, which are 
underestimated and indicate a lot about the essence and potentials of ethno-nationalism. 
 
Winston Churchill delivered some of the most famous speeches in British history – 
including ‘We Shall Fight on the Beaches’, ‘This was their finest hour’, and ‘Never was so much owed by 
so many to so few’. These speeches have become in some ways synonymous with Britishness 
and the British bulldog spirit.5 Despite not being well received at the time, these speeches 
now provide an example of what Anderson (1983: 202) terms the ‘reassurance of fratricide’, 
as noted in the previous section of this chapter, in which the act of forgetting is a matter of 
the national will – a ritualised performance of the will to forget. Another speech by a British 
prime minister at a moment of crisis that touched the national psyche was Tony Blair’s 
speech after the death of Princess Diana. Gallagher (2013) described Blair’s ‘People’s 
Princess’ moment as one of his most famous and statesman-like speeches, and linked this to 
the capacity of his government to embody Britain. An alternative – and perhaps more 
compelling – explanation is that it was about Blair as a person and an attempt to personally 
embody Britain’s feeling at the time. It is important to consider here the argument made by 
                                                 
5 Churchill’s speeches were not necessarily well received at the time. Some listeners thought he was 
drunk, and some found his speeches depressing (Toye, 2013). They have only in retrospect come to 
be seen as epitomising the British spirit. 
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Fairclough (2000: 96): ‘A rhetorical style is not an invariable way of using language; it is 
rather a mixture of different ways of using language, a distinctive repertoire. Tony Blair does 
not always speak in the same way, but he has a distinctive repertoire of ways of speaking 
which he moves between in a recognisable way’. 
 
Yet these examples of speeches by Enoch Powell, Winston Churchill, and Tony Blair, and 
the limited analysis accompanying them, are the exceptions not the rule – which supports the 
argument by Finlayson and Martin (2008) that there is still limited systematic research into 
the role of speeches in British politics. This research seeks to help contribute to this by 
providing a detailed analysis of British prime ministers’ speeches in relation Africa and their 
role in the construction of British national identity. Having looked at the role of political 
elites’ speeches in shaping national identity (with specific reference to the British context), it 
is useful to understand whether and why the audience of these speeches matters, and how 
this shapes discourse. 
 
2.2.3 Does Audience Matter? 
In many societies, speaking and speech-giving is not a right of those in power but rather it is 
a duty. Clastres (1990: 153) gives the example of Native Americans to make this point: 
 
Indian societies, do not recognise the chief’s right to speak because he is the chief, they require 
that the man destined to be chief prove his command over words. Speech is an imperative 
obligation for the chief. The tribe demands to hear him: a silent chief is no longer a chief. […] 
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The whole political philosophy of primitive society can be glimpsed in the obligation of the 
chief to be a man of speech.  
 
In modern democratic countries across the world, the legitimacy of office is still derived in 
part from the correct execution of institutionalised speech-moments similar to the example 
provided by Clastres. Such speech-rituals ‘assign roles to participants, test or demonstrate the 
competence or authority of political actors and may serve to affirm party, ideological or 
[most importantly for this research] national identifications’ (Finlayson, 2015: 96). Therefore, 
in analysing speeches over such a broad period, as this thesis does, it is important to have a 
range of speeches to draw on from each speaker. 
 
In the US, such speech events are easy to identify (Campbell and Jamieson, 2008). The most 
prominent are the presidential inauguration address and the State of the Union address, but 
there are also many others – such as speeches made to a presidential nominating convention 
and even concession speeches. Such institutionalised speech-moments are perhaps more 
difficult to identify in the UK – but a number of such events do also structure the political 
calendar. The monarch, for example, delivers a Queen’s Speech6 at the official opening of 
Parliament, as well as the Queen’s Christmas Message.7 For the prime minister, this includes 
a wide range of addresses, such as prime ministers questions, their annual speech to party 
conference, the Lord Mayor’s Banquet, and acceptance and concession speeches. All of 
                                                 
6 the Queen’s speech is written by the government, and is also known as the ‘Speech from the 
Throne’ 
7 officially referred to as ‘Her Majesty’s Most Gracious Speech’ 
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these events are opportunities to assess arguments and policies but also to test the general 
ability, skill, and character of the prime minister (Finlayson, 2015).  
 
Yet for all these institutionalised speech-moments, Finlayson (2015) argues that the role of 
the audience is strangely absent in democratic theory. This assertion by Finlayson echoes one 
made by Myers (1999: 55) 16 years earlier: ‘political leadership typically entails the need to 
address composite, or heterogeneous, audiences, a situation to which rhetorical theorists 
have devoted little systematic attention’. Myers (1999: 68) notes that as politicians in 
democratic systems succeed, they have to deal with larger, more diverse, and more 
sophisticated constituencies. Myers’ own work on the role of the audience is worth exploring 
– not least because of his focus on Macmillan’s Wind of Change speech, which he cites as an 
important instance of the rhetoric of diplomacy. Myers (2000) argues that Macmillan’s 
argumentative and discursive techniques are not additions of finery designed for aesthetic 
purposes, but that they are essential to the persuasion of the people that comprise his 
heterogeneous audience. In this example, Myers identifies four distinct groups in 
Macmillan’s audience.  
 
The first group consists of those who had backed Britain’s old policy of support for white 
domination in Africa, and thus opposed Macmillan’s core argument. This included the 
physically present audience: members of South Africa’s Nationalist Party, including the 
prime minister and cabinet, as well as the right wing of the British Conservative Party. The 
second group comprises those who had opposed Britain’s support for white domination, 
and so would likely be sympathetic to Macmillan’s message. This group included black 
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political leaders of the newly independent countries in Africa, such the ANC. The third 
group was the international audience – in particular, the US, who had been critical, if 
accepting, of Britain’s imperial presence in Africa. The final distinct group in the audience as 
identified by Myers was the remainder the British Conservative Party – that is, the moderates 
– along with corresponding sections of British public opinion. This group had backed 
Macmillan shared his opinion of the need for change (Myers: 2000). Although Macmillan got 
support for the policy within the Conservative Party and more broadly from the British 
public, he did not succeed in keeping South Africa in the Commonwealth. Myers (2000) 
concludes by arguing that Macmillan’s Wind of Change speech played a crucial role in shifting 
the Commonwealth’s role to one where the fight between communism and capitalism would 
become as significant as the loyalty of Commonwealth countries to Britain and its 
institutions. 
 
More recently, the internet and social media have heralded a radical transformation for 
political audiences. Virtually all political speeches by senior politicians such as the prime 
minister now address heterogeneous audiences. Platforms such as Facebook, Instagram, 
YouTube, Twitter, Snapchat and TikToc now offer journalists and ordinary citizens the 
opportunity to broadcast such events around the globe in real time. Previously, only major 
addresses would have been televised. This means that speeches delivered in international 
contexts are likely to be heard by domestic audiences too. Perhaps this transformation 
means that a consideration of the distinct audiences is of less relevance that it was 




This literature review has so far argued that national identity is discursively constructed. It 
has also highlighted some of the elements scholars of nationhood have identified as being 
important to the construction of national identity, such as language, history, and 
international relations. Additionally, it has shown how British political elites’ speeches are 
central to this discursive construction, but little attention has so far been given to an analysis 
of British politics so far. This section also looked at how the audience can influence the 
discourses politicians use. In the next section, drawing on the disciplines of international 
development, international relations and political science, this thesis will explore why Africa 
is useful in understanding national identity construction by political elites, moving beyond 
Myers’ analysis of Harold Macmillan’s Wind of Change speech. 
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2.3 Why Focus on the Role of Africa in National Identity Construction? 
There are competing arguments in the UK-Africa literature about the rationale for Britain’s 
continued engagement with Africa after the Cold War. These include securitisation 
(Porteous, 2005; Abrahamsen, 2005); projecting ideas about the moral nature of Britain 
(Gallagher, 2013; Chandler, 2012; Harrison, 2013) and post-empire damage limitation 
(Mayall, 1986; Williams, 2004). In broad terms these different views can be grouped into two 
areas that have characterised Britain’s relationship with Africa. The first is concerned with 
using Africa to project British morality. In contrast, the second discourse views Africa as an 
arena in which Britain can maintain or even expand its influence – even as its Empire 
crumbled. This manifests itself in a variety of ways, from allowing Britain to continue to play 
its old role of Pax Britannica (albeit on a smaller scale), to the trading opportunities offered by 
Britain’s unique relationship with many of its former colonies in Africa.  
 
During the Cold War (1947-1991), ‘first world’ countries adopted a policy of containment 
against the communist expansion of the ‘second world’. Their doing so provided the most 
compelling explanation for their interactions with the non-aligned ‘third world’8  
(Ohaegbulam, 1992; Schmidt, 2013). In the post-Cold War era, however, this ceased to 
explain the rationale for external engagement with Africa. This section begins with some 
background and context to UK-Africa narratives, as these are crucial in understanding how 
these narratives emerged, before exploring the narratives in more detail. 
                                                 
8 a term that has subsequently become somewhat synonymous with Africa (see Odey, 2013) 
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2.3.1 Historical Context 
Although Britain first established the Colonial Office as a government department in 1768, it 
was not until over a century later that Africa began to play a central role in the history, 
foreign policy, self-image and public imagination of the UK. This was particularly marked 
following the 1884 Berlin Conference and subsequent ‘Scramble for Africa’. In the 1870s, 
only 10% of Africa was under direct European control. By 1900 European nations had 
added almost 10 million square miles of Africa (one-fifth of the land area of the globe) to 
their overseas colonial possessions, accounting for 90% of the continent (Appiah and Gates, 
2010). The British Empire alone ruled over 30% of Africa’s population (Adler and Pouwels, 
2012), contributing to its position and identity as the global hegemonic power and Pax 
Britannica.  
 
One of the earliest ways in which Africa entered the popular consciousness and discourses 
of people in Britain was through on the writings and tales of Christian missionaries and 
explorers during the Victorian period. Through these, Africa became woven into narratives 
about British identity and its role in the world. The ‘Scramble for Africa’ was itself justified 
under the guise of halting the slave trade (Pakenham, 1991). Christian missionaries in Africa 
campaigned against the slave trade, and in some cases speeded the involvement of European 
states in halting it. The celebrated Scottish missionary-explorer David Livingstone brought 
much publicity to the cause with his travel journals. Livingstone called for a crusade to 
defeat the slave trade controlled by Arabs in East Africa, saying that it was eating out the 




Britain had previously had some success in halting the slave trade around the shores of 
Africa, such as in Sierra Leone, The Gold Coast and Bight of Biafra (Manning, 1990). 
However, Arab traders from north of the Sahara and on the East Coast still traded, and 
many local chiefs were reluctant to give up the use of slaves. Reports of slaving trips and 
markets were brought back to Europe by explorers such as Livingstone, and abolitionists in 
Britain and Europe called for more to be done.  
 
Paradoxically, abolitionism may have contained the seeds of empire. In Capitalism and Slavery, 
Williams (1994) contends that abolition was not purely altruistic but was as economically 
conditioned as Britain’s later empire building in Africa. Although the idealism that motivated 
abolitionists such as William Wilberforce and Thomas Clarkson is undeniable (Hague, 2008; 
Clarkson, 2010), Williams argues that Britain could afford to legislate against the slave trade 
only after it had helped to provide the surplus capital necessary for industrial ‘take-off’. 
Britain had lost much of its slave-owning territory as a result of the American Revolution, 
and as the leading industrial power in the world, Britain found in abolition a way to work 
against the interests of its rivals who were still heavily involved in colonial slavery and a 
plantation economy (Williams, 1994).  
 
During this period, Africa also came to occupy an important place in the hearts and minds 
of the British public. Within a few months of its publication in 1857, David Livingstone’s 
Missionary Travels sold 70,000 copies – and made him so rich and famous that he ‘had to 
avoid situations where he might be mobbed by admirers’ (Brantlinger, 1985: 176). 
Brantlinger argues that if Livingstone was a national hero towards the end of the 1850s, he 
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was a national saint by the time of his last African expedition in 1872. Even Charles Dickens, 
who usually hated evangelicals, made an exception of Livingstone – calling him one of those 
who ‘carry into desert places the water of life’ (Simpson, 1970: 15).  
 
One event which has now entered the mythology of the era and epitomises the British 
‘discovery’ of Africa was when Henry Morton Stanley embarked on a 700-mile expedition 
through the tropical forests to find Livingstone, and reportedly greeted him with the now 
famous line ‘Dr Livingstone, I presume?’  (Stanley, 1872: 412). Stanley turned his account of 
this expedition into the best-seller How I Found Livingstone. He later followed it with In 
Darkest Africa which sold 150,000, was frequently translated, and was ‘read more universally 
and with deeper interest than any other publication of [1890]’ (Chamberlain, 2013: 28).  
 
Brantlinger contends that such accounts of African exploration exerted an incalculable 
influence on British culture and the course of modern history, and that it is difficult to find a 
clearer example of the Foucauldian concept of discourse as power (Brantlinger, 1990: 180). 
Importantly, the writings of these explorers were presented as nonfictional quest romances 
in which the heroic authors are portrayed as moving from adventure to adventure against a 
dark, infernal backdrop where there are no other characters of equal stature, only bewitched 
or demonic savages (Ross, 2002).  
 
In their writings, Brantlinger argues, explorers broadly portrayed Africans as amusing or 
dangerous obstacles or as objects of curiosity, while missionaries portrayed Africans as weak, 
pitiable, inferior mortals who need to be shown the light. The focus of these stories is not 
 
42 
Africa or Africans but a David Livingstone or a Henry Morton Stanley – Victorian Saint 
George’s battling the armies of the night (Brantlinger, 1985). As such, it is noteworthy that 
their writings about Africa were more accurately about creating an identity for themselves.  
 
Livingstone believed that the African was benighted and that the European was the bearer of 
the light of civilization and true religion. According to Livingstone, Africans were inured to 
bloodshed and murder, and cared for no god except being bewitched, and that without 
commerce, Christianity and civilisation the prospects for the ‘dark regions’ were not bright. 
Jeal (2013: 4) argues that Livingstone, ‘with his missionary aims and his almost messianic 
passion for exporting British values, seemed to his successors to have provided the moral 
basis for massive imperial expansion’. 
 
From these early writings, we can see how the two distinct (but interlinked) narratives we 
have identified began to emerge. The first narrative is rooted in this idea that it was the role 
of European missionaries to bear of the light of civilisation (and Christianity) into the dark 
region of Africa. This is what Rudyard Kipling termed the ‘White Man’s Burden’. The 
second narrative can be traced to the early 19th Century with the idea that British support for 
abolitionism was not purely altruistic but a way to provide Britain with an economic 
advantage against its rivals, who were still heavily involved in colonial slavery and a 
plantation economy. With the collapse of the British Empire, some scholars such as Mayall 
(1986) contend that British involvement in Africa has been an attempt to maintain its 




In addition, Victorian missionary-explorers presented two conflicting portrayals of Africans 
– albeit both in need of ‘civilising’ by Europeans. On the one hand, Africans were portrayed 
as ‘helpless’ and ‘child-like’ – which helped the narrative of Britain as a moral guider; on the 
other they are seen as dangerous, savage and cannibalistic. This latter conception could be 
the basis for a sub-component of the second narrative – that Africa’s underdevelopment is a 
security threat to Britain and Europe. In the early 20th century, this was also reinforced 
through pseudoscience – setting the ‘rational’ Europe against ‘primitive’ Africa. In more 
recent decades, this debate has become re-ignited by the spread of Islam in Africa based on 
similar crude stereotypes (Keenan, 2009). Here this thesis explores each of these narratives 
in more detail with reference to the contemporary literature and debates, in order to better 
understand the post-Cold War context.  
 
2.3.2 Using Africa to Present Britain as a Moral Authority 
Since the mid-1980s, UK public perceptions of Africa have been shaped heavily by media 
coverage and celebrity philanthropy. The charity supergroup Band Aid was formed in 1984 
to raise awareness and funds for the Ethiopian famine following Michael Buerk’s BBC 
broadcast of the ‘biblical famine’ (Eldridge, 1993). Although it was formed from a desire to 
help, Band Aid has been accused of propagating old colonial narratives of Africa as an 
undifferentiated, exotic, perennially static and helpless continent (Grant, 2015), as well as the 
notion of the ‘white saviour’ (Jeffreys and Allatson, 2015). In some ways, these can be seen 
as a continuity of the narratives set out by Livingstone and other missionaries a century 
earlier.   
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Grant (2015) argues that although this movement emanated from benevolent intentions, 
through the choice of the Band Aid song-lyrics, the images displayed, and the comments and 
decisions made regarding the concert events, the movement served to ‘other’ people from 
the Global South. Thus, Band Aid and Live Aid/8 contributed to, and compounded, 
problematic truths which suggest that the Global North is superior to the south. Such truths 
were also evident during the colonial period, and were promoted through exhibitions that 
advocated that people from the north were superior to colonial natives, and that colonialism 
was beneficial to the colonies, i.e., aiding the natives to improve themselves. Consequently, 
Band Aid, Live Aid/8 and colonial exhibitions all proclaimed to aid the people of the Global 
South while advocating problematic truths.  
 
This same theme of generating moral authority through interactions with Africa is argued to 
continue under New Labour. In 1997, Tony Blair turned the Overseas Development 
Administration, a wing of the Foreign and Commonwealth office, into a new Department 
for International Development headed by a Cabinet minister. Its core aim was to fight global 
poverty, marking a turning point for Britain’s aid programme which had hitherto focused on 
economic development (Little and Wickham-Jones, 2000). The aid budget itself was more 
than doubled, which was part of New Labour’s effort to ensure, in the words of Robin 
Cook, that its foreign policy had an ‘ethical dimension’ (Williams, 2002).  In many ways, 
Africa became a testing ground for this ethical foreign policy. In 2004, Blair established the 
Commission for Africa initiative, which served as the blueprint for the G8 Summit in 2005. 
In accordance with the Commission’s recommendations, Blair and Gordon Brown put aid to 
Africa and debt cancellation at the centre of the agenda (Payne, 2006). 
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Gallagher (2009; 2013) puts forward the theory that this focus on Africa was about 
displaying the capacity of the ‘good’ British state. She contends that Britain’s relationship 
with Africa under New Labour represented something new, and that British state actors, in 
attempting to ‘do good’ in Africa, constructed the idea that they were involved in an 
idealised project. This was enabled through the sanitisation of historical engagement, and an 
apparent lack of British interests in Africa.  
 
According to Gallagher (2013) this gave British policy in Africa a moral rather than political 
tone, and that narratives of Africa were more accurately the narrative Britain creates for 
itself, about its history, identity and role in the world.  That is, when British politicians 
interact with or talk about Africa, they present their actions and words as beyond their own 
national self-interest, and that they are involved in a ‘noble cause’, transcending politics and 
economic interests. Gallagher’s work has not generated much discussion in the literature9, 
which is noteworthy because it means her central theses have not been revisited in a major 
way.  
 
This argument is similar to one made by Harrison (2013), who argues that campaigning 
around Africa has mainly (although not exclusively) been a ‘conversation’ about the moral 
nature of Britishness. In this sense, Africa campaigns are ‘introverted’: developing imagery 
                                                 
9 Britain and Africa under Blair has been cited 18 times on Google Scholar. All of these references are 
only in passing, and none of them address the substantive points in Gallagher’s arguments. For 
example, Graham Harrison’s The African Presence: Representations of Africa in the Construction of Britishness 
(2013) only mentions it in a sentence on page 51. Chafer and Cumming (2013) mention the book in 
passing in a footnote on page 167. 
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and discourse about Africa addressed to Britons in which they tend to take centre-stage. This 
echoes the travel journals of the Victorian missionary-explorers such as Stanley and 
Livingstone who made themselves the protagonists of their writings about Africa. The 
notion that Britain is engaged in a ‘moral crusade’ in Africa derives from widespread and 
historically deep-rooted conception of the continent as needy and helpless.  
 
British identity in this context is linked to taking up the cause of the ignored African poor in 
an attempt to prompt better governance from African leaders, who are usually described in 
either starkly ‘good’ or (more often) ‘bad’ terms (Gallagher, 2009). As such, Gallagher argues 
that discourses about Africa have contributed to the construction of British identity. 
Harrison argues the connection between Africa campaigning and British virtue is key here. 
Representations of Africa speak to a British national identity that is ordinal: quite simply that 
Britain does things about/to Africa (Harrison, 2013: 2).   
 
According to Gallagher (2009: 2), the idea of Britain ‘doing good’ in Africa was established 
under New Labour. In a speech in Addis Ababa in 2004, Blair said:  
 
In all the things that I deal with in politics, and the things that make people cynical and 
disengaged from the political process, when I come and see what is happening here [in 
Ethiopia] and see what could happen, I know that however difficult politics is, there is 




Gallagher (2013) goes on to argue that British engagement with Africa is aimed at projecting 
a British self-image and identity of competence and potency, which is more difficult to 
achieve in the complexity of domestic policies or other more difficult foreign policy 
contexts. This view of Africa as a blank arena in which Britain can project its own vision of 
its values and ideas is what makes Africa unique to study in relation to British national 
identity. Therefore, there is a compelling case to be made that Britain’s policy and discourses 
about Africa reveal far more about a British desire to project a sense of moral authority than 
about the developmental needs of Africa. 
 
Despite this, Gallagher herself concedes there were occasions on which British interests 
were put before African welfare. These include the sale of military traffic systems to 
Tanzania, implicit backing for Ethiopian incursions into Somalia, and failure act on 
condemnation of human rights abuses in the DRC, Sudan and Zimbabwe with military 
action (Gallagher, 2013: 145). Taylor and Williams (2004) also note the selectivity of 
Labour’s criticism regarding fraudulent elections – such as focusing on Zimbabwe whilst 
ignoring those in Zambia and Madagascar. In the wake of the ‘War on Terror’, New Labour 
was also accused of ignoring the poor human rights record of Kenyan President Daniel arap 
Moi in favour renewing a military cooperation agreement that allowed British troops to use 
bases in Kenya. Gallagher concedes these tarnish the ideal of an ethical policy in Africa, but 
she argues that they are exceptions rather than a convincing argument that Britain’s post-
Cold War Africa policy can be explained through a more conventional framework 




A number of scholars concur with Gallagher’s assertion that New Labour’s approach to 
Africa represented something new. Ero (2001), for example, argues the number of Africa-
related initiatives that emerged when New Labour came to power suggest a different 
approach compared to the ad hoc methods of the past. Quoting Prospect magazine’s Fred 
Halliday, she argues that Labour’s ‘long absence from office, and the desire to strike a new 
note in foreign and domestic policy, account for the way Labour has presented itself in the 
international arena’. She contends this was also from a desire to break from the Major 
administration and what Labour saw as Britain’s increasing marginalisation within the 
international community.  
 
Additionally, Mumford and Selck (2010) look at foreign policy speeches and conclude that 
New Labour under Blair adopted a more moral rhetoric than previous Conservative 
governments, and that this shift ‘was not eminent until 2002’ suggesting that it was a result 
of the attacks on September 11th 2001. However, they admit that ‘one limitation of their 
study is its sole focus on Thatcher’s rhetoric to indicate the Conservative foreign policy 
agenda. Ignoring John Major’s time in government leaves a seven-year gap’ (Mumford and 
Selck, 2010: 309). They justify this by asserting that Thatcher was the more important agenda 
setter for the Conservatives. This decision to ignore Major is evident more broadly in the 
UK-Africa literature; there is an emphasis on Blair and Cameron, in contrast to little analysis 
of Major and Brown because of their perceived insignificance. One of the main reasons for 
choosing these four consecutive prime ministers was to address this imbalance in the current 
literature and assess claims of continuity and discontinuity in UK-Africa narratives despite 
the lack of research from 1990-1997 and from 2007-2010.  
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Despite these arguments by Mumford and Selck (2010), Gallagher (2009; 2013), and Ero 
(2001), the ‘newness’ of the New Labour agenda is questionable. It has become popular to 
view 1997 and Blair’s landslide as a landmark moment and paradigm shift. Douglas Hurd, 
for example, quoted in Abrahamsen and Williams (2001) was annoyed by pretence that New 
Labour’s shift of two or three degrees was a shift of 180 in foreign policy thinking – and that 
somehow all their predecessors were ‘immoral rogues’. Abrahamsen and Williams (2001) 
argue that New Labour was instead successful at branding itself as ethical and caring, and that 
there was relatively little new about New Labour’s policy towards sub-Saharan Africa. 
Moreover, they argue that most Western countries started adopting democracy and human 
rights into foreign policy rhetoric – so New Labour were not alone on this. Taylor (2010: 35) 
agrees that New Labour’s Africa policies largely continued on the same path as previous 
governments, preserving a ‘calculating eye to the national interest and Britain’s international 
reputation’ (Abrahamsen and Williams, 2001: 249). 
 
It is also noteworthy that seeking a more engaged role in the world on issues of poverty and 
development was not new to the UK under New Labour. The Department for International 
Development – for example - existed previously, and so its re-establishment in 1997 does 
not necessarily represent a ground-breaking change. Likewise, the 1997 White Paper was not 
the first UK White Paper on international development – the first was published over two 
decades before this (Hewitt and Killick, 1998).  The 1997 Australian Aid review shows how 
New Labour was not unique in this regard either (Mullen, 1999)  These detract from the 
argument that New Labour’s focus on ethical foreign policy represented something ‘new’. 
An analysis of political elites’ speeches before and after New Labour can help illuminate to 
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what extent the temporal dimension of UK-Africa relations was punctuated by 
discontinuities. 
 
So far, this section has presented the argument that Africa’s centrality in British foreign 
policy under New Labour represented a new moral cause for Britain more than it signified a 
commitment to the development needs of Africa (Gallagher, 2009; 2013; Harrison, 2013). It 
has also detailed nuances to this argument, such as that New Labour’s focus on Africa was 
not new, but simply reflected a change in presentation of Britain’s focus on Africa 
(Abrahamsen and Williams, 2001). This section of the literature review moves on to provide 
more detailed explanations for how and why Africa specifically occupies such a unique place 
in British consciousness and foreign policy, and why it is useful to study to understand the 
construction of British national identity.  
 
As discussed previously, one of Gallagher’s central arguments is that Africa provides Britain 
with the opportunity to construct a self-image of competency because it transcends the 
complexity of domestic politics. Gallagher (2013: 1) goes on to argue that for realists, Africa 
represents a place of anarchy and free-flowing aggression, while for liberal-utopians, it is 
represents harmony and idealism. In both cases, Africa symbolises an arena where ‘normal’ 
politics can be transcended and where actors coalesce in doing abstract ‘good’, free of more 
contentious issues. As a blank space where ‘goodness’ can be practised, Africa is ideal.  
 
In a 2004 BBC article, Taylor makes a similar argument, putting it succinctly: ‘Africa is ripe 
for gesture politics because it’s low cost financially and low cost politically. It makes good 
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headlines, shows you care and plugs into New Labour imagery. But if nothing is achieved, 
then no-one expected much and they can blame others’ (Taylor, quoted in Geoghegan, 
2004). Chandler (2003) concurs, saying that one important factor behind major western 
powers making foreign policy concerns central to defining their administrations is the 
difficulty of generating moral authority through domestic politics. He goes on to argue that 
foreign policy has become an important way for cohering governments and institutions, 
often appearing to be without any clear consensus-building political agenda of their own. 
Chandler claims that attempts to resolve questions of legitimacy through ethical policy led 
governments and institutions to focus on the previously peripheral concerns regarding 
human rights.  
 
However, Williams (2002) notes that New Labour stopped using Cook’s notion of an ‘ethical 
dimension’ to present its foreign policy to the public. He argues that while explicit ethical 
standards provide important benchmarks for activists and public intellectuals, they can also 
serve to highlight the failures of an administration at the expense of more positive 
developments. So discarding the language of an ‘ethical dimension’ may actually encourage a 
more sophisticated public debate that moves beyond the facile and misleading belief that 
foreign policies are either ‘ethical’ or ‘unethical’.  
 
Meanwhile, Cornwall and Nyamu-Musembi (2005) present an alternative – and perhaps 
more compelling – explanation to Chandler about why governments engaged with the 
concerns of human rights advocacy groups. They note that New Labour’s 1997 and 2001 
White Papers do not mention rights, and that there had been a history of hostility to the 
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language of rights, so question why – in 2005 – there was less hostility (even enthusiasm) for 
a rights-based approach. They contend that with the end of the Cold War, there was a more 
comprehensive view of rights encompassing all rights (civil, political, economic, social and 
cultural), and from there it was not a big jump to concerns such as food security as rights. 
They also cite the impact of NGO activism, who spearheaded rights at the World Summit 
for Social Development in Copenhagen in 1995. Cornwall and Nyamu-Musembi contend 
that rights can be seen as a means through which openly intrusive conditionalities that no 
longer fit the rhetoric of partnership could be brought in. That is, rights were a way of 
reframing participation. This challenges the idea that Africa was empty realm used by New 
Labour project for gesture politics, and suggests that claims of discontinuities in UK-Africa 
relations are perhaps exaggerated.   
 
Thus, though compelling as a concept, deriving moral authority through international 
relationships (and particularly though an idealised Africa) has some limitations in that the 
argument largely considers the domestic perspective. The idea that Africa is a place that is 
distant from the messy, banal realities of domestic politics that can be used to construct 
fantasies, does not take into account Britain’s international role. In this capacity, where 
narratives more open to criticism because they are not so distant, it is hard to sanitise 
historical engagement or simplify complex arguments for domestic consumption.   
 
If political elites create different versions of Africa in different spheres, it is central in 
understanding how Africa is used to create narratives about Britain and its place in the 
world. For example, we may find one simplified, crude construction for a domestic audience 
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– sanitised of historical engagement. We might find that when political elites talk on the 
international stage, there is another more nuanced construction for audiences that are more 
familiar with the complexities of the continent and aware of British historical involvement in 
Africa. Of course, it is not possible to entirely separate out audiences; modern media has 
meant that speeches delivered in international contexts are likely to be heard by domestic 
audiences too.  
 
However, the idea that this was simply a New Labour project is questionable, and is one of 
the points this thesis will seek to clarify by looking at longer-term trends in the post-Cold 
War period. In 2005, Cameron claimed that he was the ‘heir to Blair’ (Wintour, 2011). Soon 
after, he began adopting some of Blair’s mannerisms, phrases and ideas, including – perhaps 
– the concept of using Africa to shape the UK’s national identity with an emphasis on 
British morality. Cameron made two visits to Africa as leader of the opposition. Beswick 
(2019) argues that in doing so, Cameron sought to ‘demonstrate his credentials as a potential 
international statesman’ and ‘position engagement with Africa as part of Conservative Party 
modernisation’. It also represented his commitment to modernisation and to detoxify the 
image of the Conservatives as the ‘nasty party’ (Heppell and Lightfoot, 2012: 133).  
 
Throughout this section, we have explored the argument that Africa’s centrality in British 
politicians’ discourses and foreign policy under New Labour was essentially about projecting 
a moral identity of Britain instead of a commitment to the needs and priorities of Africa 
(Gallagher, 2009; 2013; Harrison, 2013). It has also highlighted arguments that call into 
question the newness of New Labour’s focus on Africa. These competing arguments will be 
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tested through the analysis of prime ministers’ speeches. The next section of the literature 
review moves on to explore a competing argument; that Britain’s involvement in Africa can 




2.3.3 Using Africa to Display British Power and Influence 
A contrasting argument is that Britain’s post-Cold War engagement with Africa can be more 
compellingly explained through its desire to project power and influence in the world, 
manifesting itself in a variety of different ways – from allowing Britain to continue to play its 
old role of Pax Britannica (albeit on a smaller scale), to the trading opportunities offered by 
Britain’s unique relationship with former in Africa. With the collapse of the British Empire, 
some authors in the literature contend that British involvement in Africa has been an 
attempt to maintain its influence in the world. In the two decades following the Second 
World War, Britain granted independence to most of its colonies. This process largely began 
under Attlee, but was resisted by his successors Churchill and Eden, and then greatly 
accelerated under Macmillan following his landmark Wind of Change speech (Hyam, 2007). 
Dean Acheson, who had been the US Secretary of State under President Truman, noted 
‘Great Britain [had] lost an empire and not found a role yet’ (Acheson, 1963: 163). 
 
Williams (2004) argues that that ever since Britain’s retreat from colonialism in Africa, the 
primary concern of successive governments towards the continent has been aptly 
summarised by James Mayall (1986) as one of ‘damage limitation’. Mayall argued that 
Britain’s Africa policy revolved around the need to turn its imperial legacies ‘from liabilities 
into assets [which required the creation of] a network of low key, but still special, 
relationships between Britain and her former colonies’ (Mayall, 1986: 54). Williams (2004) 
contends that successive British governments have achieved this through three main 
mechanisms: the organisation and management of the international economy; bilateral 
relations – primarily economic in character; and the political organisation of international 
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society. However, Taylor (2010) claims that even under Conservative governments under 
Thatcher and Major, whose members have the most favourable attitude toward the colonial 
endeavour and retain romantic attachments to the Commonwealth, Africa was not a core 
priority. A discourse analysis of speeches delivered by British prime ministers in the post-
Cold War era would help to shed light on whether this is indeed the case, and perhaps also 
the reason for this. 
 
As part of this second argument, there is evidence to support the claim that Britain’s 
relationship with Africa is rooted in concerns about security rather than development or 
British morality. For example, in contrast to the quote from Blair in the previous section 
about noble causes worth fighting for, in his 2001 conference speech, Blair stated:  
 
The state of Africa is a scar on the conscience of the world. But if the world as a 
community focused on it, we could heal it. And if we don't, it will become deeper and 
angrier (Gallagher, 2013: 11). 
 
This metaphor draws on imagery used by the missionary-explorer David Livingstone in the 
mid-nineteenth century – that the Central African slave trade was ‘the open sore of the 
world’ (Provenzano, 2010). Porteous (2005) and Abrahamsen (2004; 2005) argue that 
Britain’s relations with Africa post-9/11 were rooted in security rather than development.  
 
This contradicts the idea that British involvement was of ‘disinterested good’ or even 
enlightened self-interest. Gallagher herself points out that Africa was not a key issue for Blair 
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during his first term. However, Africa was on the agenda by the end of 2001. She argues that 
for Blair, the war on terror and development in Africa were elements of the same 
programme. By contrast, Porteous (2005) contends that at the end of the Cold War, the 
West developed new approaches to Africa. Narrow strategic interests were put to the side, 
and fixed development goals were set, such as poverty reduction and debt relief. Talk of 
accountability and reform of international governance to reduce marginalisation of poor 
countries. Porteous argues that New Labour played an active role in steering this approach, 
but that the events of 9/11 intruded on this redefinition, and security and ideology crowded 
back; Africa with its large Muslim population was seen as region in need of attention in the 
War on Terror.  
 
Abrahamsen (2004; 2005) concurs. She argues that New Labour’s increasing attention to 
Africa is part of ongoing securitisation of the continent in the context of the War on Terror. 
That is, Africa moved from a category of development/humanitarianism to one of potential 
risk, threat and danger. Africa was more frequently drawn into ‘security’ debates where 
aspects of Africa’s underdevelopment was regarded as representing a threat to the West, 
possibly facilitating terrorism. This presents a challenge to Gallagher’s argument that Africa 
represents an area where British policies are motivated by selfless concern for Africa and 
remains unclouded by the complexity and ambiguity normally associated with more political 
relationships.  
 
This concern about security has led to visible displays of hard power by Britain in Africa, 
most notably in Sierra Leone in 2000. British troops were deployed in Operation Palliser, 
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originally to evacuate foreign nationals. Before deployment, the United Nations Mission in 
Sierra Leone had been on the verge of collapse, however the operation exceeded its original 
mandate and took full military action to defeat rebels and restore order. The British were the 
catalyst for the ceasefire that ended the civil war. Tony Blair was regarded as a hero by many 
in Sierra Leone. Marr (2008: 551) argues that the success of ground attacks, real and 
threatened, over air strikes alone was influential on how Blair planned the Iraq War, and that 
the success of the first three wars Blair fought ‘played to his sense of himself as a moral war 
leader’. Whilst this is intimately linked to the first narrative about projecting British morality 
in the world, it is also fundamentally about British influence and power – and Britain’s ability 
to act as a global power policing the world. This narrative can also be seen in Blair’s speech 
on Rwanda. He portrayed a new world order as one where the United Kingdom was always 
ready to defend human rights and democracy in Africa. ‘If Rwanda happened again today as 
it did in 1993, when a million people were slaughtered in cold blood, we would have a moral 
duty to act there also.’ 
 
This view is echoed by Reid (2014), who looks at international engagement with Africa from 
the First World War and the height of colonial rule through to the present day. Reid argues 
that there have been significant changes in the relationship between Britain and Africa 
throughout this period – from colonialism to decolonisation, to the emergence of African 
nation states, the Cold War, through to current humanitarianism. However, Reid contends 
that despite this, there has also been much continuity in external policy and perception of 
Africa. In particular, Africa is valued for the economic opportunity it offers as a place of 
markets, materials and people, and is simultaneously seen as a military and political threat, 
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whose inherent volatility makes intervention both desirable and inevitable. Thus, Reid argues 
that whilst the context has changed significantly, engagement with Africa is still 
fundamentally economic and military in nature. Reid argues that British concern for Africa’s 
development began comparatively recently, and that even this is rooted in the paternalistic 
altruism of the 19th century (as discussed earlier in this chapter in relation to abolitionists and 
missionaries). 
 
Another way in which Britain has looked to maintain influence in Africa is through trade. 
Mawdsley (2015) argues that under the Cameron coalition government, the economic 
growth agenda returned to the centre of the Department for International Development’s 
(DFID) mandate. An increased focus on the private sector could be seen as a reaction to an 
increasingly hostile domestic context regarding foreign aid and internationalism more 
broadly after the Global Financial Crisis of 2007/2008. This increased emphasis on trade 
perhaps opens up a new more nuanced narrative about the role of Africa in the world, one 
more free from the paternalism often associated with aid and development. An interesting 
area for further exploration, therefore, would be to see if this is reflected and correlates with 
Conservative administrations (whose natural emphasis is on trade) compared to Labour 
administrations.  
 
In recent decades, China’s growing presence in Africa has introduced a new dynamic in 
Africa’s relations with external actors. Motivated by the prospect of resources and new 
markets, China has begun challenging US and European dominance in Africa. African 
governments have responded eagerly to this new source of investment and aid, as well as to 
 
60 
China’s readiness to overlook conditionalities that are usually placed on aid by countries such 
as Britain (Alden, 2006). The US and Europe claim that China’s model of resource and 
infrastructure-focused assistance is undermining reforms by entrenching corrupt regimes 
(Kotsopoulos, 2014). It is for this reason that Britain may be seeking to reinforce its 
influence in the region – akin to a modern Marshall plan that seeks to bring African 







This literature review has focused on three areas of literature that are central to this thesis. 
Firstly, it argues that nations can be thought of as ‘imagined political communities’. The 
concept of the nation is conveyed and communicated through discourse, and there is no 
single national identity – instead, there are competing national identities constructed 
according to context. Secondly, political leaders, such as British prime ministers, are able to 
propagate specific conceptions of national identity because of the wide audience afforded to 
them. Political speeches are of particular importance in doing this, and there is a lack of 
analysis regarding the role of speeches in British politics. Finally, the competing arguments 
for Britain’s post-Cold War engagement with Africa are best summed up as two strands 
exemplified by Reid (2014) and Harrison (2013). Reid argues that Africa has long been seen 
in terms of economic opportunity, and although immediate contexts have changed over 
time, international engagement with Africa remains essentially economic and military. By 
contrast, Harrison (2013) argues that British campaigning around Africa has mainly been a 
‘conversation’ about the moral nature of Britishness.  
 
Africa occupies a unique position in the consciousness that makes it useful for studying 
British national identity. On the one hand it may be seen as a place for gesture politics 
because ‘it’s low cost financially and low cost politically. It makes good headlines, shows you 
care’ (Taylor, quoted in Geoghegan, 2004). On the other, it is a continent that offers 
economic opportunities whilst also being a security threat whose instability makes 
intervention both desirable and inevitable. 
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This research makes contributions to the second and third of these areas of literature 
explored in this chapter – relating to the role and study of British political speeches and to 
the place of Africa in post-Cold War British consciousness and foreign policy. It does so by 
providing a systematic study of speeches as a means of exploring British national identity, 
and by assessing continuities and discontinuities in discourses in British prime ministers’ 
speeches relating to Africa. This literature review has important implications for the research 
methodology and methods, which are explored in the next chapter. As it argues that national 
identity is socially constructed through discourse, it follows that a discourse analysis is an 
appropriate method to examine this. Additionally, this chapter has found that political 
speeches are often the starting point for studies of national identity, and these will form the 





Having critically reviewed the existing literature, this chapter focuses on methodology. It 
begins by looking at the research epistemology and ontology, and then addresses the 
research approach, strategy, and design – including data collection and analysis methods. It 
also covers research ethics, positionality, and limitations of this research, and concludes with 
the analytical framework used in this research. As this chapter deals with delineating an 
appropriate methodological approach for the research questions, it is appropriate to revisit 
the three research questions central to this thesis. 
 
1. Through their speeches, to what extent and in what ways have British prime 
ministers in the post-Cold War era invoked different discourses about Britain’s 
relationship with Africa? 
2. Are there noticeable patterns in the use of different discourses over this time (for 
example, by political administration, or by social/political/economic circumstance in 
Britain) that may explain the use of such discourses?  
3. What does this tell us about the way discourses about Africa and UK relations with 
Africa are used by prime ministers in the construction of British national identity? 
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3.1 Research Philosophy 
In order to address these research questions, it is important to firstly understand the research 
philosophy. Marsh and Furlong (2010: 184) use the metaphor that research philosophy is ‘a 
skin not a sweater’ – meaning that it ‘cannot be put on and taken off whenever the 
researcher sees fit’. That is, even if the ontological and epistemological positions are 
unacknowledged, they still shape the assumptions of a researcher – including their approach 
to theory and the methods they use (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). This is explored in this 
section through a brief discussion of ontology and epistemology. 
 
Ontology concerns the nature of reality. More precisely, how far ‘reality’ is constructed by 
the researcher as being of an objective nature, or more as the product of individual 
cognition. Epistemology, meanwhile, concerns the nature of knowledge – that is, what can 
be known about the world? Broadly speaking, there are two main research paradigms that 
take different views on ontology and epistemology: positivism (also known as objectivism, 
foundationalism, or realism) and constructivism (also known as interpretivism, anti-
foundationalism, or relativism). The former posits a ‘real’ world, ‘out there’, independent of 
our knowledge of it. The latter sees the world as socially constructed (Marsh and Smith, 
2001: 529-530). 
 
As detailed in Chapter 2, this thesis builds on the idea that nations are ‘imagined 
communities’ constructed through discourse. As such, it sits within this latter constructivist 
paradigm – it embraces a moderate constructivism as its epistemological starting point 
(Reisigl, 2017: 48). The constructivist paradigm grew out of the philosophy of Husserl’s 
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phenomenology, as well as other German philosophers’ study of interpretive understanding 
called hermeneutics (Clegg and Slife, 2009: 26). Constructivism argues that structure and 
actor are mutually constituted. Although material constraints do exist, what is important 
from the constructivist perspective is ‘how an action does or does not reproduce both the 
actor and the structure’ (Hopf, 1998: 172). 
 
Constructivists do not generally begin with a theory (as with postpositivists), instead, they 
‘generate or inductively develop a theory or pattern of meanings’ throughout the research 
process (Creswell, 2003: 9). This means that a constructivist researcher is most likely to rely 
on qualitative data collection methods and analysis or a combination of both qualitative and 
quantitative methods (mixed methods). Quantitative data may be utilised in a way that 
supports or expands upon qualitative data and effectively deepens the description. Thus, 
many researchers now view qualitative and quantitative methods as complementary 
(Creswell, 2003; Thomas, 2003; Hardt-Mautner, 1995). The discussion of qualitative and 
quantitative approaches and their relationship to each other will be expanded on in the next 
section. 
 
3.2 Methodological Approach 
This section focuses on the methodological approach and justifying which methods are most 
appropriate for answering the research questions. This section will look at these at a 
theoretical level. As briefly mentioned in the previous section, although constructivists tend 
to use qualitative research methods, there is a place for quantitative methods too. Indeed, 
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combining these approaches – in what is known as ‘mixed methods’ can provide the most 
useful insight for research such as this. 
 
This section explains why combining qualitative tools with thematic analysis and critical 
discourse analysis is the best approach for understanding the discursive construction of 
British national identity through British prime minister’s speeches about Africa. However, it 
is important to understand the argument made by Fowler and Kress (1979: 197): ‘there is no 
analytic routine through which a text can be run, with a critical description issuing 
automatically at the end’. Fowler stresses that ‘[c]ritical interpretation requires historical 
knowledge and sensitivity, which can be possessed by human beings but not by machines’ 
(Fowler 1991: 68). This means that any tool, or method, which creates distance by lifting 
discourse out of context, to consider them in isolation is the ‘very antithesis’ to approaches 
within this field (Fowler and Kress, 1979: 198; Hardt-Mautner, 1995).  
 
While this view, according to Hardt-Mautner (1995), continues to be valid and applicable to 
software programmes use in general, she makes the case for an approach which combines 
the quantitative methods of corpus linguistics with the qualitative methods of CDA, in order 
to make up for what ‘is usually lost in terms of breadth’ in qualitative research (Hardt-
Mautner, 1995: 3). That is, although coding distances the researcher from the text, gathering 
quantitative information can help offer valuable insight into the data. Importantly, however, 
there must be a clear distinction between the quantitative and qualitative components of the 
research, with quantitative tools remaining separate from a textual analysis where the 
complete texts are examined in detail for the ‘full ideological significance’ of expressions.  
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Thus, whilst quantitative tools provide the means for a large scale overview, this is not 
sufficient in itself to count as a method of analysis. van Dijk suggests that a ‘deep qualitative 
analysis [on a smaller selection of data will] generally yield much more insight’ (MacMillan, 
2005). Therefore, these approaches are not incompatible – but it must be understood that 
the quantitative element of this mixed-methods approach does not constitute analysis per se. 
Instead, the quantitative tools are used to understand the overt content and context of the 




3.2.1 Quantitative Tools 
The literature that focuses on the analysis of political speeches shows that some researchers 
favour the use quantitative tools. One such example is provided by Charteris-Black (2005), 
who uses a quantitative method to track the frequency and usage of metaphors by various 
political figures in an attempt to understand what this reveals about their leadership styles. 
He compiled a corpus of speeches for each political figure he analysed, and then categorised 








Another example of how quantitative methods have been used is provided by van Noije and 
Hijmans (2005), whose research was discussed previously in Chapter 2. The authors first 
created an inventory of the defining themes of national identity and nationalism addressed 
by French presidents’ speeches. They then took note of the wording and sentiment in which 
these themes were framed to produce Figure 3:2. It should be noted that the authors 
incorrectly use a line graph to plot a discreet dataset (their themes); such data is not 
continuous and therefore should be plotted using bar charts. This research learns from this 
mistake whilst also appreciating that the plotting of such themes can reveal about national 
identity. However, such purely corpus-based methods as used by Charteris-Black (2005) and 
van Noije and Hijmans (2005 study text in isolation, and therefore to draw conclusions 
directly from them would contradict the critical approach as set out earlier in this chapter.  
 
 
Figure 3:2. Number of remarks by French president (van Noije and Hijmans; 2005) 
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Content analysis can also be conducted quantitatively, and can be used – for example – to 
track broad trends in narratives. This can be helpful for creating tools such as word clouds 
that help reveal these trends and themes that can be investigated further with qualitative 
methods. Burnham et al. (2004) note that quantitative content analysis was stimulated by the 
need to develop a more objective and systematic method for analysing the rapidly increasing 
volume of communication produced by governments, companies and other organisations 
such as newspapers and television companies. Berelson, one of the pioneers of content 
analysis research, defines quantitative content analysis as ‘a research technique for the 
objective, systematic and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication’ 
(Berelson, 1952: 18). As the content analysis is conducted under clearly specified conditions 
that make it systematic and objective, content analysis can be replicated by other researchers.  
 
One problem with quantitative content analysis is described by Johnston (2006: 383). 
‘Researchers, particularly (but not exclusively) novice qualitative researchers [find] 
themselves coding in a somewhat mechanistic manner, often for excessively long periods of 
time […] The incessant desire to code every part of a document without taking the time to 
think and reflect upon the data can lead to an overly descriptive prosaic project’. This desire 
to code excessively is referred to in the literature as a ‘coding trap’.  
 
A final example of the use of quantitative tools in textual analysis is provided by Mumford 
and Selck (2010). They use TEXTPACK, which codes words, word roots and word strings.  
The authors began by selecting a speech for each politician they were focusing on to signify 
their broad views on international relations. In order to achieve semantic validity, whereby 
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the dictionary must be ‘sensitive to the linguistic contexts of the word’ as well as ensuring 
the correct meanings, they applied a three-step process. First, they evaluated the speeches 
and chose words and phrases they felt denoted ‘morality’ or ‘national interest’. Mumford and 
Selck say they achieved this by selecting words and phrases that clearly matched the concepts 
identified in the literature, such as ‘moral’, ‘environment’, and ‘national interest’. Second, the 
sentences that were recognised to carry connotations of morality or national interest were 
filtered, and the nouns, adjectives and phrases carrying those meanings were selected. In 
doing so, the authors found that words such as ‘international’ and ‘United Nations’ were 
regularly used in value-laden ways.  
 
Out of the three examples looked at in this section, the quantitative tools used in this 
research build on the examples by van Noije and Hijmans (2005) and Mumford and Selck 
(2010). It does so by recognising that searching the data for specific keywords from the 
literature review can help identify trends. It also appreciates that plotting this data in a similar 
manner to Figure 3.2 can help appreciate the significance of different trends in relation to 






3.2.2 Discourse Analysis 
A recurrent theme in the literature on discourse analysis is that discourses reproduce the 
everyday assumptions of society, and that those common perceptions and understandings 
are encouraged and reinforced by those with access to the media, such as politicians, 
journalists and academics (Burnham et al., 2004). As such, scholars have increasingly come to 
realise the importance of language and, in particular, political language.   
 
There are five major approaches to analysing discourse according to Howarth (2000: 2-5). 
Firstly, positivists view discourses as ‘cognitive schemata’ which are defined as ‘the conscious 
strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion understandings of the world and of 
themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action’. Secondly, the realistic approach 
views discourse as a structured system in itself, and the purpose of analysing it is to describe 
how they contribute to the causation of events and social processes. Thirdly, the Marxist 
view of discourse analysis centres on the link of discourse to the contradictory process of 
economic production in capitalist structures. Fourthly, critical discourse analysis is similar to 
the Marxist approach but stresses a sociological rather than an economic structure within 
which to carry out discourse analysis. In this approach, human meaning and understandings 
are seen as crucial in explaining the social world. Fifthly, Howarth (2000) argues that post-





This thesis builds on this fourth approach identified by Howarth, critical discourse analysis 
(CDA). Fairclough (2000) argues that CDA views language as one element of social practice, 
and aims to see how it is articulated along with other elements. CDA is particularly 
concerned with social change and how it relates to social relations of power and domination. 
Wodak (2006: 65) argues that CDA:  
 
is not concerned with evaluating what is ‘right’ or ‘wrong’. CDA [...] should also justify 
theoretically why certain interpretations of discursive events seem more valid than others. One 
of the methodical ways for critical discourse analysts to minimize the risk of being biased is to 
follow the principle of triangulation. Thus one of the most salient distinguishing features of 
the DHA is its endeavour to work with different approaches, multimethodically and on the 
basis of a variety of empirical data as well as background information . 
 
Fairclough (2000) views discourses to be performative, meaning-making attempts to make 
sense of the world through words and language. The study of discourse assumes that 
language, as a part of the culture from which it is drawn, is social practice. In this take on the 
connection between the ideational and the material, the structuring power of language fulfils 
a performative function because governments have to use language (written or spoken) to 
mobilise support, generate consensus around policy positions and legitimise actions taken at 
home and abroad (Fairclough 2000). Simpson and Hall (2012: 136) have argued that 
‘discourse analysis should reveal as much about the contexts as about the text’ because it is 
closely attentive to the various audiences for linguistic performances as well as ‘language use 
in a social context’. 
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Looking at other studies relating to the use of discourse in the construction of national 
identity, we find that other authors also favour Critical Discourse Analysis – such as Wodak 
et al. (2009) in their study of Austria10, and Broad and Daddow (2010), whose focus is on the 
UK Labour Party’s discourse on the EU. 
 
However, Potter and Wetherell (1987: 168) contend that the ‘analysis of discourse is like 
riding a bicycle compared to conducting experiments or analysing survey data which 
resemble baking cakes from a recipe. There is no obvious parallel to well-controlled 
experimental design and test of statistical significance […] it is not a case of stating first you 
do this and then you do that. The skills required are developed as one tries to make sense of 
transcripts and identify the organizational features of documents’. Despite this variety of 
conceptualisations of discourse and disagreements over how to perform discourse analysis, 
Broad and Daddow (2010) argue that one thing that unites scholars of foreign policy 
language is that they are interested in what Doty describes as how ‘particular interpretive 
dispositions [...] create certain processes and exclude others’ (Doty, quoted in Gaskarth 2006: 
327). Gaskarth adds that discourses are productive in the sense that they do not neutrally 
reflect an objective reality ‘out there’ but actively construct it.  
 
                                                 
10 Wodak et al. (2009: 2) state that although their study focuses on Austria, it is by no means 
restricted to it. Many of its insights, especially its theoretical and methodological approach, which was 
specially developed for their investigation, are equally applicable to other countries. 
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3.2.3 Discourse-Historical Approach 
This section begins by explaining the discourse analysis used in this thesis – the Discourse-
Historical approach (DHA) – and its origins, before moving on to discuss its application in 
this thesis. This chapter concludes by integrating the methodology and analytical framework 
in Table 3.4 to help explain the structure of the rest of the thesis.  
 
The DHA was pioneered and refined by Ruth Wodak (Wodak et al., 1990; Wodak et al., 
1994; Wodak and van Dijk, 2000; Wodak and Chilton, 2005; Wodak and Meyer, 2009; 
Wodak et al., 2009), and embraces a moderate constructivism as its epistemological starting 
point (Reisigl, 2017: 48). It was developed in the context of the 1986 Austrian presidential 
campaign of Kurt Waldheim, a former Secretary-General of the UN. As it emerged that 
Waldheim had kept secret his service as an intelligence officer in the Nazi Wehrmacht during 
World War II, the DHA was developed to study the semi-public discourses that emerged11 – 
with a specific focus on anti-Semitism in its historical context and Austrian national identity 
(Wodak et al., 1990; 1994). Notably, both of these pioneering DHA works used speeches 
from politicians as part of their empirical data. Since then, the DHA has been used in a 
variety of contexts – such as the analysis of overt and covert forms of racism in national 
parliaments (Wodak and van Dijk, 2000), the discursive construction of European identities 
in the speeches of German, British, and French politicians (Wodak and Weiss, 2005), and 
                                                 
11 For example, in Austrian newspapers, the New York Times, daily news broadcasts and TV news, 
statements by politicians, TV discussions and news documentaries  
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discourses about refugees and asylum seekers in the British press from 1996-2006 (Delanty, 
Wodak and Jones, 2011).   
 
Building on the research from 1990 and 1994, Wodak et al. (1999) examined the relationships 
between the discursive construction of national sameness and difference, and the ways in 
which this leads to the political and social exclusion of specific communities. They also 
offered a general theoretical and methodological framework that can be applied for the 
analysis of the discursive construction of national identities in various contexts and national 
states (Reisigl, 2017: 45).  
 
When revising their 1999 research and framework a decade later, the three closely 
interwoven dimensions of analysis for the discursive construction of national identity 
remained the same (Wodak et al., 2009: 30): 
 
1. Content or topic 
2. Discursive strategies 
3. Means and forms of realisation 
 
This can also be described as in Figure 3.3, below, where the content or topic is the macro 






Figure 3:3. Three interrelated dimensions of analysis (adapted from Wodak et al., 2009) 
 
For Wodak’s study on Austrian national identity, the first dimension of analysis – the macro 
content – was revealed through a critical survey of the literature and pilot analyses of the 
data. In the second dimension of analysis, there are four discursive macro-strategies 
embedded in the discursive construction of national identity:  
 
1. Constructive strategies – these encompass the linguistic acts which serve to build and 
establish a particular national identity, e.g. discursively establishing groups ‘us’ and ‘them’ 
or an image of oneself, or an identity. These are primarily linguistic procedures, which 
constitute a national ‘we-group’ through particular acts of reference. One such example 




2. Perpetuation and justificatory strategies – these attempt to maintain or reproduce already 
established groups, images or other discursive artefacts. Justifications strategies are 
frequently used when the status quo is under dispute, and needs to be justified in order 
to be preserved, and are frequently used to emphasise continuity. Justification strategies 
are used to to defend and preserve a problematic narrative of ‘national history’, such as 
the colonisation of Africa. 
3. Transformative strategies – these strategies attempt to transform the meaning of a 
relatively well-established aspect of national identity into another. Kovács and Wodak 
(2003) use the example of the redefining of Austrian neutrality which integrates modified 
geopolitical conditions, and where neutrality is not altogether lost.   
4. Dismantling or destructive strategies – these serve to de-mythologise or demolish 
existing national identities or elements of them. For example, dismantling of Austria’s 
neutrality, which was dictated from outside (by allied occupants) and should therefore be 
renounced.  
 
For each of these four macro-strategies, Wodak et al. (2009) identify five micro-strategies, 









However, for the purpose of this thesis, this three-tiered framework has been adapted into a 
four-step approach. The critical approach set out by Wodak et al. (2009) is too detailed for a 
large dataset such as this, so combining their focused Discourse-Historical Approach with 
quantitative tools and thematic content analysis provides a framework that can be borrowed 
and built on in further research. 
 
The four-step approach of this thesis is as follows: 
 
Level 1: identify the specific contents-oriented themes; 
Level 2: identify sub-themes 
Level 3: thematic content analysis 
Level 4: critical discourse analysis 
 
This is explained in more detail in the analytical framework at the end of this chapter in 
Table 3.4. The next section moves on to address the ethics, positionality, and the limitations 




3.3 Ethics, Positionality, and Limitations 
It is important to address points on ethics, positionality, and the limitations of this research. 
As this research is based on speeches gathered from physical and online archives, it does not 
raise any notable ethical problems. However, this does not mean that archival research is 
without ethical problems altogether. McKee and Porter (2012: 64) identify a number of 
questions that can help guide a consideration of ethics in this context of archival research. 
These begin by focusing on motives: What are my motives for conducting a particular 
research inquiry? Why do I want to study a particular person or persons, texts, and contexts? 
As mentioned previously, this research seeks to expand on existing literature and test 
arguments made in it. The current research focuses predominantly on Blair, and this is 
expanded in this research to include Major, Brown, and Cameron. In doing so, it also offers 
an opportunity to re-assess and challenge the arguments in the existing literature.  
 
There are further questions that can be asked about the ethics of archival research in terms 
of positionality. McKee and Porter (2012: 65) suggest this can be framed as: How do my 
personal and professional experiences shape the questions I ask, the archives I research, the 
methods and methodologies I choose, and the conclusions I draw? The question of 
positionality is important to address since, as with research philosophy, it shapes a 
researcher’s understanding of knowledge. Takacs (2002: 169) stresses the importance of 
acknowledging that ‘one’s knowledge claims are not universal truths – that one’s 
positionality can bias one’s epistemology’. All researchers conduct research with some degree 
of positionality, but acknowledging this helps other academics scrutinise the methods and 
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research in an attempt to maintain academic robustness and relative impartiality. As Cloke et 
al. (2000: 137) point out, ‘a strategy of positionality can be identified in which ‘telling where 
you are coming from’ can be employed tactically as a contextualisation of the interpretations 
which are to follow’. 
 
The author is a longstanding member of the UK Labour Party, and has been on the 
executive committee of the Labour Campaign for International Development (LCID) since 
2011. LCID is affiliated to the Labour Party, but exists separately from it. The organisation 
has been both supportive and critical of stances taken by the Party on matters relating to 
international development and foreign policy more broadly. Whilst undertaking this research, 
the author has held the position of Vice-Chair of Policy (2015 – 2018), and Chair (2018–). 
Through this organisation, the author previously interviewed the two Labour prime 
ministers focused on in this thesis, Tony Blair and Gordon Brown, for a video about the 
Labour government’s record on internationalism. For this video, the author also conducted 
interviews with Glenys Kinnock12, Douglas Alexander13, Hilary Benn14, Jim Murphy15 and 
Mary Creagh16.  
 
                                                 
12 Minister of State for Africa and the United Nations, 2009-2010 
13 Secretary of State for International Development, 2007-2010 
14 Secretary of State for International Development, 2003-2007 
15 Leader of the Scottish Labour Party, 2014-2015; Shadow Secretary of State for International 
Development, 2013-2014 
16 Shadow Secretary of State for International Development, 2014-2015 
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It is important, therefore, that the research methods and the rationale behind the decisions 
made (such as the speech inclusion criteria) are explained clearly and transparently. This 
allows the research to be scrutinised and – if necessary – replicated by other researchers. The 
combination of quantitative and qualitative methods also helps improve the transparency of 
this research and mitigate potential biases emerging from the author’s positionality as the 
quantitative tools are easily replicable. 
 
Other ethical questions offered by McKee and Porter (2012: 66-70) are less relevant to this 
research. As publicly delivered speeches delivered by prime ministers, questions about 
consent, how such materials ended up in archives, determining which materials are ‘public’ 
and ‘private’, and questions about the passage of time and the rights of the dead are not 
pertinent to this research. The ethical approval for this thesis has been submitted and 
approved by the University of Birmingham Humanities and Social Sciences Ethical Review 
Committee. This was received and logged by the Research Support Group and has been 
assigned reference number ERN_17-0463.  On the basis of the University Ethics Self-
Assessment Form (SAF), no further ethical review is required.  
  
It is also important to consider potential limitations to this research. These are listed in Table 





Table 3:2. Potential limitations to research 
Potential Limitation How To Overcome 
Limited availability / 
access to speeches 
 Use physical archives such as the Conservative Party archive at 
the Bodleian Library and the Labour Party archive at The People’s 
History Museum 
 Contact offices of John Major, Tony Blair, Gordon Brown and 
David Cameron directly asking for all speeches relating to Africa 
broadly so that these can be filtered to find ones that meet the 
inclusion criteria 
Difficult to generalise 
findings because of small 
sample size and context 
specificity 
 Find ways to increase the sample size, such as by looking at 
speeches by other senior politicians who are also offered a broad 
audience and extensive media coverage, such as the chancellor 
Influenced by researcher’s 
perceptions, hence 
subjective 
 Be methodical and transparent in each stage of the research and 
clearly signal why decisions were made and how conclusions were 
reached 
Selection bias 




3.4 Research Strategy and Design 
Having outlined the methodology and methods this thesis will be using, this section will look 
at the practical application of this.  
 
3.4.1 Speech Selection Criteria 
As noted in the previous section, it is important to establish a transparent, robust speech 
selection criteria. This is achieved by building on how other scholars have approached this. 
One example of this is provided by Mumford and Selck (2010), who look for trends in 
Blair’s foreign policy speeches. Their sample included 68 speeches for Blair, 36 for Robin 
Cook, and 311 for Thatcher. Their selection criteria for speeches is as follows (Mumford and 
Selck, 2010: 302): 
 
(a) the speech was held during the years in government; (b) the predominant part of the 
speech (i.e. more than half) was about foreign policy issues, defence, global issues or 
international and transnational organisations and corporations; (c) the speech qualified 
automatically if it was made within a foreign country; (d) the speech was not about the 
European Union (EU) or made to an EU governmental audience 
 
Other studies are not so clear about their selection criteria. De Castella et al. (2009: 7) focus 
on rhetoric about fear and terrorism in the speeches of Australian Prime Minister John 
Howard. They found a total of 765 public speeches made by Howard for their period of 
study and selected 26 for ‘their focus on terrorism related issues’. The authors do not specify 
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how exactly these 26 were chosen. They complement this initial sample with additional 
speeches selected from the Parliamentary Document Repository, ParlInfo, using the sole 
keyword ‘terror’. Their final contained 27 speeches. Of these, they coded 13 in their entirety. 
The other 14 contained sections that did not relate to the theme of terrorism, and when 
these unrelated sections were greater than 500 words, they were omitted from coding and 
the total word count of coded material was reduced accordingly. 
 
Drawing on these approaches, speeches were included in the sample if they met the 
following inclusion criteria.  
  
1. The speech was delivered by a British prime minister in the timeframe of this study 
(1990 – 2016). Namely, the speech was delivered by John Major, Tony Blair, Gordon 
Brown, or David Cameron when they held the office of prime minister; 
2. The speech mentioned ‘Africa’, or mentioned any one of the 54 African countries; 
3. All speeches delivered in Africa were automatically included.  
4. They were not made in the House of Commons. The speeches analysed are ones where 
the speaker has some control over the physical audience and arena. They are optional 
speeches in the way House of Commons speeches are not.  
 
A complete list of speeches is provided in Appendix A, where they are listed chronologically, 
and have been labelled and numbered, and are referenced as such in the body of the thesis. 




An initial systematic search was conducted by searches on the website 
<http://www.ukpol.co.uk>, an online political speech archive with over 5,500 speeches on 
British politics – using ‘Africa’ as the sole keyword. This yielded a wide range of results, 
including speeches by backbench MPs. However, only speeches by relevant prime ministers 
were selected, in keeping with the definition and rationale highlighted above. This search 
found 4 speeches from Major, 5 from Blair, 7 from Brown, and 27 from Cameron. This was 
complemented by another systematic search of another online speech archive, <http:// 
www.britishpoliticalspeech.org/>, again with the sole keyword as ‘Africa’ – but this time 
with the ability to search only the relevant time period, 1990–2016. Similar systematic 
searches were carried out on these two online archives using each of the 54 African 
countries as the keyword. 
 
For the speeches of John Major, his website <http://www.johnmajor.co.uk> provides 
transcripts of virtually all his speeches throughout his political career. It also provides a 
section devoted to Africa. It is noteworthy that this section devoted to ‘Africa’ is one of only 
10 categories identified by the curators of his website – alongside categories such as 
‘Economy’, ‘Education’ and ‘Gulf War’ – perhaps indicating its importance.17 All speeches in 
this section were included in the sample, and the rest of Major’s website was systematically 
searched for further speeches in accordance with the inclusion criteria.  
 
                                                 
17 John Major’s website was updated in mid-2019 and this is no longer the case. However, it was 
important to note that for a long period this was the case.  
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Many of Blair and Brown’s speeches were posted on the government website at the time 
they were delivered. However, after leaving office in 2010, the website was cleared. Many of 
these were subsequently archived at <http://www.collections.europarchive.org/>, and 
speeches from this site that met the inclusion criteria were incorporated into the sample. 
However, for the Blair administration, the archived speeches only cover 1997-2005, leaving a 
gap around 2006/2007.  
 
Accessing David Cameron’s speeches presented a different problem. In 2013, it was revealed 
that the Conservative Party had removed a decade of speeches from their website and the 
main internet library (Ramesh and Hern, 2013). It also blocked access to them via the 
Internet Archive’s Wayback Machine, a US-based library that periodically searches and stores 
the contents of webpages from specific ‘crawls’. It should be noted that this may have 
impacted the sample of speeches from the Cameron administration that can be studied. The 
remainder of Cameron speeches were accessed through the <.gov.uk> website, but it is 
unclear if the sample is incomplete. 
 
In order to address this, these online systematic searches were complemented by visiting the 
Conservative Party and Labour Party archives. The Conservative Party’s archive is housed at 
the Bodleian Libraries in Oxford, and the Labour Party’s archive is at The People’s History 
Museum in Manchester. The Conservative archives do not yet cover the Cameron 
administration. However, additional speeches were found from the Major administration, 




Many of the speeches in the Labour archive were printouts of the government website 
before they were archived. These include the URLs in the header, and by noting these down 
and searching for them in the Wayback Machine, the speeches could be accessed and copied 
without having to use optical character recognition (OCR) technology. However for 
speeches without URLs on them, OCR technology was used. This brought the total Blair 
sample to 105, and the Brown sample to 62.  
 
Given the problems highlighted, it is understood that this sample may not contain every 
speech delivered by a British prime minister mentioning Africa (or a country in Africa) from 
1990-2016. Little and Wickham-Jones (2000: 278), for example, note that Blair delivered a 
speech in 1999 in Cape Town, but the transcript of this speech cannot be found. However, 
this section has shown that great efforts have been taken to ensure it is thorough and 
representative, both in terms of the time period covered, and in terms of the four prime 
ministers. Table 3.3 gives the number of speeches that met the inclusion criteria for each 
prime minister, the number of words in each corpus, and speeches per duration as prime 




Table 3:3. Speeches that met the inclusion criteria for each prime minister, the number of words in 
each corpus, and speeches per duration as prime minister. 
 






Size of corpus 
(words) 
John Major 48 335 0.1433 114,311 
Tony Blair 105 530 0.1981 228,572 
Gordon Brown 62 150 0.4133 171,114 
David Cameron 58 332 0.1747 154,284 
 
Table 3.3. shows a relative consistency between Major, Blair and Cameron in terms of 
speeches referencing Africa per week. However, it raises a significant finding about Brown; 
even accounting for incomplete dataset of speeches, Gordon Brown is an outlier in that he 
talked about Africa roughly twice as much as the other three prime ministers. This requires 
further investigation.  These speeches are plotted over time in Figure 3:4 to check whether 
they represent a good spread over the time period 1990-2016, and the figure shows there are 




Figure 3:4: Distribution of speeches by Major, Blair, Brown, and Cameron referencing Africa in the 
full corpus of speeches 
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3.5 Analytical Framework 
This analytical framework brings the theoretical focus of the methodology into perspective 
by showing how it will be used to analyse the data from the corpus of speeches. In doing so, 
it sets out a roadmap for the rest of the thesis. This is succinctly summarised in Table 3:4 at 
the end of this chapter. 
 
In Chapter 4, quantitative tools are used to capture the overt content of the entire corpus of 
speeches. This is to help ensure that this breadth of information is not lost by focusing on 
only a few speeches. It also helps ensure that the results are more representative of the 
whole corpus of speeches rather than being based on a small sample of speeches. The 
corpus of speeches that meet the inclusion criteria (see 3.4.1) contains over 650,000 words.18 
As such, it is impossible to conduct a critical discourse analysis of the entire corpus within 
the scope of this thesis. As noted previously, ‘[c]ritical interpretation requires historical 
knowledge and sensitivity, which can be possessed by human beings but not by machines’ 
(Fowler 1991: 68). This means that any tool or method that creates distance by lifting 
discourse out of context to consider them in isolation is often considered the ‘very antithesis’ 
to approaches within this field (Fowler and Kress, 1979: 198; Hardt-Mautner, 1995).  
 
Nevertheless, whilst quantitative methods and coding distances the researcher from the text, 
gathering such information can still provide useful insights and make up for what ‘is usually 
                                                 
18 John Major’s 48 speeches: 114,311 words. Blair’s 105 speeches: 228,572 words. Brown’s 62 
speeches: 171,114 words. Cameron’s 58 speeches: 154,284 words. Total word count: 668,281. 
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lost in terms of breadth’ (Hardt-Mautner, 1995: 3). It is important to ensure there is a clear 
division between the quantitative and qualitative elements of the study, with software 
programmes used to measure instances, for example, remaining separate from a textual 
analysis that provides the ‘full ideological significance’ (Hardt-Mautner, 1995: 9). Therefore, 
these approaches are not incompatible – but it must be understood that Chapter 4 does not 
constitute analysis per se. These quantitative tools in Chapter 4 are used to derive content-
oriented ‘themes’ that describe the main categories in terms of how British prime ministers 
talk about Africa.  
 
Chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8, begin with a more detailed use of quantitative tools. In order to find 
the frequency of keywords in each theme that are in reference to Africa, a Python script has 
been written. This code processes the corpus of speeches to find every combination of 
keyword that is collocated against a reference of ‘Africa’ or an African country for each 
prime minister. Collocation helps to ensure that the sentences that contain these keywords 
are in reference to Africa but it does not guarantee it. It should also be noted that this 
approach can miss references if they are not collocated within a sentence. Nevertheless, this 
is a transparent and replicable tool that can help provide additional contextual information 
about the themes. The Python code uses the Natural Language Toolkit (NLTK), which 
enables the rapid parsing, processing, and comparison of human language input. The Python 
code for this program is given in Appendix B and is extracted from a Jupyter notebook 
(hence the #In[] clauses). Although the code is universal for editors and IDEs, Jupyter was 
used for its flexibility. The script enables the comparison of two lists based on keywords – in 
this case the first comparison list is ‘Africa’ or any of a list of countries in Africa, and the 
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second list is selected keywords for a given theme. For a breakdown of how the code works, 
see Appendix B. This helps derive ‘sub-themes’ which are more nuanced content-oriented 
categorisations within each of the themes.  
 
Chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8 continue with a thematic content analysis within each of these sub-
themes. These thematic content analyses assess continuity and discontinuity of these sub-
themes for each prime minister in order to identify trends. They also enable this research to 
respond to claims made in the existing literature about continuities and discontinuities, and 
provide partial explanations about the construction of national identity. This focus on 
content also serves to highlight speeches that will be explored in more detail using critical 
discourse analysis. Each of these chapters concludes with a critical discourse analysis of 
selected speeches in order to focus in on discursive methods in more detail  
 
These findings are brought together in Chapter 9, which expands on the focus of discursive 
methods and identifies four discourses about how Africa is used in the construction of 
British national identity. Chapter 9 also looks at potential explanations for the themes, sub-













 (1) Check the spread of speeches in the corpus, (2) study the geographic location of 
speeches delivered, (3) map and graph the African countries mentioned in speeches, 
(4) plot word cloud of each prime minister’s corpus, (5) code speeches using NVivo. 
 
Output: 

















 Identify sub-themes within the four broad categories using Python program.  
 
Output: 



















































































































 Thematic content analysis by sub-theme in order to understand why this category is 
notable in British prime ministers’ speeches about Africa and what this says about 
British national identity. 
 
Output: 





















 Discourses prominent in prime ministers’ speeches in reference to Africa 
(“Paternalism” discourse, “Tutelage” discourse, “Partnership” discourse, “Insecure 





This chapter has covered the methodology and methods that will be used in this thesis. It 
shows that quantitative tools can be used in conjunction with discourse analysis, as long as 
quantitative tools remain separate the textual analysis. This chapter has drawn on other 
research that uses quantitative tools to understand the construction of national identity, and 
highlight how this research builds on these approaches. In addition, this chapter explains 
why critical discourse analysis is used in this research, as well as why specifically the 
Discourse-Historical Approach is used.  
 
This chapter has also explored epistemology and ontology, the research approach, strategy, 
and design, data collection and analysis methods, as well as research ethics, positionality, and 
limitations of this research. This research embraces a moderate constructivist approach, and 
combines quantitative and qualitative methods. It sets out how the corpus of speeches used 
in this thesis has been compiled, and what information is contained in this dataset. Having 
highlighting potential ethical problems, positionality, and limitations, it is crucial that this 
research is conducted in a transparent manner. The next chapter uses quantitative tools to 






Using Quantitative Tools to Understand the Data 
This chapter uses quantitative tools to understand the overt content and context of the 
speeches, which will help inform subsequent analysis. This is achieved in five parts. Firstly, 
this chapter studies the distribution of speeches from 1990-2016 to understand if there are 
significant anomalies or outliers. Secondly, it turns to the geographical location of speeches 
delivered as this context helps explain the intent behind the speeches. Thirdly, it maps and 
graphs the African countries mentioned in speeches to get a sense of whether there are any 
clear distinctions between the four prime ministers. Fourthly, it plots each prime minister’s 
corpus of speeches about Africa as word clouds, where word size is proportional to 
frequency of usage, in order to shed light on the broader content of these speeches. Finally, 
this chapter concludes by using computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software 
(CAQDAS) to code the speeches. These approaches are combined with knowledge from the 
literature review to derive four overarching content-oriented ‘themes’ in the speeches. These 
are that Britain’s post-Cold War relationship with Africa can be understood as being based 
on British ‘history’, ‘security’, ‘morality’, and ‘economy’. The quantitative tools used in the 
first four sections of this chapter are easily replicable and therefore also help to improve the 




4.1 Distribution of Speeches 
The graph showing the distribution of speeches that fit the inclusion criteria was first given 
in Chapter 3 (Figure 3:4). Previously, this was used simply to check whether there were any 
significant gaps in the data. However, this graph is also useful to study in itself – so it has 
been reproduced below (Figure 4:1).  
 
Figure 4:1. Distribution of speeches by Major, Blair, Brown, and Cameron referencing Africa in the 
full corpus of speeches 
 
This graph indicates that there are some spikes in references to Africa – notably around 1994 
and 2007/8. The 1994 spike reveals that three and then five separate speeches about Africa 
were delivered on consecutive days. This occurred on the 20th and 21st September 1994, and 
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was part of Major’s visit to South Africa – the first by a British prime minister in 34 years. 
These speeches were also delivered in the context of Nelson Mandela’s recent election as 
president of South Africa, and the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide. The spike in 2007/8 
is slightly different because it is over a longer timeframe, and covers seven instances in which 
multiple speeches referenced Africa in a single day. Part of this can be explained by Blair’s 
visit to Sierra Leone and South Africa towards the end of his premiership in May 2007. This 
is noteworthy and will be explored in more detail as it indicates an attempt to use the 
platform offered by a tour of Africa to frame his time in office. However, there is no 
straightforward explanation for the continued spike in speeches at the beginning of Brown’s 
time in office as they are diverse in terms of their audience – ranging from Google’s 
Zeitgeist Conference to the Church of Scotland to the United Nations. 
 
A further important point to take from this graph is how infrequently speeches referencing 
Africa were made by Blair between 1997 and 2001. This will need further examination 
because it lends weight to the argument that Africa was not a priority for Blair in his first 
term, and that this only started properly in his second term (Porteous, 2005: 289-90). This 
timeframe also appears to correlate with the finding by Mumford and Selck (2010: 309) that 
New Labour under Blair adopted a more moral rhetoric in foreign policy speeches than 
previous Conservative governments, but that this shift ‘was not eminent until 2002’ 
suggesting that it was a result of the attacks on September 11th 2001.  
 
Another – and perhaps more helpful – way to look at the same data is to group the speeches 
by year, as shown in Figure 4:2. Doing so helps reveal trends not apparent in Figure 4:1. This 
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shows that in terms of quantity of speeches relating to Africa, the Major-Blair transition does 
not appear to be particularly significant. It also reinforces the extent to which Brown is an 
outlier in the number of speeches he gave that referenced Africa, first noted in Chapter 3 
(Table 3.3). 
 
Figure 4:2. Distribution of speeches by Major, Blair, Brown, and Cameron referencing Africa in the 
full corpus of speeches, separated by year 
 
4.2 Geographical Location of Speeches 
The geographic location in which speeches are delivered is significant because prime 
ministers usually have significant control over location, meaning that this information may 
help illuminate intention. This section breaks down the location of speeches into three 
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‘spheres’: international, domestic, and those actually delivered in Africa. There are some 
difficulties in separating out geographic locations in this way. When a speech has been given 
at a specific summit, such as at an EU or G8 summit, they have been categorised as such – 
rather than the country in which the summit took place. For example, the EU Council 
meeting in Lisbon on 18th October 2007 (GB07p), is categorised as ‘EU’ rather than 
‘Portugal’. Additionally, a small number of speech transcripts do not specify audience. For 
these speeches, the geographic location is inferred from the content of the speech. 
 
This information is plotted as pie charts. By doing so, the following four charts represent 
geographic locations as a percentage of each prime minister’s corpus rather than frequency. 
This is to allow for more meaningful comparison than using raw numbers because otherwise 
the length of each prime minister’s time in office is in some form correlated to those figures.  
For the following four charts, black and grey is used to signify African audiences; red, orange 
and brown are used for other international audiences; and blue and green are used for 





Figure 4:3. John Major’s speeches by audience – divided into ‘International’, ‘Domestic’, and ‘Africa’ 
 
103 
Figure 4:4. Tony Blair’s speeches by audience – divided into ‘International’, ‘Domestic’, and ‘Africa’ 
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There are a number of noteworthy observations that can be drawn from these four charts 
that will help inform subsequent analysis chapters. Over a quarter of Major’s speeches that 
reference Africa are delivered in Africa (15 out of 48), and the vast majority of these are in 
South Africa (10 out of 15). This suggests that Major’s primary purpose in talking about 
Africa was specifically to focus on South Africa. By contrast, Blair spoke in seven African 
countries, and also referenced Africa in the most locations out of the four prime ministers. 
This could be interpreted in two somewhat contradictory – although not necessarily 
incompatible – ways. On the one hand this could be seen as a sign of a deeper engagement 
with the continent rather than just rhetoric on the part of Blair and the Labour government. 
On the other hand, it could be a way for Blair to project statesmanship (and potentially 
British power) on the world stage by focusing on Africa as the cause du jour. This research 
indicates there is an element of truth to both of these interpretations. 
 
As shown in the previous section of this chapter (see Figure 4:2), when factoring for time in 
office, Brown spoke about Africa far more frequently than the other three prime ministers. 
However, only one of Brown’s speeches is actually delivered in Africa. There are two factors 
that may help explain this: his short tenure in office, and that the 2007/2008 Financial Crisis 
and domestic politics dominated his schedule. Brown delivered a high percentage of 
speeches specifically to bilateral and multilateral audiences, such as domestic joint press 
conferences with other heads of state, and speeches made to the UN and EU.  
 
Although Cameron’s length of tenure in office was similar to that of Major, he only 
delivered two speeches in Africa. It is also important to note that a high number of 
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Cameron’s speeches that reference Africa were delivered to business conferences and 
multinational corporations, which taken together represent 30% of all his domestic speeches 
referencing to Africa. This points towards the re-emergence and re-centring of economic 
growth and the private sector in development thinking under Cameron, as argued by 
Mawdsley (2015).  
 
4.3 Countries Mentioned in Speeches 
As well as the geographic location of speeches, the African countries British prime ministers 
mention in their speeches also help to reveal their intentions. These are plotted on a map of 
Africa (Figure 4:7) and as a graph of mentions of country as a percentage of each prime 
minister’s corpus (Figure 4:8). Figure 4:8 suggests that while Major, Brown and Cameron talk 
frequently about specific countries (South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Libya respectively), Blair 
tends to talk about more countries in Africa, but less often (see also Figure 4:7). Major’s 
references to South Africa represent a significant outlier by some of orders of magnitude, 
and complement the findings in Figure 4:3 about the prominence of South Africa in Major’s 
speeches. 
 
Importantly, Blair also talks about Africa as a continent far more often than the other three 
prime ministers. Although the previous section that showed Blair spoke in seven African 
countries, this frequent reference to Africa in such broad terms may be evidence that Blair’s 
speeches about Africa were not detail-orientated, but instead prone to generalisations about 
the continent.  
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Figure 4:7. African countries that are mentioned in speeches by British prime ministers (1990-2016) 19 
                                                 
19 In creating this figure, references to ‘Congo basin’ have not been included as either DRC or the 
Republic of Congo, references to ‘Lake Chad’ have not been included as Chad, and references ‘Niger 
Delta’ have not been included in Niger. This is because these landforms span multiple countries and 





Figure 4:8. Mentions of ‘Africa’ and African countries in the speeches of British prime ministers 
(1990-2016) as a percentage of the total corpus of text for each speaker 
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4.4 Word Clouds of Content 
Word clouds can provide useful visualisations to help understand large quantities of textual 
data. They provide an overview by distilling text down to those words that appear with 
highest frequency (Heimerl et al., 2014). In this section, the entire corpus for each prime 
minister is entered into an online open-source word cloud generator.20 This tool plots the 
200 highest-frequency words in the corpus, where the size of the word is directly 
proportional to its frequency (n). The word cloud generator also provides options to plot 
these as proportional to log n and √n of word frequency as these can help emphasise words 
in different parts of the frequency spectrum. However, directly proportional was chosen 
because it is the most straightforward and intuitive way of understanding the data. 
 
There are also drawbacks to word clouds. Harris (2011) notes that ‘word clouds support only 
the crudest sorts of textual analysis’, although he submits that ‘word clouds make sense when 
the point is to specifically analyze [sic] word usage’. As this section is not analysis in itself but 
instead a means to gain useful insights into the broader context of the overall corpus, this is 
an appropriate tool to use. The reoccurrence of words such as ‘Commonwealth’ or ‘G8’ 
would, for example, be important contextual information about the potential role of such 
institutions in British prime ministers’ discourse relating to Africa. 
 
                                                 




The data contained in each corpus was refined before being entered into the word cloud 
generator in order to make better use of the word clouds. For example, references to ‘South 
Africa’ were combined into one word ‘SouthAfrica’ in order to distinguish these references 
as their own tag, rather than blur these specific references to more general references to 
‘Africa’. This was also done for: ‘African Union’, ‘European Union’, ‘Great Britain’, ‘Security 
Council’, ‘United Kingdom’ and ‘United Nations’. The colours of the words in the word 
clouds do not carry meaning, but instead help to identify words from one-another.  
 
The most striking feature across all of the word clouds is the prominence of references to 
‘people’ – it is the most frequently used word in each corpus. This represents a continuity 
across the speeches of all four prime ministers, but does not reveal anything in itself. 
Looking more closely at the figures, for the two Conservative prime ministers, Major and 
Cameron, ‘Britain’ features more prominently in their word clouds than it does for the 
Labour prime ministers (Figure 4:9 and 4:12). By contrast, collective words such as ‘world’, 
‘international’, and ‘global’ are more prominent in the speeches of Blair and Brown (Figure 
4:10 and 4:11). This suggests a bilateral / multilateral split in thinking across party lines, and 
requires closer textual analysis.  
 
There are other important trends that can be inferred from these word clouds. The 
Commonwealth, for example, only appears in Major’s word cloud (Figure 4:9). Additionally, 
although these speeches have been selected for their focus on Africa, the word ‘Africa’ only 
appears prominently in Blair’s word cloud (Figure 4:10). This is line with the finding from 
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Figure 4:8 that Blair spoke about Africa as a continent far more frequently than the other 
three prime ministers. The word clouds also reveal clusters of related or synonymous words 
that signify some reoccurring concepts – notably around ‘security’ and ‘economy’. The 
words ‘economy’, ‘economic’ and ‘security’ appear in all four word clouds, although not 
particularly prominently. However, when considered alongside related words, they appear to 
be indicative of broader trends. There are a number of words relating to security, such as 
‘defence’ and ‘terrorism’, as well as those relating to the economy such as ‘trade’, 
‘investment’, ‘market’, and ‘business’. This is taken into account in defining the content-












Figure 4:11. Word cloud of Gordon Brown’s corpus of speeches, where word size is directly 
proportional to frequency. 
 
 
Figure 4:12. Word cloud of David Cameron’s corpus of speeches, where word size is directly 
proportional to frequency 
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4.5 Computer-Assisted Qualitative Discourse Analysis Software 
The final stage of understanding the overt content of the entire corpus is achieved using 
computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS). A range of such software 
packages are available, including ATLAS.ti, Cassandre, MAXQDA, and NVivo. These 
software packages are broadly very similar (Gilbert, Jackson and di Gregorio, 2014). Evers et 
al. (2010) argue that there is no ‘best’ software; the decision to select a particular package 
over another is multifaceted. This project used NVivo 11 because it is intuitive and is 
designed to support such large datasets. Spencer, Ritchie and O'Connor (2003: 209) note 
that one of the advantages of NVivo is its efficiency in making links across large datasets, 
which would be difficult and time-consuming if done manually. 
 
CAQDAS helps to organise textual information by coding sections of speeches and 
identifying ‘nodes’. A node is defined as ‘a collection of references about a specific theme, 
place, person or other area of interest’ (Bryman, 2012: 596). Before discussing the coding 
and nodes for the corpus of speeches, however, there are some issues around the coding that 
are important to note. 
 
Firstly, coding is highly subjective and presents a number of problems. When a concept 
continues over a sentence or paragraph, it is subjective as to whether this should be coded 
once or many times. Whilst this was initially a problem, it was resolved by re-coding the data 
only once per sentence referencing Africa or a country in Africa. A second related but 
separate problem is about the content itself. Due to the interchangeable and often 
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synonymous usage of ‘Africa’ with wider international development issues, it is tempting to 
code in terms of development rather than Africa specifically. Africa is sometimes used as an 
example to talk about poverty or development, which then continues without reference to 
Africa – but it could well be implied that this part of the speech still relates to Africa. This 
was resolved by strictly coding parts of speeches that explicitly refer to Africa or countries in 
Africa. Thirdly, it should also be noted that these categorisations are not clear distinctions – 
there are overlaps and areas of uncertainty. The Responsibility to Protect (R2P), for example, 
could arguably be categorised into security or morality, as it is often presented as a moral 
obligation to protect civilians in conflict zones. This was resolved by coding sections of 
speeches to the category with which they instinctively had the strongest affinity. 
 
NVivo was used to code the 273 speeches in the sample and identify ‘nodes’. This included 
broad nodes such as ‘Aid’ and ‘Immigration’ to highly-specific sub-nodes, such as ‘Role of Sports 
in helping youth in South Africa’ and the mention of ‘Africa or African country mentioned as the 
location of a conference or summit’. These nodes helped summarise the content of the speeches – 
albeit in a more subjective way than the other tools used in this chapter. Through this 
coding, some reoccurring ideas emerge. Across all four prime ministers, nodes about trade 
and peacekeeping are important.  
 
In deriving themes in the speeches of the four prime ministers, categorisations from related 
fields – such as aid and development more broadly – are helpful to consider. One example is 
the categorisation of countries’ rationale for foreign aid as ‘good neighbour’, ‘merchant’, 
‘power broker’ and ‘activist’ roles, identified by Breuning (1995). Breuning, however, makes 
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the problematic assumption that ‘because of their common socialization [sic] as citizens of 
the same state, groups of decision makers representing one state have been inculcated with 
the same “truths”, myths, and lessons of history, and as a result share certain biases in their 
perception and framing of the state’s role in world politics’ (1995: 236). Despite this 
oversimplification, Breuning’s categorisations are helpful in that they serve to highlight some 
of the competing economic, political, and humanitarian motivations described more broadly 
in the literature. 
 
Bringing together the findings from the quantitative tools in this chapter with knowledge 
from the literature review, this thesis categorises four distinct content-oriented themes that 
explain how British prime ministers in the post-Cold War period reference Africa in their 
speeches. These are that Britain’s post-Cold War relationship with Africa can be viewed as 
being based on British ‘history’, ‘security’, ‘morality’, and ‘economy’. The rationale for the 
four ‘themes’ identified in the speeches of the prime ministers are provided in Table 4:1. It is 
noteworthy that in considering foreign policy options for Britain the 1990s, Tugendhat and 
Wallace (1988) derive similar categorisations. Although their categorisations did not inform 
the four themes identified in this research, it is useful to look at the similarities in the broad 
themes they identify. These include: ‘historical legacy’, the ‘economic dimension’, the 
‘security dimension’, and the ‘intangible elements of foreign policy’ – which includes the 




Table 4:1 How Themes For Further Analysis Were Chosen 
Theme Research that helped identify this theme 
History 
 Literature Review: Williams (2005a; 2005b), Reid (2014) 
 NVivo Coding 
Security 
 Literature Review: Abrahamsen (2005), Porteous (2005), 
Pugh et al. (2013), McConnon (2014) 
 Word clouds (Figure 4.9, 4.10, 4.11, 4.12) 
 NVivo Coding 
Morality 
 Literature Review: Ero (2001), Williams (2002), Chandler 
(2003; 2012), Gallagher (2009; 2013), Taylor (2012), 
Harrison (2013) 
 Audiences of speeches (Figure 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, 4.6) 
 NVivo Coding 
Economy 
 Literature Review: Williams (2004), Cargill (2013), Reid 
(2014) 
 Audiences of speeches (Figure 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, 4.6) 
 Word clouds (Figure 4.9, 4.10, 4.11, 4.12) 






This chapter has used a variety of quantitative tools to understand the breadth and context 
of information contained in the corpus of speeches. It has provided potential insights about 
distinctive characteristics of individual prime minister’s speeches, as well as areas of potential 
alignment between prime ministers – such as a bilateral focus for Conservative prime 
ministers and a multilateral focus for Labour prime ministers. Taking the findings from this 
chapter and considering them alongside the literature review enables the categorisation of 
the content of the speeches into overarching ‘themes’. The broad dichotomy from the 
literature review (Chapter 2) was the distinction between referring to Africa in a way that 
helps define a moral identity for the UK, and using Africa to build or project UK power or 
influence – whether economic or political. 
 
Combining the findings from this chapter with the literature review, this research identifies 
four distinct, but interlinked, themes for understanding Britain’s post-Cold War engagement 
with Africa. These are that British prime ministers present Britain’s post-Cold War 
relationship with Africa as being based on British ‘history’, ‘security’, ‘morality’, and 
‘economy’. Each of these themes will be expanded on in the following chapters, integrating 
and scrutinising the relevant literature for each theme where applicable. The subsequent 
chapters will also break these themes down into sub-themes in order to understand 




Losing an Empire, Finding a Role: Reimagining Britain’s History in Africa 
As detailed in Chapter 3, this thesis builds on the tripartite framework set out by Wodak et al. 
(2009) to create a four-part approach to understanding the discursive construction of 
national identity. The previous chapter laid out the first part of this: the main themes in 
British prime minister’s discourses on the relationship between Britain and Africa (and by 
extension, Africa’s place in the construction of British national identity) are ‘history’, 
‘security’, ‘morality’, and ‘economy’.  
 
This chapter and the subsequent three chapters move on to focus in more detail on nuances 
within each of these themes to derive ‘sub-themes’. These sub-themes constitute the second 
part of the four-part approach, and are found using additional quantitative tools. 
Concurrently, these four analysis chapters centre on a thematic content analysis and critical 
discourse analysis to study the discursive strategies used by British prime ministers – which 
comprise parts three and four of this framework. The commonalities and differences across 
the four thematic chapters will be brought together and assessed in Chapter 9, with 
particular attention to the linguistic means and realisation of discursive strategies. In doing 
so, this thesis will explain how British prime ministers’ discourses of Africa construct British 




This chapter focuses on the extent to which British prime ministers in the post-Cold War 
period have referred to Africa in their speeches in terms of the shared history between 
Africa and Britain. The argument that Britain’s current relationship with Africa is based on 
its long historical link is not a new one – as detailed in Section 2.3 of Chapter 2. Reid (2014: 
144), for example, argues that there is ‘a marked degree of continuity from the nineteenth 
century to the early twenty-first, in terms of both conceptualization [sic] of Africa and 
international engagement with it’. This continuity manifests itself in a variety of ways. For 
instance, the phrase used by Blair in his 2001 conference speech (TB01f)21 that ‘the state of 
Africa is a scar on the conscience of the world’ draws on imagery used by the missionary-
explorer David Livingstone in the mid-nineteenth century – that the Central African slave 
trade was ‘the open sore of the world’ (Jeal, 2013: 367).  
 
As this chapter and the subsequent four analysis chapters show, however, the most valuable 
and noteworthy insights come not from just whether Africa is talked about in terms of history, 
morality, security, or economy – although this will indeed be discussed – but rather how this 
is done. What elements are highlighted? What elements are diminished? This selective 
narration by British prime ministers is central to understanding the construction of British 
national identity.  
 
This chapter shows that common history is invoked primarily by Major, Blair and Cameron, 
but the extent and way in which this is achieved varies. This chapter focuses on three sub-
                                                 
21 Tony Blair (2nd October, 2001), Labour Party Conference, Brighton, UK. 
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themes that emerge from the analysis. Firstly, British prime ministers employ different 
discursive strategies to sanitise Britain’s colonial history in Africa. The second sub-theme is a 
more specific focus on this around the Commonwealth as a sui generis institution that 
embodies particular values, cultures, and norms. As a unique organisation with no legal or 
political obligations and arguably irrelevant (Williams, 2005a), its place in these speeches is 
noteworthy because it suggests that the Commonwealth is not only a formal institution but 
also – and perhaps equally importantly – a rhetorical conception (or ‘imagined community’ 
as Anderson (1983) puts it). Britain’s historical role in the Commonwealth gives it a status as 
primus inter pares, which is important in terms of Britain’s national identity and role in the 
world. The third section is more specific still, highlighting the way in which sport (cricket in 
particular) offers Major a way to talk about the commonalities between Britain and Africa in 
an uncontroversial way that largely transcends politics, and enables him to suggest shared 
values and shared history that go beyond British self-interest. This chapter finds an 
increasing reluctance by British prime ministers from 1990-2016 to explicitly address 
Britain’s colonial history with Africa, to the extent that Cameron frames it a part of history 
so long-gone that it is no longer relevant to modern British national identity.  
 
The next section provides an analysis of the speeches, starting with a more detailed 
quantitative approach around the theme of ‘history’, before moving onto a thematic content 
analysis and then critical discourse analysis.  
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5.1 Quantitative Analysis 
Quantitative tools have already been used check the robustness of the data collected 
(Chapter 3), identify any outliers or unusual trends in the data, and to help identify the four 
categories for analysis (Chapter 4). Here, quantitative tools are used again, but this time more 
specifically focusing on the history dimension to help highlight trends within this theme. 
This is achieved through a study of specific keywords. These keywords were selected based 
on the literature review and the author’s own reading of the speeches during the data 
collection stage, as well as from the findings from the word clouds generated in Chapter 4. 
 
For this History chapter, the keywords selected are: ‘history’, ‘historical’, ‘common’, 
‘Commonwealth’, ‘Empire’, ‘colonial’, and ‘colonialism’. ‘Common’ was selected for its usage 
in the literature in reference to common values, common language, or invoking a common 
heritage. This information is plotted in Table 5:1, where mentions of selected keywords are 
shown in terms of their raw numbers by prime minister. In Figure 5:1, these are plotted as 
percentages of each prime minister’s corpus.  
 
Table 5:1. Frequency of selected history-related keywords in the context of Africa by prime minister 
 John Major Tony Blair Gordon Brown David Cameron 
Histor(y/ical) 21 17 4 7 
Common 5 0 2 0 
Commonwealth 53 19 10 1 
Empire 1 1 0 0 
Colonial(ism) 0 2 2 0 
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Figure 5:1. Frequency of selected keywords related to ‘History’ in the context of Africa (as a 
percentage of each prime minister’s corpus 
 
As with the quantitative insights in Chapter 4, it is important to consider these findings 
separately from the textual analysis. Lifting discourse from its context cannot be considered 
analysis in itself because critical interpretation requires historical understanding and 
sensitivity, which can be possessed by human beings but not by machines (Fowler 1991: 68). 
 
The most striking observation and clearest trend from Figure 5:1 is the apparent diminishing 
emphasis on the Commonwealth over the four prime ministers. This finding is noteworthy 
and needs exploring in more detail because it appears to contradict the claim by Martin and 
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Garnett (1997: 58) that the Commonwealth was ‘an institution relegated to the back burner’ 
for Major’s government. Of course, as this research does not include Thatcher, this could 
still be true when compared to previous administrations – but it is significant that Major 
marks the high point in references to the Commonwealth in relation to Africa out of the 
four prime ministers analysed. This is in contrast to the time of Churchill, when he 
considered the Commonwealth the most important of three ‘majestic circles’.22 Martin and 
Garnett (1997: 58) argue that the Commonwealth ‘slipped down the list of FCO priorities 
since Britain joined the European Economic Community. In a formal sense there may have 
been declining emphasis on the Commonwealth, but its usage in the context of speeches 
about Africa hints at perhaps a different role – one that is as much about the rhetoric of the 
Commonwealth as it is about its role as a formal institution.  
 
Having captured a broad picture of references to specific history-related keywords, this 
section moves on to look in more detail at the context of these keywords. This is achieved 
by using the sentences extracted using the Python code as they show how history keywords 
are referenced in the context of Africa. However, if these sentences were plotted as they are 
– the results would inevitably show the keywords as appearing with the highest frequency. 
Therefore, deleting only the keywords from the extracted sentences and plotting the 
                                                 
22 ‘The first circle for us is naturally the British Commonwealth and Empire, with all that that 
comprises. Then there is also the English-speaking world in which we, Canada, and the other British 
Dominions and the United States play so important a part. And finally there is United Europe. These 
three majestic circles are co-existent and if they are linked together there is no force or combination 
which could overthrow them or even challenge them.’ Winston Churchill (19th October, 1948), 
Conservative Party Meeting, Llandudno, Wales, UK (Deighton, 1995: 155). 
 
126 
remainder of the corpus helps to understand the context of these sentences. This 
information is plotted here for each prime minister as a word clouds, where word size is 
directly proportional to frequency of usage. As with the word clouds in Chapter 5, the 
colours of the words do not carry meaning, but instead help identify words from one-
another.  
 
Figure 5:2 reaffirms the centrality of South Africa in the speeches of Major. It also reveals an 
interesting finding; ‘cricket’ is frequently talked about in the context of Britain’s history with 
Africa. A deeper look at this reveals that it is significant enough to merit being a sub-theme 
in this chapter on its own. In contrast to the findings in Chapter 5 (see Figure 4:8), 
Zimbabwe is prominent in the speeches of Blair in this context (Figure 5:3). There is 
insufficient information in the word clouds generated for Brown and Cameron to draw 
meaningful conclusions from them. This can be seen in the prominence of relatively 
arbitrary words, such as ‘Lancaster’ and ‘1950s’, and indicates that the sample of sentences 
extracted by the Python code for these two prime ministers was small. Nevertheless, this has 
yielded potentially useful insights for further study.  
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Figure 5:2. Word cloud showing frequency of words in John Major’s sentences containing specific 
history keywords, excluding those keywords 
Figure 5:3. Word cloud showing frequency of words in Tony Blair’s sentences containing specific 
history keywords, excluding those keywords 
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Figure 5:4. Word cloud showing frequency of words in Gordon Brown’s sentences containing 
specific history keywords, excluding those keywords 
 
Figure 5:5. Word cloud showing frequency of words in David Cameron’s sentences containing 
specific history keywords, excluding those keywords 
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5.2 Thematic Content Analysis 
The findings from the additional quantitative tools in the previous section help reveal ways 
in which British prime ministers refer to history in the context of Africa. Taking these into 
consideration alongside the literature and knowledge of the speeches gained from reading 
them in the data collection stage, three sub-themes have been derived to guide the thematic 
content analysis. These centre on the role of colonial history, the role of the Commonwealth 
(see Figure 5:1), and the role of sports with particular reference to cricket (see Figure 5:2). 
This section explores the ways in which the four prime ministers talk about this history, with 
a focus on the elements they emphasise and diminish, as well as an assessment of 
continuities and discontinuities in this. 
 
5.2.1 Commonality Rooted in Colonial History 
This section begins by looking at the way in which Major, Blair and Cameron distance 
themselves from Britain’s colonial history in their speeches. It then moves on to look at 
examples where British prime ministers refer to Africa as a common concern for Britain and 
other countries with colonial legacies in Africa, and contrasts this with examples where 
Africa is a common concern for all countries regardless of whether they have historical links 
to the continent. This indicates that portrayals of British engagement with Africa has 
developed from being rooted in colonial history to being rooted in mutual self-interest.  
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During Major’s 1994 keynote speech to the South African National Assembly (JM94f)23, he 
presents a positive picture of Britain’s ‘benign’ history in Africa. He accomplishes this by 
presenting Britain as a reluctant coloniser with benevolent intentions.  
 
We British were relative late-comers to Africa […] Trade rather than colonisation was 
the reason for early British and European contacts with Africa. Benign commerce turned 
however into the slave trade […] The British Parliament outlawed this moral outrage in 
1807 and the Dutch followed 7 years later. […] Christian missionaries travelled 
courageously through Africa, but in turn they unwittingly paved the way for the harsh 
incursions of rival empire builders.  
 
This speech is analysed in more detail in the CDA section of this chapter, but this condensed 
extract helps understand the broad way in which the history between Britain and Africa is 
framed. It also allows for comparison with Blair and Cameron. In 2007, Blair gave a video 
speech marking the 200th anniversary of the British Parliament legislating to abolish the slave 
trade in the British Empire (TB07e)24. Blair’s speech shows the way in which responsibility 
for atrocities committed by Britain is accepted on the one hand, but dismissed on the other 
– and the way in which the tension between these two narratives are balanced. This speech 
will also be explored in detail in the CDA section of this chapter, but in this thematic 
content analysis it helps to understand the way in which Blair frames Britain’s historical 
involvement. He focuses on the role of British abolitionists and Britain’s role in ending the 
                                                 
23 John Major (20th September, 1994), South African National Assembly, Cape Town, South Africa. 
24 Tony Blair (25th March, 2007), video speech broadcast in Elmina Castle, Ghana. 
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slave trade, saying: ‘The people who fought against slavery came from all walks of life. They 
include former enslaved Africans like Olaudah Equiano, church leaders like Thomas 
Clarkson and statesmen like William Wilberforce’. 
 
Another way in which Blair achieves this can be seen in a speech he gave in Addis Ababa 
(TB04h).25 In this example, he simply ignores this difficult history using the false equivalency 
that ‘painful as it is for all of us’:  
 
And yet as a result of history, as a result of a huge complexity of problems that have beset 
Africa over many decades, some of which we needn’t even go back into, painful as it is for 
all of us, as a result of these problems, these people with all this talent and ability can't make 
their lives work.  
 
Cameron also attempts to distance himself from Britain’s colonial history – but he achieves 
this in a different way to Major and Blair. In his 2011 speech to the Pan-African University 
in Nigeria (DC11f)26, he presents himself as a young new leader who is completely removed 
from the administrations that came before him. This reflects the way in which he had run for 
leader of the Conservative Party in 2005 and then as prime minister in 2010. He argues: 
 
‘I passionately believe in liberal democracy… and I believe Africa can do it too. Let me be 
clear: this isn’t about imposing Western beliefs on Africa or neo-colonialism. I’m from the 
                                                 
25 Tony Blair (7th October, 2004), Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 
26 David Cameron (19th July, 2011), Pan-African University, Lagos, Nigeria. 
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generation free of this shadow. I wasn’t even born when Harold MacMillan made his 
winds of change speech. And I’ll be the first to say, we have our own work to do keeping 
democracy strong back at home. This is about what will work for Africa - and what we are 
seeing work’.  
 
In doing so, Cameron attempts to frame Britain’s historical role in Africa as part of history 
so far in the past that it is no longer relevant to modern British national identity. This 
represents a contrast from the methods used by Major and Blair, who acknowledged the link 
between this colonial past in Africa and Britain’s modern identity.  
 
A flaw of many discussions of Britain and Africa in the literature is that they tend to – 
explicitly or implicitly – work on the assumption that British politicians formulate their 
policy stance in isolation and have an agenda to ‘use’ Africa in a way that is advantageous 
specifically to Britain. One such instance is to project an image of British morality (Ero, 
2001; Chandler, 2003; Gallagher, 2013; Harrison, 2013). However, a study of the speeches 
reveals a problem with this argument.  
 
There are many examples of Africa being a focus across countries, with British prime 
ministers thanking other countries for their work on Africa – both countries with colonial 
histories in Africa, as well as countries that do not have colonial legacies. This indicates that 
there has been a desire by British prime ministers to reframe British engagement with Africa 
as being rooted in mutual self-interest, partnership and cooperation instead of colonial 
history. This is important because it suggests a different rationale for engagement with Africa 
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– one that extends beyond individual prime ministers or even Britain. For example – Major 
says that Britain and France have a joint obligation to Africa, and that this obligation is 
rooted in their historic ties to Africa (JM95d)27:  
 
Britain and France are both European countries a worldwide outlook. […] We are Permanent 
Members of the United Nations Security Council and participants in the Economic Summits. 
And we both have obligations to parts of the world, like Africa, where we have long-
standing and historic ties. […] Both of us have long, historic and very strong interests 
in Africa. We are launching today a joint initiative on conflict resolution and peacekeeping in 
Africa. We shall help African countries to develop their own capabilities and shall invite 
Western European Union partners to join us in sending advisory teams to Africa.  
 
This could be interpreted as an attempt to diminish the legacy and impact of Britain’s 
colonial history by shifting the blame onto other Western European countries who also 
engaged in the ‘Scramble for Africa’ in the late nineteenth century. However, the context of 
Major’s speech – delivered as part of a joint press conference with President Chirac, and as 
such not explicitly about Africa in any way – points towards a more altruistic rationale; a 
joint approach to tackle problems in Africa based on a common outlook and with an 
acknowledgement of a joint history. This latter explanation is reinforced by Major later in the 
same speech28: 
  
                                                 
27 John Major (30th October, 1995), joint press conference with President Chirac, London, UK. 
28 John Major (30th October, 1995), joint press conference with President Chirac, London, UK. 
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[Britain and France] are the only two European nations that are nuclear powers, that have a 
worldwide interest, that sit on the United Nations Security Council, that have long-standing 
historical interests in large parts of the world like Africa and it is upon that basis that 
we have a common outlook on many problems. And it was that common outlook, 
based on common background, common history and common interests, that led the 
President and I to conclude that there was ample scope for a global partnership.29  
 
In contrast to Major’s reference to colonial history as the rationale for a collective focus on 
Africa, subsequent prime ministers do not refer to it explicitly. In a joint press conference 
with German chancellor Angela Merkel, Brown (GB07c)30 thanks Germany31 for the success 
of their presidency of the G8 and their focus on Africa: ‘I would also like to congratulate you 
on the success of your G8 Presidency […] it is in no small measure due to your leadership 
that the G8 have such a successful conclusion, both on climate change and on making 
progress on Africa.’  
 
Two examples from Cameron show that Africa more recently has become a common focus 
even for countries that did not engage in empire building. In 2011, Cameron said that Africa 
                                                 
29 The ‘Further Research’ section (see 10.3.2) presents ways in which research into France’s historical 
role and legacy in Africa (Françafrique) can build on this thesis by adopting the framework but 
applying it to the speeches of French presidents.  
30 Gordon Brown (16th July, 2007), Berlin, Germany. 
31 Although Germany was not initially involved in colonialism in Africa, its 1871 victory in the 
Franco-Prussian War led to imperial ambitions, and Germany gradually took over Kamerun, Togo, 
Tanganyika, and Ruanda-Urundi (Klinghoffer, 2006: 80). 
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has and should continue to be a common focus for Britain and Russia32, although with that 
focus being grounded in security. In a speech in Moscow (DC11i)33, Cameron said: 
 
We have shared interests in stability in the Middle East and North Africa too.  I know 
we have not always agreed, Britain and Russia, about how to achieve that stability.  Let me put 
my cards on the table: the view I have come to is that the stability of corrupt and violent 
repressive dictatorships […] like Gaddafi’s in Libya, is a false stability. 
 
Similarly, in a speech in China (DC13k)34, Cameron said: ‘We’re [Britain and China] also 
working together on global challenges, […] joint work on trade and investment to lift 
African countries out of poverty. We both want an ambitious WTO deal in Bali this week, 
and we have agreed to share expertise and strengthen peacekeeping missions in Africa.’ 
 
The two competing explanations provided for this shift are not mutually exclusive. Prime 
ministers’ desire to sanitise Britain’s historical legacy in Africa is not incompatible with the 
concept that Africa has become a broader matter of mutual self-interest for countries across 
the world. However, this latter explanation also reveals an important factor about Britain’s 
national identity; it indicates Britain no longer commands the hard and soft power to 
‘govern’ in Africa as it did during the days of the British Empire, and could therefore be seen 
as a sign of British decline.   
                                                 
32 In 1889, Russia established the settlement of Sagallo in the Gulf of Tadjoura (present day Djibouti) 
but this lasted less than two months (Henze, 1991: 67). 
33 David Cameron (12th September, 2011), Moscow, Russia. 




This section has uncovered some of the strategies Major, Blair, and Cameron use to distance 
themselves from Britain’s colonial history in Africa. It also reveals how concerns about 
Africa had initially been presented a common cause for Britain and countries with colonial 
legacies there, and how this has developed to a broader concern rooted in common self-
interest – such as trade and security (which are dealt with in more detail in subsequent 
chapters). 
 
5.2.2 Britain And The Commonwealth: Primus Inter Pares 
Having looked at the way in which British prime ministers in the post-Cold War period have 
referred to Africa in their speeches in terms of the broad shared history between Africa and 
Britain, this section focuses specifically on the use of the Commonwealth as a means of 
doing this. The evolution of the institution itself shows how this relationship between Britain 
and Africa has changed over time – first as an organisation that stipulated that membership 
required dominionhood (as laid out in the 1931 Statute of Westminster), and later as a free 
association of independent member nations (as laid out in the 1949 London Declaration)  
(Lloyd, 1997). Members of the Commonwealth have no legal or political obligations, but 
rather are apparently united by language, history, and culture. In 1970, Queen Elizabeth II 
said in her Christmas address that the Commonwealth was ‘a special family – a family of 
nations’ (The Royal Family, 1970). As such, its prominence in these speeches (particularly 
under Major) is noteworthy because it suggests that the Commonwealth is as much a 




McIntyre (2001: 3) argues that although the Commonwealth went through a ‘renaissance’ in 
the 1990s, it never captured the imagination of the UK government. Martin and Garnett 
(1997: 58), for example, contend that for Major’s government it remained ‘an institution 
relegated to the back burner’. In 1996, the Foreign Affairs Committee issued a report 
criticising the government for not paying more attention and devoting greater resources to 
the Commonwealth, arguing that the Commonwealth was an asset of significant potential 
for consolidating the UK’s interests beyond the Euro-Atlantic area (Williams, 2005a: 381). 
 
In contrast to this apparent lack of focus on the Commonwealth, it appears to play a 
prominent part in the speeches of Major in relation to Africa. This can be seen in Figure 5:1, 
but a deep textual analysis is required to understand this information in context. This focus 
on the Commonwealth increasingly declines under Blair, Brown, and Cameron – although it 
re-emerges briefly towards the end of Cameron’s premiership in 2016, which coincides with 
the vote on Britain’s membership of the European Union. 
 
Although the Commonwealth is referred to less frequently in Blair’s speeches, there is much 
continuity between Major and Blair in terms of how they use the Commonwealth to talk 
about the commonalities between the different member states. In Major’s 1991 speech in 
Harare, he talks about the common factors that unite the Commonwealth (JM91j)35:  
 
                                                 
35 John Major (21st October, 1991), Harare, Zimbabwe. 
 
138 
In the past from time to time the Commonwealth has often been divided. But the factors 
which unite it have always brought the members together again. And when we sit round the 
table it is quite remarkable to contemplate nearly fifty countries from every continent. The 
superficial differences are clearly vast - size, wealth, colour, religion - but sitting down 
together we do all speak the same language both literally and metaphorically. I can 
think of no other international meeting of this sort that needs no interpreter or any other 
meeting where as the Prime Minister of St Lucia remarked the other evening “It is not 
cricket”36 and everybody knew precisely what he meant. 
 
Blair echoes this sentiment about shared values and language in the Commonwealth at the 
beginning of his premiership (TB97b)37, in an address to the Commonwealth Business 
Forum.  
 
The Commonwealth should not be reluctant to take on an economic role and an economic 
profile. We have a common language in a global economy in the information age. We have 
common values that can shape the way we work. We have many shared practices, similar 
legal and accounting systems. And we can do more business with each other if we make 
more of these advantages. 
 
The focus on English as a common language by both Major and Blair is important – 
especially as English is only one of hundreds of languages spoken in the Commonwealth, 
                                                 
36 Although the latter part of this quote is not specifically about Africa, it helps introduce the next 
sub-theme in section 6.2.3. 
37 Tony Blair (22nd October, 1997), Commonwealth Business Forum. 
 
139 
and is not the primary language for many Commonwealth citizens. As discussed extensively 
in Chapter 2, language is central to national identity. The nation is a meaningful notion in 
everyday life because people talk about it; they make discursive claims for, about and in the 
name of the nation. One principal way in which the nation has been legitimised throughout 
history is by way of sharing a common language. Indeed, sharing a common language may 
be seen as one of the hallmarks of a nation.38 
 
In this way, the Commonwealth appears to act as a sort of imagined community in which 
historical circumstances have provided Britain and the British prime minister the platform to 
claim to speak on behalf of the whole institution and the people it represents. The 
similarities between Major and Blair go beyond stating that the Commonwealth shares 
certain values and institutions. Both, for example, explicitly reference the Commonwealth as 
an arena in which Britain’s history of empire and colonialism can be transformed into a new 
identity. Major told the Conservative Party conference in 1994 (JM94m)39: 
  
a generation ago it was said that Britain had lost an empire but not yet found a role. It may 
or may not have been true then, but it surely isn't true today, because economically and 
militarily Britain remains in the top league - a member of the permanent five of the United 
Nations, a leading member of NATO, of the European Union, and of a Commonwealth that 
covers one-third of all the people on earth, a member of the Group of Seven of the worlds’ 
                                                 
38 There are, of course, notable exceptions to this – such as Canada (see Freake, Gentil and 
Sheyholislami (2011) for the construction of national identity in a bilingual context) 
39 John Major (14th October, 1994), Conservative Party Conference, Bournemouth, UK. 
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most powerful economies and one of only five significant nuclear powers in the world, and we 
have too as a priceless asset, perhaps the finest professional armed forces anywhere. That is 
Britain today, stripped of the masking-tape so often placed above it. So let’s recognise what we 
are, look with confidence at the new world, and go out and put our own distinctive British 
mark on it.  
 
Once again, Blair strongly echoes the essential argument put forward by Major – which helps 
explain the frustration expressed by Douglas Hurd that New Labour’s shift of 2 or 3 degrees 
was presented as a shift of 180 in foreign policy thinking (quoted in Abrahamsen and 
Williams, 2001: 260). In his second term in office, Blair made a speech in India (TB02a)40, in 
which he said: 
 
For Britain, there is both challenge and opportunity. The days of Empire are long gone. […] 
We are not a superpower, but we can act as a pivotal partner, acting with others to make 
sense of this global interdependence and make it a force for good, for our own nation and 
the wider world. In so doing, I believe we have found a modern foreign policy role for 
Britain. In part this is by virtue of our history. Our past gives us huge, perhaps 
unparalleled connections with many different regions of the world. We are strong allies 
of the US. We are part of the European Union. Our ties with the Commonwealth […] are 
visibly strengthening. […] It is generally accepted that our development assistance 
programmes, massively increased since 1997, give us an opening to help partner countries 
achieve their goals. The initiative on Africa is one prime example. 
                                                 
40 Tony Blair (5th January 2002), Confederation of Indian Industry, Bangalore, India. 
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Major’s speeches that refer to the Commonwealth do, however, have a unique aspect to 
them. He uses his position to advocate for democracy and human rights, and to push for 
‘sound economic and political management’ in the Commonwealth. In the context of the fall 
of the Berlin Wall, this is about the virtues of capitalism over socialism.  This usage of the 
Commonwealth in this way is an attempt to steer former British colonies without appearing 
paternalistic by suggesting that these are collective values that must be upheld by all 
members. We see this, for example, on Major’s visit to Harare (JM91h)41:  
 
This meeting must set the framework for the Commonwealth of the 1990s, we must build on 
our existing strengths, make the most of new possibilities. But the bedrock of what we must 
do must be the general application of democracy and human rights. It is on that basis 
that we can build good government and economic prosperity. 
 
Major’s use of ‘we’ in this speech is important to focus on because it is not meant literally. 
Major is not calling into question Britain’s democracy or record on human rights, but it is 
less paternalistic that the more accurate ‘you’. Volmert (1989: 123) argues: ‘A speaker has 
at his/her disposal a whole range of (clever) options with which to present the interests 
and affairs of ‘we-groups’ in the public sphere. […] a speaker can unite himself and his 
audience into a single ‘community sharing a common destiny’ by letting fall into oblivion 
                                                 




all differences in origin, confession, class and lifestyle with a simple ‘we’’. Major echoes 
this sentiment in later in this same trip in Zimbabwe (JM91j)42: 
 
All the members of the Commonwealth have pledged themselves to democracy, the rule of law 
and fundamental human rights as well as the sound economic and political management. In 
short, all those matters that collectively come together under the term of good government. 
 
The Commonwealth largely disappears as a theme under Brown and Cameron’s coalition 
government (as seen in Figure 5:1), but begins to emerge towards the end of Cameron’s time 
in office – as leader of a majority Conservative government – and the vote on Britain’s 
membership of the EU. Cameron uses it to make the case for Britain’s engagement with the 
world. For example, in the final speech in the sample of speeches gathered, Cameron’s 
speech to EasyJet (DC16f)43, he says: 
 
We care about tackling climate change; we care about trying to alleviate poverty in Africa; 
we know we need to have the world’s trade lanes open for British business and enterprise. And 
I absolutely believe, if you want a big, bold, strong United Kingdom, then you want to be in 
organisations like a reformed European Union, rather than outside of them. Britain is part of 
the G7, we’re part of the G20, we’re part of NATO, which helps to keep our defences strong. 
We are a very important part of the Commonwealth, which brings about a third of 
humanity together in one organisation. And we’re members of the European Union. Being 
                                                 
42 John Major (21st October, 1991), press conference, Harare, Zimbabwe. 
43 David Cameron (24th May, 2016), EasyJet, Luton, UK. 
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in these organisations doesn’t diminish our standing and our strength in the world, in my view. 
It enhances it. 
 
In contrast to Major’s frequent and detailed references to the Commonwealth, Cameron 
only refers to the Commonwealth in passing alongside other institutions such as NATO and 
the EU. In doing so, he suggests that Britain’s national identity is increasingly tied to its role 
as part of a complex network of institutions in which Britain is on equal terms with the other 
members.  
 
This second sub-theme has shown that although the Commonwealth is an organisation with 
no legal or political obligations, it remains a powerful ‘imagined community’. Despite 
asserting it is a free and equal association of independent states, the Commonwealth’s history 
means that British prime ministers are more able to claim to speak ‘on behalf’ of the 
Commonwealth than any other figure (except the Queen). That is, Britain is primus inter pares 
in the Commonwealth. One way in which this can be seen is Major and Blair’s emphasis on 
English as a common factor that unites the Commonwealth, despite the fact that it is not the 
primary language for many Commonwealth citizens. As such, this helps provide British 
prime ministers with the platform to discursively construct the Commonwealth in a way that 
suits Britain. For Major, this enables him to use it as a means to express ‘proper’ economic 
policies for former British colonies in the aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall in a slightly 





In Major’s speeches that reference Africa, the role of sport – and in particular, cricket – 
emerges as an important theme. Indeed, he mentions cricket in nine out of the forty-eight 
speeches in the sample, representing almost a fifth. This finding is reinforced by its 
prominence in Figure 5:2. This finding is a new addition to the post-Cold War UK-Africa 
literature, and is noteworthy because the way in which he talked about Africa in turn reveals 
the way he viewed Britain’s relationship with Africa. For Major, sport is a way to talk about 
the commonalities between Britain and Africa (sometimes the Commonwealth more 
broadly) in a way that transcends politics, and suggest shared values and shared history that 
go beyond self-interest. This is a unique phenomenon in the speeches of John Major, and is 
one that clearly distinguishes him from his three successors – and as such is a discontinuity 
in the framing of UK-Africa relations. 
 
The role of sports and cricket in the British Empire has been the subject of much discussion 
in academic literature – however this has not been explicitly linked to the role it played in 
UK-Africa relations post-Cold War. At a broader level, Holt (1989: 212) contends that 
‘sports were thought to help create a climate of relations that would bind the Empire 
together’. Indeed, the Victorian cricket legend W. G. Grace wrote in his memoirs that ‘the 
good fellowship born on the cricket-field has done more than is recognised to knit together 
the various sections of the British Empire and to advance the cause of civilisation’ (Grace, 




Perkin (1989: 145) goes further, arguing that ‘in the case of Britain and its Empire […], sport 
played a part in holding the Empire together and also, paradoxically, in emancipating the 
subject nations from tutelage. Thus it helped the Empire to decolonize [sic] on a friendlier 
basis than any other in the world’s history, and so contributed to the transformation of the 
British Empire into the Commonwealth of Nations’. A compelling reason for the power of 
such sports is provided by Mangan (1992: 2): ‘games, especially cricket, were elevated by the 
middle classes to the status of a moral discipline. […] Eventually, cricket became the symbol 
par excellence of imperial solidarity and superiority epitomizing [sic] a set of consolidatory 
moral imperatives that both exemplified and explained imperial ambition and achievement. 
It became a political metaphor as much as an imperial game’.  
 
The notion of sport as an historic ‘political metaphor’ between members of the 
Commonwealth helps to explain how it offered Major an opportunity to talk about lifting 
sanctions on South Africa and bringing it back into the international community. Indeed, 
Major himself says precisely this in a speech to the National Sporting Club at the Café Royal 
in London (JM91e)44: 
 
I was delighted this year to see South Africa readmitted by the International Olympics 
Committee and personally delighted to see South Africa come back into international cricket 
and I look forward to seeing them play at our great cricket grounds before too long. The 
government may have done what it could to bring that about through quiet diplomacy, 
                                                 
44 John Major (19th September, 1991), National Sporting Club, Café Royal, London, UK. 
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but cricket itself did a good deal more […] the field of sport played a very positive role 
indeed 
 
This shows how the focus on sport and cricket provides Major with an opportunity to 
project a national identity that appears less self-interested and more focused on shared 
values. This can be seen again in Major’s keynote address to the Parliament of South Africa 
in 1994 (JM94f)45: 
 
South Africa is one of the world’s great sporting nations; our sportsmen and sportswomen 
have had memorable encounters over the years; they have had memorable encounters this year 
on the cricket and rugby fields and at the Commonwealth Games but your sporting 
opportunities are not yet evenly distributed yet and we would like to help you spread 
them to each and every part of your community. 
 
Major not only used sport as a lens through which to reflect commonalities between Britain 
and Africa on an international level – he also used it to find common ground between 
himself and people from ethnic minority, such as Afro-Caribbean, backgrounds in Britain. 
His doing so represents an attempt to define Britishness and British national identity as a set 
of common values, beliefs, and pursuits – rather than an identity based on ethnic 
background (JM91f)46. 
 
                                                 
45 John Major (20th September, 1994), South African National Assembly, Cape Town, South Africa. 
46 John Major (25th September, 1991), Windsor Fellowship, London, UK. 
 
147 
I know from personal experience what a vital and rich contribution people from the ethnic 
minorities can make. […] when I revisited Brixton to open a nursery at St Paul's Church, I had 
the opportunity of talking to the new youngsters who live in Brixton. And just like my 
generation, what they wanted to talk about was cricket and football and the same sort 
of things that concerned me so many years ago. 
 
It is important to note that the link between sport and Africa is briefly mentioned in 
sports politics literature, such as Bale (2002); Grix and Carmichael (2012); Giampiccoli 
and Nauright (2019). Although these discussions are broadly tangential to the focus of this 
thesis, the literature specifically relating to Major is worth examining here. Bale (2002: xvii) 
notes that in 1995, Major supported a scheme to send ‘sporting missionaries’ to Africa. 
Major saw the continent as holding ‘a vast reserve army of athletic talent that could be 
used as sports labor [sic] in the global sports economy’ (Nauright and Amara, 2018: 2).  
 
This view is rooted in history, according to Bale. He notes that in 1995, The Times reported 
on Major’s idea and illustrated the story with a photograph of a young Tutsi man leaping 
over the heads of two European visitors. The photograph represented the ‘treasure [that 
was] to be found in late twentieth-century Africa’ and ‘communicated an image of African 
athleticism’ (Bale, 2002: xvii). The article in the Times that accompanied the photo implied 
‘the need for the more civilised Europe to rescue African athletes from their primitive 
conditions by giving them the gift of Western sports. In this way, they could be taken to a 




This sub-theme around the role of sport – and in particular, cricket – in Major’s speeches 
reveals a similarity to the previous sub-theme on the Commonwealth. For Major, sport is a 
way to talk about the commonalities between Britain and Africa in a way that transcends 
politics, and suggest shared values and shared history that go beyond self-interest. This is a 
unique phenomenon in the speeches of Major, and is one that clearly distinguishes him from 
his three successors. In a similar fashion, the Commonwealth is also a means of expressing 




5.3 Critical Discourse Analysis 
In the thematic content analysis, we found that there are three sub-themes that emerge in the 
way in which British prime minister’s talk about Africa in relation to history. In this section, 
specific speeches will be analysed in greater detail using the Discourse-Historical Approach. 
The speeches selected for analysis in terms of history are given below in Table 5:2, along 
with details about the speeches. One speech each was selected for Major, Blair and 
Cameron. As we have seen in the thematic content analysis, Brown has been largely absent 
from this chapter because he does not use this framing to talk about Africa – and so a 
discourse analysis is not necessary. These speeches were selected based on coding that was 
carried out with NVivo (section 4.5), the quantitative analysis at the beginning of this chapter 
(section 5.1) and from the thematic content analysis in the previous section (section 5.2). 
These speeches were also chosen for their focus on the link between Africa and history in 
sufficient depth to discuss the discursive strategies used.  
 
Table 5:2. History-related speeches selected for critical discourse analysis 
Prime Minister Date of Speech Location 
John Major 20/09/1994 
South African 
National Assembly, 
Cape Town, South 
Africa 
Tony Blair 25/03/2007 
Video speech in 
Elmina Castle, 
Ghana 






The first speech selected for Critical Discourse Analysis in relation to history is Major’s 1994 
address to the South African National Assembly in Cape Town. Figure 5.1 from the 
quantitative analysis chapter showed there was a ‘spike’ in references to Africa in 1994, in 
which three and then five separate speeches about Africa were delivered on consecutive 
days. These speeches were given on the 20th and 21st September 1994, and were part of 
Major’s visit to South Africa – the first by a British prime minister in 34 years. Major’s 
speech to the South African National Assembly was the keynote address of this tour. In his 
memoirs, Major (2000: 509) recalls: 
 
I visited South Africa in September 1994, five months after the first fully democratic elections 
in the country’s history, and addressed both Houses of Parliament. There was a limit to how 
much practical help Britain could give out of an overseas aid budget that is targeted at the very 
poorest nations, but I promised £100 million of assistance. Afterwards, at lunch - in the room 
in which, over thirty years earlier, Harold Macmillan had delivered his famous ‘Wind of 
Change’ speech - I saw something of the remarkable spirit that had taken the country into the 
new era. Former inmates of the notorious prison on Robben Island sat chatting with white 
MPs who had served in the previous National Party government. 
 
In this speech, as discussed in the thematic content analysis, he portrays a positive picture of 
Britain’s ‘benign’ history in Africa. He accomplishes this in two ways. Firstly, he presents 
Britain as a reluctant coloniser with benevolent intentions. The second way is to highlight 
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the joint service of Britain and South Africa in the World Wars against a common enemy 
and for a common cause (JM, 1994f)47: 
 
To make a new beginning we must first look the past in the eye. It is there in our hearts, it is 
there in our joint history, so let us be frank about what has united us and also about what has 
divided us. We British were relative late-comers to Africa, but in the 400 years since Sir 
Francis Drake’s epic voyage of 1580 we have been deeply involved with this continent. Trade 
rather than colonisation was the reason for early British and European contacts with Africa. 
Benign commerce turned however into the slave trade and at the height of the 18th 
century into the transportation of over 6 million Africans. The British Parliament 
outlawed this moral outrage in 1807 and the Dutch followed 7 years later. As the 19th 
century progressed philanthropic explorers and Christian missionaries travelled courageously 
through Africa, but in turn they unwittingly paved the way for the harsh incursions of rival 
empire builders, and at the century's end right and wrong mingled on each side in the Boer 
wars and left a bitter legacy.  
 
This extract shows how Major diminishes the negative elements of Britain’s colonial 
legacy. Instead of focusing on the historical consequences of colonialism, which would be 
extremely challenging given his audience, Major instead centres this section of his speech 
on Britain’s intentions. As this is more nebulous, it is easier to obfuscate and diminish 
Britain’s role. Major employs a variety of ‘justificatory’ strategies – particularly 
‘trivialisation’ strategies such as avoidance and euphemising. For example, Major refers 
                                                 
47 John Major (20th September, 1994), South African National Assembly, Cape Town, South Africa. 
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simply to being ‘deeply involved’ in Africa and the ‘transportation of over 6 million 
Africans’, rather than acknowledging conditions and horrors they suffered. These are 
examples of what Wodak et al. (2009) refer to as a ‘euphemistic verb obscuring agent’. 
 
This can also be seen in his argument that the British were ‘late-comers to Africa’ – which 
he later reinforces through the use of ‘unwittingly’. This theme is continued with the 
assertion that Britain’s intentions were ‘trade rather than colonisation’ and ‘benign 
commerce’, and then by a claim to moral superiority by abolishing the slave trade before 
the Dutch. Major also asserts a claim to truth by his use of ‘let us be frank’, which is a 
linguistic strategy to lend weight to his assertions.  There other examples of Major using a 
similar rhetorical technique. Later in this speech, he says: ‘Britain would like to work 
closely with South Africa to turn the tide at last in this Continent in which my nation has 
been so deeply involved for so many years’ – which is a way to hint at the lasting legacies 
of European colonialism without addressing it in name. Similarly, in his speech to the 
Western European Union Assembly (JM96a)48, he simply says: ‘History, culture and trade 
bind Europe to virtually all parts of the globe: from the Mediterranean to the Far East, 
from Africa to Latin America’. 
 
Focusing back on Major’s 1994 speech to the South African National Assembly, he jumps 
from this sanitised account of Britain’s colonial past and juxtaposes it with more recent 
history – when Britain and South Africa fought together in the World Wars.  
                                                 
48 John Major (23rd March, 1996), Western European Union Assembly, London, UK. 
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And yet despite these recent wounds, former adversaries from Britain and South Africa 
fought side by side in two World wars, in Flanders, in East Africa, in North Africa, in 
Europe, on the ground and in the air. We in Britain owe those South Africans - from all the 
country’s main communities - a great debt of gratitude. They joined us in a common cause 
and they were ready to make, and did make, a common sacrifice.  
 
As noted in Chapter 2, an important aspect of the role of history in the construction of 
national identity is the role of ‘forgetting’. Anderson (1983) argues that the very act of 
forgetting affirms the national site of memory. Or, as Gourgouris (1996) puts it, the act of 
forgetting is a matter of the national will – a ritualised performance of the will to forget. In 
this extract, we see Major use this framing to shape a British national identity that portrays 
South Africa as an equal partner.  
 
Another important point in this extract to note is Major’s use of ‘from all the country’s main 
communities’. This appears to be an attempt by Major to move beyond remarks made by 
Conservative politicians in the mid to late 1980s during Thatcher’s premiership. In 1987, 
Thatcher (1987)49 said in a press conference that ‘a considerable number of the ANC leaders 
are communists’, and concluded that ‘when the ANC says that they will target British 
companies, this shows what a typical terrorist organization it is’ (McSmith, 2013). In 
                                                 
49 Margaret Thatcher (17th October, 1987), Vancouver Trade and Convention Centre, 
Commonwealth Summit, Vancouver, Canada. 
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addition, Teddy Taylor MP50 declared that Mandela ‘should be shot’, whilst Terry Dicks 
MP51 asked: ‘How much longer will the Prime Minister allow herself to be kicked in the face 
by this black terrorist?’. As well as sanitising the distant history of colonialism, this shows 
Major’s attempt to distance himself from more recent history too. 
 
The second speech to be studied in detail is Blair’s 2007 video speech on the 200th 
anniversary of the British Parliament legislating to abolish the slave trade in the British 
Empire (TB07e)52. The context and occasion of this speech make it difficult to dismiss 
Britain’s historical involvement in Africa; it was an event held specifically to acknowledge 
Britain’s role in the slave trade, and was broadcast in Elmina Castle – a major historical hub 
of trans-Atlantic slave trade, and a site of many atrocities and abuses. Despite this, it is used 
as an opportunity to simultaneously accept responsibility for Britain’s historical role in the 
slave trade but also to take credit for Britain’s historical role in abolishing it. The way in 
which the tension between these two narratives is balanced is revealing because it helps to 
understand the narration of British national identity.  
 
It is important to briefly consider the specific context of this speech. Richards (2005: 617), 
who focuses on Ghana’s slave ‘castle-dungeons’, including Elmina Castle – the audience for 
this speech – notes: 
                                                 
50 Sir Edward (Teddy) Taylor, Conservative MP for Glasgow Cathcart (1964 – 1979); Rochford and 
Southend East (1980 – 1997). 
51 Terence (Terry) Dicks, Conservative MP for Hayes and Harlington (1983 – 1997). 
52 Tony Blair (25th March, 2007), video speech played in Elmina Castle, Ghana. 
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Like theatre, memory is constructed through processes of selecting, repeating, forgetting – 
willfully as well as unconsciously – and re-assembling narratives. […] No matter how much we 
strive for a full recuperation of a past event, our selection of facts, the emphases we devote, 
and the meanings we make are determined by our location in the present; we remember for 
some purpose, most often expressed as a need to learn how the past can instruct our present 
and future. 
 
Blair begins the speech by acknowledging the scale of the atrocities committed and Britain’s 
historical involvement in this, calling the transatlantic slave trade ‘one of the most shameful 
enterprises in history’. This theme is present in the first quarter of the speech, and the 
adjectives used in this part of the speech help emphasise this. For example, he goes on to 
highlight the ‘inhumane abuse’ suffered by people at Elmina Castle, but also ‘in cities across 
the UK – in Liverpool, Hull, Bristol and London which played their role in this deplorable 
trade’. This theme reaches its peak with the sentence: ‘It is an opportunity for the United 
Kingdom to express our deep sorrow and regret for our nation’s role in this inhumanity and 
for the unbearable suffering, individually and collectively, the slave trade caused.’  
 
This section segues into the next theme, which qualifies this acknowledgement of 
wrongdoing with a shift of focus to abolitionism, and with it Britain’s claim to rightness. 
Blair offers one African and two British abolitionists in his example: ‘the people who fought 
against slavery came from all walks of life. They include former enslaved Africans like 
Olaudah Equiano, church leaders like Thomas Clarkson and statesmen like William 
Wilberforce’. This is significant because it shows a shift in conceptualisation of national 
 
156 
identity from a colonising nation to one of an emancipator. The second theme continues and 
goes beyond famous abolitionists to suggest that the spirit of abolitionism was embodied in 
‘countless’ people in Africa and Britain: ‘But the campaign also involved countless men and 
women, black and white, now forgotten by history, from across Africa, including Ghana, 
from Britain and many other countries’.   
 
Importantly, this second theme then offers an opportunity for Blair to focus on Britain’s 
current aid and development commitments to Africa, as well as its role in tackling modern 
day slavery – which fills the latter half of the speech. This shows how a speech about the 
200th anniversary of the end of the slave trade in the British Empire is used to talk about 
British government policy achievements.  
 
Debt relief, for example, has enabled health care charges to be scrapped in Zambia. It has 
released the investment to build 2,500 primary schools in Tanzania so they can meet their 
target of universal primary education years ahead of schedule. There's been increased funding 
to tackle AIDS, already providing 1.6 million in poor countries with anti-retroviral drugs. 
Britain is determined to continue to lead the drive to overcome all these challenges. 





The final speech selected for CDA in the context of history is Cameron’s 2011 speech to the 
Pan-African University in Nigeria (DC, 2011f).53 As seen in the thematic content analysis 
section, he uses this to present himself as a young new leader who is removed from the 
administrations that came before him. 
  
‘I passionately believe in liberal democracy… and I believe Africa can do it too. Let me be 
clear: this isn’t about imposing Western beliefs on Africa or neo-colonialism. I’m from the 
generation free of this shadow. I wasn’t even born when Harold MacMillan made his 
winds of change speech. And I’ll be the first to say, we have our own work to do keeping 
democracy strong back at home. This is about what will work for Africa - and what we are 
seeing work’.  
  
Unlike Major and Blair, however, Cameron rarely refers to Britain’s historical legacy in 
Africa. Instead, looking at this speech in more detail, we can see other ways in which this 
focus of this speech is about making a break with recent history and looking to the future. 
This is aimed at three audiences simultaneously: the immediate audience in Nigeria, the 
public in the UK, and the Conservative Party.  His focus on trade is an attempt to distance 
himself from the recent history of New Labour for all these audiences, whilst his 
commitment to aid represents a significant shift for the leader of a party that has traditionally 
been sceptical about the effectiveness of aid.  
 
                                                 
53 David Cameron (19th July, 2011), Pan-African University, Lagos, Nigeria. 
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Today, Britain accounts for less than four percent of Africa’s exports. That’s almost three 
times less than China - and one of the reasons I’m here is to make sure we catch up. It’s why 
I’ve brought a plane full of business leaders. And it’s why we want to do more to extend 
loan guarantees and trade finance to British companies that are looking to do business in 
Africa. Because we see Africa in a new way, a different way. Yes, a place to invest our aid.  
But above all a place to trade. 
 
Throughout the speech, Cameron shifts between ‘I’ and ‘we’. As such, this makes it unclear 
which capacity he is speaking in. For example, in this extract, he begins by talking about his 
own purpose in coming to Africa in a personal capacity. However, the phrase ‘we want to do 
more’ and ‘we see Africa in a new way, a different way’ may imply his government or that he 
is speaking on behalf of Britain. This is complicated further by the section of the speech 
devoted to critiquing ‘aid sceptics’ who mostly come from his own party. Nevertheless, these 





This chapter has focused on three sub-themes about the role of history in British prime 
ministers’ speeches in relation to Africa. Firstly, Major, Blair, and Cameron use different 
discursive strategies to sanitise Britain’s colonial history in Africa. Major uses euphemisms to 
downplay the role of Britain’s colonial legacy in Africa, as does Blair - but to a lesser extent. 
Blair primarily uses transformational strategies to change the focus from Britain’s role as a 
coloniser to emphasise its role in abolitionism. Cameron, meanwhile, attempts to move 
beyond this history altogether.  
 
The second sub-theme is a more specific focus on this around the Commonwealth as a 
unique institution that symbolises certain values. The Commonwealth’s place in these 
speeches is noteworthy because it suggests that the Commonwealth is more than a formal 
institution; it is also – perhaps equally importantly – a rhetorical conception. The 
Commonwealth’s history means that British prime ministers are more able to claim to speak 
‘on behalf’ of the Commonwealth than any other figure (except the Queen). This helps 
provide British prime ministers with the platform to shape the ‘commonalities’ in the 
Commonwealth – which can be used as a tool to condemn or express approval towards 
other Commonwealth countries in a subtle manner. This focus on the Commonwealth, 
prominent under Major, largely disappears under Blair, Brown, and Cameron – although it 
re-emerges briefly towards the end of Cameron’s premiership in the second term, which 




The third section is more specific still, highlighting the way in which sport (cricket in 
particular) offers Major a way to talk about the commonalities between Britain and Africa in 
an uncontroversial way that largely transcends politics, and enables him to suggest shared 






Security for Whom? Between Pax Britannica and Partnership with Africa 
This chapter focuses on the extent to which Britain’s post-Cold War engagement with Africa 
is presented by British prime ministers as being based on security, and how this shapes 
British national identity, as constructed by them. The idea that Britain’s relationship with 
Africa is based primarily around concerns about British security rather than African 
development is explored in the literature (Abrahamsen, 2005; Porteous, 2005; McConnon, 
2014; Pugh et al., 2013). This chapter will offer an opportunity to assess such – especially in 
relation to the changing place of Africa in British foreign policy pre and post-9/11. It begins 
with a continuation of the quantitative analysis in Chapter 5, but with a specific focus on the 
security dimension. It then moves on to a thematic content analysis of the speeches and 
critical discourse analysis around this theme.  
 
This chapter finds that Major, Blair, Brown, and Cameron all link deprivation in Africa to 
the threat of extremism in the UK. In addition, this chapter shows considerable evidence for 
this link before 9/11 in contrast to the perceived sharp change after 9/11 in the literature. 
Furthermore, all four prime ministers show a lack of clarity about the extent to which British 
military forces should support peacekeeping in Africa compared to supporting the 
development of African peacekeeping forces.  This suggests that there has not been a clear 
trend in terms of Britain’s role in relation to peacekeeping in Africa; prime ministers are no 
clearer on this now than at the end of the Cold War. Finally, this chapter finds that whilst 
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there is a consistency amongst the four prime ministers about Britain’s place in the world 
and its duty to intervene, this is most notable in the speeches of Blair and Cameron. This 
chapter is notable largely for its continuities, in contrast to the significant discontinuities 
found in the previous chapter on history.  
 
6.1 Quantitative Analysis 
For this security chapter, the keywords selected for input into the Python program are: 
‘security’, ‘conflict’, ‘extremism’, ‘extremist’, ‘stability’, ‘instability’, ‘peacekeeping’, ‘terror’, 
‘terrorism’, ‘terrorist’, ‘threat’, and ‘war’. This information is plotted in Table 6:1, where 
mentions of selected keywords are shown in terms of their raw numbers by prime minister. 
In Figure 6:1, these are plotted as percentages of each prime minister’s corpus.  
 
Table 6:1. Frequency of selected security-related keywords in the context of Africa by prime minister 
 John Major Tony Blair Gordon Brown David Cameron 
Security 11 31 25 31 
Conflict 4 81 8 6 
Extrem(ism/ist) 3 15 4 14 
Instability 3 4 5 0 
Peacekeeping 4 25 7 5 
Stability 4 11 9 12 
Terror(ism/ist) 2 35 10 17 
Threat(s) 2 18 8 16 





Figure 6:1. Frequency of selected keywords related to ‘Security’ in the context of Africa (as a 
percentage of each prime minister’s corpus). 
 
Figure 6:1 suggests that there is broadly much similarity between the four prime ministers in 
their speeches about Africa and security. There is an indication of potential similarity 
between Blair and Cameron, as seen in references to ‘extremism’, ‘terrorism’, and ‘threat’. 
Whilst ‘security’ appears more frequently with each prime minister, this trend is not mirrored 
in any of the other keywords as might be expected if this was part of a wider trend. Blair’s 
usage of ‘conflict’ is a significant outlier. These initial observations will be explored further 





Having captured a broad picture of references to specific security-related keywords, this 
section moves on to look in more detail at the context of these keywords. This is achieved 
by using the sentences extracted using the Python code as they show how security is 
referenced in the context of Africa. Removing the keywords from the extracted sentences 
and plotting the remainder helps to understand the context of these sentences. This 
information is plotted here for each prime minister as a word cloud, where word size is 
directly proportional to frequency of usage.  
 
Figure 6:2 shows that Major’s discussions of Africa in the context of security are centred 
around South Africa, but also relate to economic issues – which explains the prominence of 
words such as ‘economy’ and ‘investment’. In contrast, the other three prime ministers’ word 
clouds show an emphasis on humanitarian words – for example ‘poverty’, ‘peace’, and 
‘democracy’ in the word clouds of Blair, Brown and Cameron respectively. Figure 6:5 shows 
Cameron’s attention to Somalia and Libya. It also shows the frequency with which Cameron 
talks specifically about Islam in this context, and apparently marks him out from the other 
three prime ministers.   
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Figure 6:2. Word cloud showing frequency of words in John Major’s sentences containing specific 
security keywords, excluding those keywords 
 
Figure 6:3. Word cloud showing frequency of words in Tony Blair’s sentences containing specific 
security keywords, excluding those keywords 
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Figure 6:4. Word cloud showing frequency of words in Gordon Brown’s sentences containing 
specific security keywords, excluding those keywords 
 
Figure 6:5. Word cloud showing frequency of words in David Cameron’s sentences containing 




6.2 Thematic Content Analysis 
Bringing together the findings from the additional quantitative approach in the previous 
section with the literature and knowledge of the speeches gained during the data collection 
stage, three security related sub-themes can be identified. Firstly, we can find a sub-theme 
around Africa’s underdevelopment as a breeding ground for terrorism and extremism – 
which poses a threat to Britain. This is broadly how security – as understood by UK 
policymakers – is discussed in the literature around Britain and Africa, as detailed in Chapter 
2. Secondly, all four British prime ministers’ rhetoric about peacekeeping in Africa is divided 
between a focus on African states acting as a stabilising force themselves, or – at other times 
– whether British assistance is required. Thirdly, there is a sub-theme around the display of 
British hard power in Africa. Whilst this is rooted in security, and is inextricably intertwined 
with the other sub-themes, the emphasis here is on Britain and projecting British power. 
This can be seen most clearly in the examples of Sierra Leone and Libya. These sub-themes 
will be explored here in more detail, with reference to the literature where relevant. 
 
6.2.1 Africa’s Underdevelopment as a Security Threat 
The idea of Africa’s underdevelopment as a breeding ground for terrorism and extremism – 
and the threat it poses to Britain – is explored in some detail in the literature. Abrahamsen 
(2005) argues that while Britain’s actions in Africa were far less visibly militarised than US 
policies, New Labour’s approach to Africa changed in subtle but important ways following 
9/11. Abrahamsen cites the centrality of Africa in Blair’s 2001 Labour Party Conference 
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speech (TB01f)54 following 9/11 as indicative of these changes. Africa had few direct links to 
al-Qaeda, and it is therefore not clear why Blair would choose to devote so much attention 
to Africa. Abrahamsen concludes that Blair’s attention to Africa was part of an on-going 
‘securitisation’ of the continent. Through this securitisation, interactions with Africa shifted 
from a paradigm of ‘development/humanitarianism’ to a category of ‘risk/fear/security’. 
That is, Africa was increasingly mentioned in the context of the ‘war on terrorism’ and the 
dangers Africa posed to Britain and the international community. 
 
This argument is echoed by Porteous (2005). He contends that 9/11 intruded on the post-
Cold War reassessment of the West’s aims, interests and responsibilities in Africa. ‘Security 
and ideology have crowded back to centre stage in western thinking, albeit in new forms. 
[…] The new focus on weak and failed states has led policy-makers to identify Africa, with 
its large Muslim populations, as one of several regions in need of attention in the emerging 
‘war on terror’’ (Porteous, 2005: 297). However, Porteous also argues that in the years 
following 9/11 and the Iraq War, Britain’s policies on Africa did not shift significantly, and 
the rhetorical commitment to maintaining support for African development was reinforced, 
even amplified. Duffield (2001: 121) argues that this is because development has been 
reframed as ‘a structural form of conflict prevention’. 
 
Whilst not specifically focusing on Africa, McConnon (2014) makes a similar claim to 
Abrahamsen and Porteous – that since 9/11, Britain increasingly coordinated its foreign, 
                                                 
54 Tony Blair (2nd October, 2001). Labour Party Conference, Brighton, UK. 
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development, and security policies. The Department for International Development (DFID) 
brought Britain’s national security into the core of its policy discourse through a gradual 
process by linking poverty and instability in the developing world to threats to UK’s national 
security such as terrorism and religious extremism. DFID justified this shift through claims 
of common interest (DFID, 2009) between development for people in the global South and 
security for the UK by drawing on the concept of human security, where international 
development is offered as a solution to national security problems.  
 
However, the speeches provide evidence of British prime ministers making the clear link 
between Africa’s underdevelopment and extremism long before 9/11. In a 1994 speech to 
the Conservative Middle East Council (JM94b)55, Major makes this very argument about 
Algeria, framing it in terms of economic deprivation.  
 
We and our partners welcome the Algerian government’s agreement with the IMF on a far 
reaching economic programme and we are supporting it financially. Extremism thrives on 
economic deprivation. Successful economic reform will do much to widen support for 
Algeria’s government and her institutions. 
 
Major expresses concerns about extremism and terrorism across North Africa more broadly 
in a joint press conference with Bill Clinton in 1995 (JM95c)56. He says that he and Clinton 
                                                 
55 John Major (28th July, 1994), Conservative Middle East Council, London, UK. 




spent time considering how they might address issues such as ‘combatting together some of 
the problems of instability, extremism and terrorism that we can begin to see in parts of 
North Africa’. 
 
The argument that 9/11 marked a radical shift in rhetoric in relation to Britain’s interactions 
with Africa is further called into question by a look at Blair’s first term. Towards the 
beginning of his premiership, Blair gave a speech to the UN General Assembly (TB98b)57 in 
which he says:  
 
The fight against terrorism has also taken on a new urgency. The past year’s global roll call 
of terror includes Luxor, Dar es Salaam, Nairobi, Omagh and many others. Each one is a 
reminder that terrorism is a uniquely barbaric and cowardly crime. Each one is a reminder that 
terrorists are no respecters of borders. 
 
It is significant that three of the four examples of terrorism Blair provided in 1998 were 
from Africa – Egypt, Tanzania, and Kenya respectively. Therefore, it would be more 
accurate to argue that the events of 9/11 served to strengthen a view expressed by British 
prime ministers numerous times in the years before the attack. According to Abrahamsen, 
the prominence of Africa in Blair’s 2001 Labour Party conference speech – less than a 
month after 9/11 – is evidence that Britain’s interactions with Africa had shifted from a 
‘development /humanitarianism’ paradigm to one of ‘risk/fear/security’. In this speech, 
                                                 
57 Tony Blair (21st September, 1998), UN General Assembly, New York, USA. 
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Blair used the phrase ‘The state of Africa is a scar on the conscience of the world. But if the 
world as a community focused on it, we could heal it. And if we don't, it will become deeper 
and angrier’ (Gallagher, 2013: 11). Gallagher (2009) contests that this phrase rhetorically 
removes African states from the normal processes and dealings of international politics. 
Gallagher also argues this gives Britain a moral authority in its assertion that it can and has 
the ability and right to direct the policies of African states. The context of the quote allows 
us to better understand this interpretation. Blair (TB01f)58 says that the partnership for 
Africa is a deal between the developing and developed world:  
 
On our side: provide more aid, untied to trade; write off debt; help with good governance and 
infrastructure; training to the soldiers, with UN blessing, in conflict resolution; encouraging 
investment; and access to our markets so that we practise the free trade we are so fond of 
preaching. But it's a deal: on the African side: true democracy, no more excuses for 
dictatorship, abuses of human rights; no tolerance of bad governance, from the endemic 
corruption of some states, to the activities of Mr Mugabe's henchmen in Zimbabwe. […] The 
will, with our help, to broker agreements for peace and provide troops to police them. The 
state of Africa is a scar on the conscience of the world. But if the world as a community 
focused on it, we could heal it. And if we don't, it will become deeper and angrier.  
 
                                                 
58 Tony Blair (2nd October, 2001), Labour Party Conference, Brighton, UK. 
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This sub-theme becomes more frequent in Blair’s post-9/11 speeches. A month later, at the 
Lord Mayor’s Banquet (TB01h)59, Blair links extremism in Africa to poverty: ‘an extremist 
and perverted version of Islam which seeks to shoulder aside or overthrow moderate 
counsels […] in Africa, grinding poverty, pandemic disease, a rash of failed states, where 
problems seldom leave their stain on one nation but spread to whole regions’. Other 
examples continuing on this same theme can be found throughout Blair’s time as prime 
minister. In 2002 he told the TUC conference (TB02h)60 that ‘Africa, if left to decline, will 
become a breeding ground for extremism’. This is echoed at the end of his time as prime 
minister in 2007 (TB07n)61: ‘[f]ailed or struggling African states are breeding grounds for the 
very extremism that threatens us everywhere’.  
 
This theme is continued by Brown, but he puts it in terms of a lack of education, and argues 
for education as a form of defence. This supports the argument made by McConnon (2014) 
that Britain’s national security was brought into the core of its development policy discourse 
through linking instability in the developing world to extremism by drawing on the concept 
of human security where development is offered as a solution to national security problems 
(GB08e)62: 
 
                                                 
59 Tony Blair (12th November, 2001), Lord Mayor’s Banquet, London, UK. 
60 Tony Blair (10th September, 2002), TUC Conference, Blackpool, UK. 
61 Tony Blair (31st May, 2007), South Africa. 




When I visited Abuja in Nigeria I found that side by side with a dilapidated school that we did 
not support enough was a madrassas where Al Qaeda inspired extremists were enticing 
children into their school offering free high standard schooling - so our offer of 
education for all is not just an education and economic policy for the developing world it is a 
defence and security policy for the developed world. 
 
By also using this argument (DC11d)63, Cameron shows that there has been continuity on 
this theme across the last four British prime ministers:  
 
Now there are those who argue these North African countries are not the poorest in the world, 
and that we should concentrate on our own affairs. I reject this. Be in no doubt. Get this 
wrong, fail to support these countries and we risk giving oxygen to the extremists who 
prey on the frustrations and aspirations of young people. We would see more terrorism, 
more immigration, more instability coming from Europe’s southern border. And that affects us 
right back at home.  
 
There are other examples of this from Cameron, such as his 2013 speech to the Somali 
Conference in London (DC13f)64, where he argues: ‘helping young Somalis to escape 
grinding poverty is not just vital for the future of Somalia it’s also the best antidote to the 
extremism that threatens us all’.  
 
                                                 
63 David Cameron (27th May, 2011), G8 Summit, Deauville, France. 
64 David Cameron (7th May, 2013), Somali Conference, London, UK. 
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This shows that this theme did not arise only after 9/11, and it was an argument used and 
cultivated by all of the prime ministers – albeit in slightly different forms. After the terrorist 
attack in Paris in November 2015 that left 130 people dead, however, Cameron breaks from 
this argument that extremism thrives because terrorists take advantages of people living in 
poverty. Towards the end of his premiership, he makes the opposite case (DC15g)65:  
 
Some say [terrorism is] because of poverty and deprivation but that overlooks that many of 
these terrorists have had the full advantages of prosperous families or a Western education. 
[…] The root cause of this threat is the poisonous ideology of extremism itself. This ideology, 
this diseased view of the world, has become an epidemic – infecting minds from the mosques 
of Mogadishu66 to the bedrooms of Birmingham. 
 
Thus, we have seen that the argument linking deprivation and extremism is one that was 
made by Major, Blair, Brown and Cameron, and was a continuity throughout this period – 
until late 2015 Cameron turned the focus to Islamic extremism itself. This also helps explain 
the prominence of the word ‘Islamist’ in Cameron’s speeches, as seen in Figure 6:5.  In 
terms of what this means for British national identity, by suggesting that Islamist ideology is 
inherently corrupting – regardless of poverty or deprivation, Cameron turns the focus away 
from Britain’s poverty alleviation efforts and instead increases the attention to the war on 
terror. 
 
                                                 
65 David Cameron (16th November, 2015), Lord Mayor’s Banquet, London, UK. 
66 Mogadishu is the capital city of Somalia. 
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However, Dowd and Raleigh (2013) argue politicians such as Cameron have fallen back on 
simplistic narratives in an attempt to explain the intensification of violent Islamist activity in 
Africa. The first of these is that violent Islamist groups in Africa form part of a single, 
monolithic, globalised Islamist threat. The second is that this threat is considered a danger 
for the West and Western interests primarily, and African stability only secondarily. The 
third is that ungoverned areas are assumed to provide a safe haven for extremism, and 
therefore Africa is seen as the new arena in which violent Islam will flourish. In particular, 
Dowd and Raleigh cite Cameron’s declaration in Algeria that ‘This is a global threat and it 
will require a global response’ as evidence of this. Cameron went on to frame this as ‘a 
generational struggle’ against an extremist ideology, and the need to ‘close down the 
ungoverned space in which [terrorists] thrive’. This research finds evidence to support this 
claim by Dowd and Raleigh (2013), such as Cameron’s speech to the World Economic 
Forum in Davos (DC13c)67, in which he argues:  
 
I believe we are in the midst of a long struggle against murderous terrorists and a 
poisonous ideology that supports them. […] al-Qaeda franchises have been growing for 
years in Yemen, in Somalia and across parts of North Africa, places that have suffered 
hideously through hostage taking, terrorism and crime […] The French are right to act in Mali 
and I backed that action, not just with words, but with logistical support too. […] We need to 
address that poisonous narrative that the terrorists feed on. We need to close down the 
ungoverned space in which they thrive. 
                                                 




A second sub-theme relating to security that can be identified in the speeches of the four 
prime ministers is around discussions of peacekeeping in Africa. For Major, Blair, Brown, 
and Cameron, there is a tension in the speeches between a discourse of Africa as an arena 
that requires British assistance on the one hand, and on the other arguing that African 
countries or institutions are able to act as a stabilising force on their own. This division 
presents two competing visions of Britain’s national identity and role in the world which lies 
at the heart of the central finding of this thesis.  
 
In Cameron’s speeches, he often makes the case that Britain’s identity is tied to its role as a 
peacekeeper in the world, and he tends to use Africa as the primary example when talking 
about this. At the beginning of his premiership, in a speech to the British Armed Forces on 
HMS Ark Royal (DC10a)68, Cameron argues that fighting piracy off the Horn of Africa is an 
important role of the Royal Navy – and that it is central to Britain’s national interest and role 
in the world:  
 
We have not asked the fundamental questions about the defence of our country, about our 
role in the world, since 1998.  […]  It is time for us to think again about how to make our 
country safe, how to project power in the world, how to look after our national interest, 
and how to make sure we are secure for the future.  That is what we should do. I know 
absolutely that the Royal Navy will have a huge role to play in that future.  We are a 
                                                 
68 David Cameron (24th June, 2010), HMS Ark Royal. 
 
177 
trading nation.  We have got to keep our sea-lanes open.  We want to stop drugs coming from 
our shores [sic], and that is the work that you do. We have to deal with the appalling threat 
of piracy off the Horn of Africa; that is what you do.   
 
Five years later, having been re-elected as prime minister, Cameron repeats this argument at 
a speech at the UN (DC15c)69, saying that Britain has a role to play in peacekeeping in 
Somalia and South Sudan: 
 
Britain has for many, many years supported peacekeeping operations and taken part in 
peacekeeping operations. We think they are very important. We also think […] Britain has a 
particular role in training and logistics and expertise and standards and so we want to 
step up what we are doing. Obviously we will want to see all the right force protection 
arrangements in place but we should be playing a part in this. The outcome in Somalia, if 
it's a good outcome, that's good for Britain. It means less terrorism, less migration, less piracy. 
Ditto in South Sudan: if we can, as peacekeepers, help to maintain order and peace and see 
stable development in that country then that is going to be, again, less poverty, less migration, 
less issues that affect us back at home.  
 
In doing so, Cameron once again centres this on Britain’s national interest. In other 
examples, such as Cameron’s 2014 speech to the UN General Assembly (DC14d)70, he takes 
a slightly less forceful approach. He begins by seemingly contradicting his previous stance:  
                                                 
69 David Cameron (27th September, 2015), UN, New York, USA. 
70 David Cameron (25th September, 2014), UN General Assembly, New York, USA. 
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I don’t believe this threat of Islamist extremism will best be solved by Western ground troops 
directly trying to pacify or reconstruct Middle Eastern or African countries’. However, he 
moves on to argue that Britain’s military still has a large role to play: But pursing an intelligent 
and comprehensive approach should include a place for our military. Our military can 
support the enormous humanitarian efforts that are necessary. 
 
It is noteworthy that when Cameron was leading the campaign to remain in the European 
Union, he cited piracy in Africa as an issue that Britain inside the EU is uniquely positioned 
to tackle. In a speech delivered at O2’s Headquarters (DC16a)71, he said:  
 
I’m not sure that 6 maybe 10 years ago I thought that Europe was quite so important for 
Britain getting things done in the world. I thought obviously NATO matters, our partnership 
with America matters, but I see and I’ve seen this for 6 years that if we want to fix stuff, 
whether it is trying to stop people smugglers in the Mediterranean, whether it’s trying to stop 
pirates off the coast of Africa, […] we gain by sitting round that table with the French, 
with the Germans, with the Italians and getting things done. 
 
In the month before the EU referendum, he made this same argument in a joint press 
conference with President Obama (DC16d)72, but focused solely on the issue of piracy in 
Africa: ‘in east Africa, we have helped to turn around the prospects for Somalia, for instance, 
                                                 
71 David Cameron (23rd February, 2016), O2’s Headquarters, Slough, UK. 
72 David Cameron (22nd April, 2016), joint press conference with President Obama, Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, London, UK. 
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thanks to an EU operation – led by Britain and supported by America – its waters are no 
longer a safe haven for pirates’. 
 
This emphasis on external actors in helping Somalia contradicts the argument Cameron 
previously made at the Somali Conference in London (DC13f)73. In this speech, he instead 
places far greater agency on Africa. He gives credit to President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud 
and the Somali people, and he stresses that Britain’s role was not in leading, but instead in 
providing support to Somalia.  
 
the transformation in Somalia that we have seen has not happened because 50 countries sat 
round a table in a room in London last year and somehow decided Somalia’s future. This 
change has happened because of the vision of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and 
his team and because of the strength and courage of the Somali people in beginning the 
long and difficult task of rebuilding their country from the bottom up. […] We know that 
Somalia’s future is shaped by Somalia and with Somalia it’s not something done to 
Somalia. Today you are setting out the plans for your country. Our task is clear: to back you 
and get behind your plans. And that is what we will do. 
 
The speeches of Blair, Brown, and Major reveal that are also torn about whether African 
countries can be their own peacekeepers, and what that means for Britain’s role in Africa. In 
Blair’s speeches, he switches back and forth between both sides of this argument. Speaking 
                                                 
73 David Cameron (7th May, 2013), Somali Conference, London, UK. 
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in Ghana in 2002 (TB02b)74, Blair praised the peacekeeping role of Ghana and other African 
countries: 
 
Right across the African continent, countries are emerging from military rule and dictatorship. 
[…] The theme of my visit this week is partnership - the necessity and the possibility of a 
greatly strengthened partnership between reforming African governments and the 
world’s richer countries. […] Over the years, Ghana has played a crucial role in UN 
peacekeeping, including in Sierra Leone, and you have been an important stabilising 
force in the region.  
 
In contrast, two years later in a speech in Addis Ababa (TB04h)75, Blair presents a very 
different argument – that ‘Africa cannot stop conflict on its own’. The context between 
Britain and Africa had not changed significantly between this speech in Ethiopia and the 
previous speech in Ghana. The most notable change in British foreign policy was Blair’s 
decision to go to war in Iraq, and therefore this speech may represent an attempt to make 
the broader argument for intervention.  
 
But there will be times when Africa cannot stop conflict on its own. Then the rest of the 
international community must stand ready to help. That is why I also want Africa to be the 
top priority for the European Union’s new rapidly deployable battle groups and to get 
them operational as soon as possible in 2005. […] Even before 9/11 al Qaeda had bases in 
                                                 
74 Tony Blair (2nd February, 2002), Ghana. 
75 Tony Blair (7th October, 2004), Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 
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Africa, they still do, hiding in places where they can go undisturbed by weak governments, 
where they plan their next attack which could be anywhere in the world, including right here in 
Africa as we have seen. So it is for these reasons, that, because it is morally right and 
because ultimately it must be in our own interest, it is clear that this spotlight of 
attention of the whole of the international community should be focused on Africa.  
 
Speaking at Davos in 2005 (TB05a)76, near the end of his second term in office, Blair reverts 
back to the focus of his Ghana speech by emphasising the role of African agency in 
peacekeeping. In this instance, Blair focuses on the role of the African Union instead of the 
European Union.  
 
This capability to intervene and keep the peace has to be built in Africa itself. 
Today in the Sudan, AU peacekeeping forces do their best. Without them, progress 
would be impossible. But if there was the proper capability with sufficient numbers 
of forces, well equipped and trained, so much more could have been done. So much 
more must be done in future conflicts. 
 
Blair continues this theme of supporting African institutions to prevent conflict in a speech 
at King’s College London in 2006 (TB06o)77: 
 
                                                 
76 Tony Blair (26th January, 2005), Davos, Switzerland. 
77 Tony Blair (26th June, 2006), King’s College London, UK. 
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I learnt about this from the time in the year 2000 in Sierra Leone where we sent - the 
UK - a relatively small force to Sierra Leone to help end the civil war. I have always 
since that time been sure that if Africa had its own ability to respond rapidly to the 
conflicts as they broke out, then many of the long protracted conflicts we have 
seen on the continent could be avoided. 
 
These contrasting – sometimes conflicting – arguments about peacekeeping in Africa are 
brought together by Blair in a speech in Sierra Leone (TB07l)78 near the end of his time in 
office, in which he argues that: 
  
‘in relation to peacekeeping and conflict resolution, yes it is Africa's responsibility to 
do it. But we in the west and in the wealthier countries have a responsibility to 
fund it, to help train the forces, to help equip them, to help make sure that the 
logistics and the capability is there to make peacekeeping and conflict resolution work’. 
 
The tension between these two arguments continues under Brown. On the one hand, Brown 
expresses his hopes for an African Union-UN peacekeeping force to protect the citizens of 
Darfur. At the same time, he acknowledges the role of Britain and the international 
community in playing an active role if the violence continues (GB07g)79:  
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The situation in Darfur is the greatest humanitarian disaster the world faces today. Over 
200,000 dead, 2 million displaced and 4 million on food aid. Following my meeting with 
President Bush, and I thank him for his leadership on Darfur, the UK and the French have 
now, with US support, agreed and tabled a UN Security Council resolution that will mandate 
the deployment of the world’s largest peacekeeping operation to protect the citizens of Darfur. 
And I hope this plan - for a 19,000 African Union-UN force - will be adopted later today. 
Immediately we will work hard to deploy this force quickly. […] But we must clear if any party 
blocks progress and the killings continue, I and others will redouble our efforts to impose 
further sanctions. 
 
Brown’s speech echoes a sentiment Major made over a decade before in his keynote address 
in Cape Town (JM94f)80:  
 
With our friends in Africa and with their agreement and with their participation, Britain 
wants to develop new mechanisms to head off conflicts before they become 
unstoppable; before the bloodshed and the misery that we have seen become reality, let 
us see if we can head them off. We have in mind, for example, setting up regional 
peacekeeping cells. We need more people trained to mediate, more people trained to act as 
peace-brokers. We would not need a cumbersome bureaucracy - not now or in any 
circumstances - but a tight and properly resourced infrastructure that could best be 
established in Africa itself to deal with the problems that exist in Africa itself. 
 
                                                 
80 John Major (20th September, 1994), South African National Assembly, Cape Town, South Africa. 
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Major revisits this speaking to the Army Staff College in Camberley (JM94p)81, saying  
 
As a country which leans heavily on her worldwide interests and trade, it is right that Britain 
should play a full part in peacekeeping, peace-making and humanitarian relief. In Africa, for 
example, we are ready to expand our role, by providing support and training to African 
peacekeepers. 
 
This sub-theme has shown how all four British prime ministers have been conflicted as to 
the level of involvement Britain should have in peacekeeping in Africa, to what extent 
institutions – such as the United Nations, the European Union and the African Union – 
should be involved. This brings to mind the quote by Dean Acheson, US Secretary of State 
under President Truman, that ‘Great Britain has lost an Empire and has not yet found a role’ 
(Acheson, 1963: 163). It also suggests, however, that there has not been a clear trend in 
terms of Britain’s role in relation to peacekeeping in Africa; prime ministers are no clearer on 
this now than at the end of the Cold War.   
 
                                                 
81 John Major (24th November, 1994), Army Staff College, Camberley, UK. 
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6.2.3 Force Projection 
A third security-related sub-theme can be identified in relation to the display of British hard 
power in Africa. Whilst this is intertwined with the two previous sub-themes in this chapter 
(Africa’s underdevelopment as a security threat, and peacekeeping), the emphasis in this sub-
theme is on projecting British hard power. This can be seen most clearly in the examples of 
Sierra Leone in 2000 and Libya in 2011, and is therefore most prevalent in the speeches by 
Blair and Cameron. However, there is a consistency amongst all four prime ministers 
speeches about Britain’s place in the world and its duty to intervene. Rieff (2000) argues that: 
‘humanitarian intervention is important because it is central to the post‐cold war west’s 
moral conception of itself [...] And in this context what is important about humanitarian 
intervention is an idea, rather than a practice’. 
 
In his Mansion House speech in 2000 (TB00c)82, Blair concedes that Britain is no longer a 
superpower. Instead, however, he uses the example of the intervention in Sierra Leone 
earlier that year to make the case that Britain’s ability to engage and intervene are vital to its 
identity as a ‘pivotal power’: 
 
On Sierra Leone there were those who said: what's it got to do with us? But I am sure Britain's 
and Europe's long-term interests in Africa are best served, if we intervene, not excessively, but 
to do what we can to save African nations from barbarism and dictatorship and be 
proud of it. And talking of pride, there can be no better advertisement for this country's 
                                                 
82 Tony Blair (13th November, 2000), Mansion House, UK. 
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values, spirit and professionalism than our Armed Forces. So we are right to engage. Although 
not today a superpower, Britain is a pivotal power in international affairs. We are the 
fourth largest economy; we have armed forces second to none in quality, global commercial 
and financial reach, a seat on the UN Security Council, a world language, an unparalleled 
network of European and global alliances. 
 
This extract is revealing not only in how Blair constructs Britain, but also because of how he 
portrays Africa and the need to ‘save African nations from barbarism and dictatorship’. In 
language and imagery, this is not dissimilar to that of Victorian explorers over a century 
earlier, as discussed in the Literature Review (Chapter 2), and serves to remove all agency 
from Africa and Africans. Blair first fully articulated this view of Britain’s identity and place 
in the world in his Chicago Speech (TB99a)83, in what he called the ‘Doctrine of the 
International Community’. 
 
The most pressing foreign policy problem we face is to identify the circumstances in which we 
should get actively involved in other people’s conflicts. […] But the principle of non-
interference must be qualified in important respects. Acts of genocide can never be a purely 
internal matter. When oppression produces massive flows of refugees which unsettle 
neighbouring countries, then they can properly be described as ‘threats to international peace 
and security’. When regimes are based on minority rule they lose legitimacy - look at South 
Africa. 
 
                                                 
83 Tony Blair (24th April, 1999), Economic Club, Chicago, USA. 
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Blair’s belief that it is Britain’s duty to intervene remains a strong theme throughout his time 
in office. In his 2001 Party Conference Speech (TB01f)84, just after 9/11, he attacks the 
failure of Major’s government to intervene in Rwanda, saying Britain would have a ‘moral 
duty to act’ if it happened again:  
 
And I tell you if Rwanda happened again today as it did in 1993 85, when a million people 
were slaughtered in cold blood, we would have a moral duty to act there also. We were 
there in Sierra Leone when a murderous group of gangsters threatened its democratically 
elected Government and people. And we as a country should, and I as Prime Minister do, give 
thanks for the brilliance, dedication and sheer professionalism of the British Armed Forces. 
 
Although numerous examples of this theme have been provided, two examples towards the 
end of Blair’s premiership are vital to look at because of the way in which Blair specifically 
talks about Britain’s role. Speaking on board HMS Albion (TB07a)86, Blair explicitly rejects 
the idea that Britain should withdraw from its hard power role on the world stage because he 
argues that Britain’s hard and soft power are driven by the same principles. Again, Africa is 
used as the example to make this case: 
 
There is a case for Britain in the early 21st Century, with its imperial strength behind 
it, to slip quietly, even graciously into a different role.  We become leaders in the fight 
                                                 
84 Tony Blair (2nd October, 2001), Labour Party Conference, Brighton, UK. 
85 It is noteworthy that the Rwandan genocide took place from April-July 1994 (Reyntjens, 1996), not 
1993 as Blair says here.  
86 Tony Blair (12th January, 2007), HMS Albion, Plymouth, UK. 
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against climate change, against global poverty, for peace and reconciliation; and leave the 
demonstration of “hard” power to others.  I do not share that case but there is quite a 
large part of our opinion that does.  Of course, there will be those that baulk at the starkness 
of that choice.  They will say yes in principle we should keep the “hard” power, but just not 
in this conflict or with that ally.  But in reality, that’s not how the world is. The reason I am 
against this case, is that for me “hard” and “soft” power are driven by the same 
principles.  The world is interdependent.  That means we work in alliance with others.  But 
it also means problems interconnect.  Poverty in Africa can’t be solved simply by the 
presence of aid.  It needs the absence of conflict.  Failed states threaten us as well as their 
own people.  Terrorism destroys progress.  Terrorism can’t be defeated by military means 
alone.  But it can’t be defeated without it. 
 
On his tour of Africa at the end of his time in office, Blair takes the opportunity to double 
down on his commitment to interventionism. Blair’s speech in South Africa (TB07n)87 is 
analysed in more detail in the critical discourse analysis section, but it is noteworthy that he 
says:  
 
Above all, and most controversially, Africa has been a prime example of a foreign policy 
that has been thoroughly interventionist. I believe in the power of political action to 
make the world better and the moral obligation to use it. […] I believe that now, today, 
our self-interest is in substantial part defined by the well-being of others; that the consequence 
                                                 
87 Tony Blair (31st May, 2007), South Africa. 
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of globalisation is that our best chance of security and prosperity lies in advancing freedom, 
opportunity and justice for all. 
 
This focus on displaying hard power is far less prevalent in Brown’s speeches, and marks a 
significant discontinuity between Blair and Brown. Nevertheless, in his 2008 speech at the 
Google Zeitgeist conference (GB08g)88, Brown also makes the case that Britain should have 
intervened in Rwanda. In doing so, he echoes the view expressed by Blair in his 2001 Party 
Conference speech. However, whereas Blair talked of it as a moral duty to intervene, Brown 
frames it as something that ‘people’ – i.e. citizens – would care enough about to be moved to 
act: 
 
I think that people power will become an explosive force in history, perhaps the most potent 
power in the hands of the world for the future, and I think it will start changing not just 
domestic policy in individual countries, but change the way we run foreign policy. If, for 
example, Rwanda was happening now, then I do not believe that the world would have 
been as silent as it was because people would have known what was happening within the 
country and people would have been moved to action. 
 
This difference between Blair and Brown’s approaches to Rwanda precedes an argument 
made by Pugh et al. (2013). They argue that under Cameron and the Coalition government, 
intervention depended upon the critique of liberal discourses of intervention framed in 
                                                 
88 Gordon Brown (19th May, 2008), Google Zeitgeist conference 
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terms of sovereignty and rights. Whereas in the Blair years there was a clearer assertion of 
global cosmopolitan purpose, the emphasis under Cameron was less controversially on 
building the capacity and resilience of people from the bottom up. That is, there was a move 
away from the intervention privileged in the 1990s and invasion of Iraq, toward emphasising 
empowerment, prevention and the agency of post-conflict and post-colonial subjects. They 
argue that the Coalition attempted to portray this as a ‘post-interventionist’ approach, such 
as in Libya. This argument by Brown shows a move away from the language used by Blair, 
and a move towards the type of ‘post-interventionist’ approach identified by Pugh et al., 
although it precedes it by some years.  
 
Daddow and Schnapper (2013) build on this ‘post-interventionist’ argument by Pugh et al. 
(2013), although they do not cite the research specifically. They concede that Cameron was a 
critic of Blair’s doctrine of the ‘international community’ which was used to justify 
intervention in Kosovo and more controversially in Iraq. In particular, they note that 
Cameron had advocated caution in projecting military force abroad while in opposition. 
Once in government, however, Cameron committed Britain to military action in Libya 
within a year of coming into office. Daddow and Schnapper (2013) argue that this focus on 
pragmatic and ethically informed foreign policy meant that although operations in Kosovo 
and Libya were undertaken in quite different circumstances, they came to be justified by 
similar arguments by Blair and Cameron. They conclude that ‘policy substance, policy style 
and party political dilemmas prompted [Blair and Cameron] to reconnect British foreign 
policy with its ethical roots, ingraining a bounded liberal posture in British foreign policy 
after the moral bankruptcy of the John Major years’ Daddow and Schnapper (2013: 330).  
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These arguments of continuity (Daddow and Schnapper, 2013) and change (Pugh et al., 
2013) – while seemingly contradictory – are not. Although Blair and Cameron came to 
justify intervention using similar arguments, Cameron was far more cautious about invoking 
the idea that the world could be remade around democratic (or indeed any other) 
ideologically charged principles. In doing so, Daddow and Schnapper (2013: 346) argue that 
Cameron proved himself to be adept at learning about the perils of too expansive an 
interventionist posture from Blair’s intervention in Iraq. 
 
It is unsurprising, therefore, that this research finds that out of the four prime ministers, 
Cameron and Blair are most similar in terms of this focus on projecting power. This perhaps 
also reflects an attempt by both Blair and Cameron to assert themselves, dismiss allegations 
of their inexperience and naïvety, and present themselves as statesman-like. This explanation 
is explored in detail in Chapter 10, with reference to media coverage, and campaigning 
strategies used by Major against Blair in the run up to the 1997 election and by Brown 
against Cameron in the 2010 election. Like Blair, Cameron also refers to projecting British 
power in the world and looking after Britain’s national interest in a speech on board HMS 
Ark Royal in 2010 (DC10a)89: 
 
We have not asked the fundamental questions about the defence of our country, about our role 
in the world, since 1998.  If you think of all the things that have happened since then – the 
actions that you have taken part in, in Sierra Leone, and Kosovo; the wars that we fought in 
                                                 
89 David Cameron (24th June, 2010), HMS Ark Royal. 
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Iraq and Afghanistan – huge changes have taken place in our world: the attacks of 9/11; the 
attacks in our own country in July 2005.  It is time for us to think again about how to make 
our country safe, how to project power in the world, how to look after our national 
interest, and how to make sure we are secure for the future.  That is what we should do. 
 
A few months later – still near the beginning of his premiership – Cameron continues with 
this sentiment about Britain’s role in the world at the Lord Mayor’s Banquet (DC10c)90:  
 
‘Our foreign policy is one of hard-headed internationalism. More commercial in enabling 
Britain to earn its way in the world, more strategic in its focus on meeting the new and 
emerging threats to our national security, and firmly committed to upholding our values and 
defending Britain’s moral authority even in the most difficult of circumstances.’ 
 
Evidence of Cameron’s understanding of the perils of too expansive an interventionist 
posture from Blair and the shift towards a ‘post-interventionist’ approach can be seen in 
Cameron’s speech to the London Conference on Libya (DC11a)91:  
 
Today is about a new beginning for Libya – a future in which the people of Libya can 
determine their own destiny, free from violence and oppression. But the Libyan people cannot 
reach that future on their own. […] First, we must reaffirm our commitment to UN Security 
Council Resolutions 1970 and 1973 and the broad alliance determined to implement it. […] 
                                                 
90 David Cameron (15th November, 2010), Lord Mayor’s Banquet, London, UK 
91 David Cameron (29th March, 2011), London Conference on Libya  
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Just twelve days ago, following an appeal by the Arab League, the United Nations passed an 
historic resolution to protect the people of Libya from the murderous brutality of Qadhafi’s 
regime. At the meeting Nicholas Sarkozy hosted in Paris, we made the right choice: to draw 
a line in the desert sand, and to halt his murderous advance by force. Be in no doubt. Our 
action saved the city of Benghazi. It averted a massacre. And it has given freedom a 
chance in Libya. 
 
In this section on Force Projection, we have seen a consistency between Blair and Cameron 
in their belief that Britain should be an active force in the world and has a duty to intervene. 
However, whereas in the Blair years there was a clearer assertion of global cosmopolitan 
purpose, the emphasis under Brown and then Cameron was more often framed in terms of 
building the capacity and resilience of people from the bottom up. In this section, Major has 
been the outlier. The view of 1997 as heralding a landmark moment in UK-Africa discourse 
and relations can be seen in the contrast between Major’s failure to act in Rwanda, and 
Blair’s action in Sierra Leone – and the continuation of this stance under Brown and 
Cameron. Blair felt Major had failed to understand Britain’s role in the world, and led him to 





6.3 Critical Discourse Analysis 
The thematic content analysis has shown that there are three sub-themes that emerge from 
the way in which British prime ministers talk about Africa in relation to security. In this 
section, specific speeches will be analysed in greater detail using the Discourse-Historical 
Approach. The speeches selected for analysis in terms of security are given below in Table 
6:2, along with details about the speeches. One speech was selected for Blair, Brown and 
Cameron. As Major is largely absent from this chapter, a discourse analysis of his speeches is 
not necessary. The speeches were selected based on quantitative tools (such as frequency of 
key words and coding using NVivo), the extracts analysed in the thematic content analysis, 
and from reading speeches during the data collection stage.  
 
Table 6:2. Security-related speeches selected for critical discourse analysis 
Prime Minister Date of Speech Location 
Tony Blair 30/05/2007 South Africa 
Gordon Brown 25/09/2008 
United Nations, New 
York 
David Cameron 24/06/2010 HMS Ark Royal 
 
 
One area that emerged from the content analysis that should be explored in more detail is 
how British prime ministers balance discourses of increased African agency on the one hand 
with maintaining British military involvement in Africa on the other. Blair’s speech in South 
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Africa was made as part of a tour of Africa near the end of his time in office (TB07n)92. As 
noted in Chapter 5, Blair made a number of speeches during this short period in May 2007 
(see Figure 4:1). In this speech, Blair admits that his foreign policy had been ‘thoroughly 
interventionist’. This approach had worked for him in the interventions in Kosovo and 
Sierra Leone, but damaged his reputation after the Iraq War. Having come into office with 
high approval ratings – reaching 65% approval in 1997 – by the end of his premiership this 
approval rating had reached minus 40 (The Economist, 2007). This tour of Africa may 
indicate an attempt to recapture some of the authority and respect he commanded earlier in 
his premiership, and show how admired he was in some other parts of the world. Blair 
begins this extract of his speech with a first person account of his views and values, showing 
that the focus is not on Africa per se, but rather on himself.  
 
Africa is close to my heart. I have made friends right across this amazing and inspiring 
continent. Africa has been at the top of my foreign policy for the last ten 10 years. From the 
very beginning I wanted to forge a new partnership with African leaders and countries. Not 
based on rich and poor or donor and recipient but based on common values of justice, 
democracy and human rights; a partnership of trust and equality. Above all, and most 
controversially, Africa has been a prime example of a foreign policy that has been thoroughly 
interventionist. I believe in the power of political action to make the world better and the 
moral obligation to use it. I do not believe that in this time - the early 21st Century - 
international politics can be just about nations’ interests, narrowly and traditionally defined. I 
                                                 
92 Tony Blair (30th May 2007), South Africa 
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believe that now, today, our self-interest is in substantial part defined by the well-being of 
others; 
 
At this point in the speech, mid-way though the sentence, Blair suddenly switches away 
from the first person to begin making broader arguments about Africa’s security. It is 
important to notice that both the previous and subsequent sections of the speech refer 
consistently to ‘Africa’ as a homogeneous entity rather than to detail specific challenges 
faced by countries or regions. In this second part of this extract, whilst creating distance 
through the generic use of ‘Africa’, Blair starts using collective pronouns such as ‘our’ and 
‘we’. These are noteworthy because it helps explain who Blair is speaking to, and who he 
is speaking on behalf of. Blair’s usage of ‘African poverty deprives this continent’ is, for 
example, contrasted in the second half of the sentence with its impact on ‘us’. In doing 
so, Blair shows that his immediate audience – South Africa and Africa more broadly – is 
not included in these collective pronouns.  
 
that the consequence of globalisation is that our best chance of security and prosperity lies in 
advancing freedom, opportunity and justice for all. It follows that where oppression, poverty 
and injustice exist, it is not only our duty but also in our self-interest to do what we can to 
bring about change for the better. Nowhere is that clearer than Africa. African conflict creates 
millions of refugees in search of a better life. African poverty deprives this continent - and 
millions of people - of the chance to succeed, and deprives us of successful and stable partners 
for economic growth and the benign exploitation of commodities and natural resources. Failed 
or struggling African states are breeding grounds for the very extremism that threatens us 
everywhere. […]  It is easy for people to mock the pretensions of an interventionist policy; and 
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intervention never fares as well as we would like. But consider the alternative and then make 
the choice. Suppose we did nothing. Actually we do not need to hypothesise. 
 
In this third section of this extract, Blair reveals that these collective pronouns – ‘we’, 
‘ours’ are in reference to Britain’s identity as part of ‘the wealthy nations’. In doing so, 
Blair projects a British national identity that tied to Britain’s economic prosperity, and its 
ability to intervene militarily. In this section, Blair also explicitly references the 
opportunity for ‘our values’ to take root – in an extreme form of ‘othering’. This suggests 
that Blair is arguing that Africa is not only separated in terms of economic prosperity but 
also in a more fundamental sense. This distance is reinforced by Blair’s argument that 
governments strayed from ‘a proper path’, and that Africa is a burden for wealthy nations 
who have to ‘stay with it for the long haul’.  
 
We did do nothing or little as Rwanda slid into genocide; as HIV/AIDS grew; as Liberia and 
Sierra Leone descended into gangsterism; as governments in the 1980s and 1990s faltered or 
strayed from a proper path. The international action of the past few years hasn’t transformed 
Africa; but as I shall say later, it has undoubtedly made it better. For that to happen, the 
wealthy nations must hold to the path set out in the MDGs and the Gleneagles G8; and 
Africa must take its responsibilities seriously and develop in the way NEPAD and the G8 
partnership provides. We have to stay with it for the long haul; commit and re-commit; 
never let it be said we are not trying, even if it cannot always be said we are succeeding. We 
now have a broad political consensus for Africa in the UK. Excellent. We need the same 
in the EU. We need each G8 to be bolder than the last. If we do this, and Africa responds as 
an equal partner, we will have set a strategic goal that in time we will achieve; and in a 
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continent in which the power of China is rising dramatically, we can work with China to serve 
the development of Africa in a way which benefits us all. But if we give up, we will lose the 
chance in this continent - rich as it is - though its people are poor - for our values to 
take root. It would be a calamitous misjudgement. 
 
Blair concludes this part of his speech by focusing specifically on the intervention in 
Sierra Leone. Blair had delivered three speeches the previous day in Sierra Leone, and this 
may represent a broader strategy to highlight his foreign policy achievements in an 
attempt to re-frame his ‘thoroughly interventionist’ foreign policy while drawing focus 
away from Iraq. Yet in this extract, he does not do this explicitly – perhaps aware of the 
difficulties associated with claiming personal credit for the successful intervention. 
Instead refers to the role of the UK military alongside Africa and UN forces. In this way, 
he balances between British continued British involvement with Africa alongside 
increased African agency – although this is somewhat at odds with the previous three 
sections of this extract which had focused predominantly on the role of Britain and other 
wealthy nations in finding solutions to African problems.  
 
So, to what ends should our intervention and support be fashioned? First, we must address 
more urgently the issue of conflict resolution and peace-keeping. I have come here today from 
Sierra Leone. When I last visited five years ago, Sierra Leone was a failed state. Emerging from 
a horrific conflict which saw 60,000 killed. 10,000 child soldiers. 1/4 million women and girls 
raped. Others brutally maimed, hands cut off. A war fuelled by the fight for diamonds and 
other commodities. We all felt despair at the wickedness that a small group of people could 
inflict on their compatriots. But I also felt proud that Africa and the international 
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community responded, with ECOWAS and UN troops, and ultimately the UK's own 
troops. We now must build on this window of opportunity and work with the elected 
government of Sierra Leone to help them build a better country for the people of Sierra 
Leone. Not easy. War destroyed the fabric of Sierra Leone. And state building is the hardest of 
challenges. 
 
The second speech selected for critical discourse analysis in relation to security is Brown’s 
speech to Lancaster House (GB08gg)93. The event was organised by the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission to celebrate the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
Although the event and context might lend itself to a framing more focused on rights than 
other speeches, it does reflect Brown’s approach to security in Africa more broadly, often 
framed in humanitarian language.  
 
we are actually meeting in the place where in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, the colonial 
movements and independence agreements were actually signed by negotiations in Kenya, 
Ghana and then Zimbabwe to create freedom from colonial oppression. And so this is a place 
which has seen many of the human rights that we value greatly being upheld by agreements for 
independence and majority governance in some parts of the world. When the declaration was 
written 60 years ago Britain was of course a very different place, but there are some things that 
do stand the test of time. The values of 1948 - that powerful post-war impulse for liberty, for 
justice, for fairness - continues not only to endure but to flourish to this day.  
                                                 
93 Gordon Brown (10th December, 2008), Lancaster House, London. 
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As discussed in the thematic content analysis, Pugh et al. (2013) argue intervention under 
Blair was framed in terms of a global cosmopolitan purpose, whereas under Cameron this 
was less controversially about building the capacity and resilience of people from the bottom 
up. However, although they argue that Cameron and his government attempted to portray 
this as a ‘post-interventionist’ approach, this can also be seen earlier in Brown’s speeches. In 
this same way, although Daddow and Schnapper (2013: 346) argue that Cameron proved 
himself to be adept at learning about the perils of too expansive an interventionist posture 
from Blair’s intervention in Iraq, these lessons can also be seen in Brown’s speeches. Brown 
does not argue for specific British intervention – he argues for United Nations to act.  
 
Perhaps the most poignant story that I have read in the last few years is a story of a young boy 
called David. He was a Ugandan, and he was caught up in the massacres in Rwanda. At the age 
of 10 he and his mother were killed by murderous people and if you go to the museum that 
commemorates the holocaust in Rwanda you see the photograph of David, and then you see 
the facts surrounding his existence: age, 10; his favourite pastime, playing football; his 
ambition, to be a doctor; and then his last words - and these were words I understand that he 
said to his mother - don't worry, the United Nations are coming to save us. But they 
never did - and that is why we must remember our responsibilities to everyone who faces 
persecution, difficulties and discrimination around the world. 
 
In his book Beyond the Crash, Brown notes that ‘one of my oft-remarked-upon failings as a 
communicator is that I like to talk in numbers, what the British press branded my “tractor 
statistics tendency”’ (Brown, 2010: 4).  In this speech, he avoids this by using the story of a 
young boy from Rwanda to make the case for UN intervention, a story he repeated a 
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number of times – see (GB08v)94 and (GB08ff)95. This personalises and humanises the 
tragedy, and highlights the cost of inaction.  
 
This focus on the UN suggests a British national identity that is more attentive to 
international rules and less focused on projecting British exceptionalism, values, and 
power in the world. In the next extract from this speech, Brown’s discursive strategy 
focuses on highlighting the urgency of the crisis. At the same time, he does not suggest 
British action.  
 
In Zimbabwe we are witnessing a humanitarian emergency of colossal proportions, thousands 
now stricken with cholera. They need help urgently and our disagreement with Mugabe will 
not stand in our way. So we are increasing our humanitarian aid and calling on others to do the 
same, for we must stand together to meet our moral obligations to the people of Zimbabwe 
who have shown such forbearance and such fortitude, whilst saying firmly to the Mugabe 
regime that enough is enough. Now European countries came together on Monday of this 
week to expand our sanctions against Mugabe’s bloodstained regime, freezing the assets and 
preventing the travel of their henchmen.  
 
As Brown shifts from the example of Zimbabwe to Darfur, he also changes 
argumentation strategy from the highly personal anecdote of the young boy, David. For 
                                                 
94 Gordon Brown (25th September, 2008), United Nations, New York, USA. 
95 Gordon Brown (17th November, 2008), Chain Reaction, Global Entrepreneurship Week, London. 
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Darfur, he focuses on numbers, using the ‘topos of the force of facts’ to make his point 
about the scale of the problem, and why it needs to be addressed so urgently.   
 
In Darfur, millions of men, women and children continue to start each day with the fear of 
violence, abduction, rape or death. Already 200,000 people have lost their lives, almost 3 
million people have been displaced, and almost 5 million - that is two-thirds of the 
population - have been affected. So more than five years after the fighting began it is time for 
the world to come together once again to tell all sides in the conflict that it must end now. 
 
Brown concludes by presenting Britain as part of a broader international community that 
upholds democracy and human rights, rather than being exceptional in this regard.  
 
So today on this great anniversary I say to the women and girls of Kivu, to the stricken people 
of Zimbabwe, to the political prisoners of Burma, to the children of Darfur who have known 
nothing in their lives but war, and to all those who struggle throughout the world for human 
rights: the world will not abandon you. We must not, and we will not turn our backs and walk 
away. Now in a country like Britain with a strong tradition of democracy, it is all too easy to 
take our rights for granted, but we should never forget that the universal rights enshrined in 
the Universal Declaration and in our Human Rights Act are a shield and a safeguard for us all.  
 
Cameron’s speech on HMS Ark Royal (DC10a)96 is similar to Blair’s in that he also presents 
Britain a global power with the ability to intervene militarily and project power in the world. 
                                                 
96 David Cameron (24th June, 2010), HMS Ark Royal 
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This is a contrast to the approach taken by Brown. The broader context of this speech is the 
Strategic Defence and Security Review 2010 by the Conservative / Liberal Democrat 
coalition government, which was the first major review since the 1998 Strategic Defence 
Review. A new chapter was added to the Strategic Defence Review after 9/11, so it could be 
argued that defence had been reviewed again in 2001 (Cornish and Dorman, 2009: 250). As 
this speech is at the beginning of Cameron’s time in office, he uses it to try and mark a fresh 
start and to distinguish himself from his predecessors. Cameron achieves this by using 
simple clauses in his sentences in an attempt to project assertiveness. These clauses have 
been highlighted in the extract below.   
  
We have not asked the fundamental questions about the defence of our country, about our 
role in the world, since 1998.  If you think of all the things that have happened since then – 
the actions that you have taken part in, in Sierra Leone, and Kosovo; the wars that we fought 
in Iraq and Afghanistan – huge changes have taken place in our world: the attacks of 9/11; the 
attacks in our own country in July 2005.  It is time for us to think again about how to make 
our country safe, how to project power in the world, how to look after our national 
interest, and how to make sure we are secure for the future.  That is what we should do. 
I know absolutely that the Royal Navy will have a huge role to play in that future.  We are a 
trading nation. We have got to keep our sea-lanes open. We want to stop drugs coming 
from our shores, and that is the work that you do.  We have to deal with the appalling 
threat of piracy off the Horn of Africa; that is what you do. We have to make sure we keep 
vital sea-lanes open, and the work in the Gulf; that is what the Royal Navy is doing 
today. I know that whatever the outcome of this review, whatever the changes we will have to 
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make, we should make them together and recognise that the Royal Navy is going to have a 
huge role to play in our future, in our defence, and in our security. 
 
In doing so, Cameron is not asking what British identity is, he is stating it. Importantly, this 
identity is tied to Britain’s role in Africa – such as its intervention in Sierra Leone and dealing 
with the piracy in the Horn of Africa. In contrast to Blair’s speech in South Africa, he does 
not say ‘I think’ or ‘I believe’, he focuses on words that project confidence and authority. He 
says ‘I know’, ‘we have to’, ‘it is time’.   
 
6.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has assessed the extent to which Britain’s post-Cold War engagement with 
Africa is presented by British prime ministers as being based on security. Within the broad 
theme of security, there were three sub-themes that showed important differences in how 
Africa is constructed and the narratives used to construct narratives about British national 
identity.  
 
Firstly, this chapter found that Major, Blair, Brown, and Cameron link deprivation in Africa 
to the threat of extremism in the UK. This represents a continuity across all four prime 
ministers until the Paris attacks in 2015, when Cameron began framing extremism as 
something that is separate from poverty or deprivation. In contrast to the argument in the 
literature, this chapter finds that this framing began significantly before 9/11. However, it 
does appear more frequently after it. Secondly, all four prime ministers show they are 
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divided about whether British military forces should support peacekeeping in Africa, or 
whether African countries and institutions can do this. This continuity suggests that there 
has not been a clear trend in terms of how British prime ministers see Britain’s role in 
relation to peacekeeping in Africa; they are no clearer on this now than at the end of the 
Cold War. Finally, this chapter finds that whilst there is a consistency amongst the four 
prime ministers about Britain’s place in the world and its duty to intervene, however this is 
most notable in the speeches of Blair and Cameron. Whereas under Blair this was framed in 
terms of a clear global cosmopolitan purpose, under Brown and then Cameron, this was 
framed less controversially on capacity building. 
 
Whilst the first thematic chapter, focusing on the role of history in British prime ministers’ 
speeches that reference Africa, found evidence of significant changes from 1990-2016, this 
chapter exploring the role of security has found a number of continuities throughout this 
time period. The next chapter centring on morality finds further evidence for continuities in 




Benevolent Britain? The Moral Basis of British Concern for Africa Beyond Blair 
Having looked at security in the previous chapter, this chapter focuses on the extent to 
which Britain’s post-Cold War engagement with Africa is presented by British prime 
ministers as being based on morality, and how this shapes British national identity. The 
moral underpinning of Britain’s relationship with Africa has been explored in the literature in 
some detail (Ero, 2001; Williams, 2002; Chandler, 2003; Vallely, 2009; Gallagher, 2013; 
Taylor, 2012; Harrison, 2013). Looking at the theme of morality more closely, a variety of 
sub-themes can be identified within this overarching concept that signify important 
differences in how Africa is constructed in the speeches of British prime ministers, and what 
this says in turn about British national identity. These sub-themes will be explored here in 
more detail, with reference to the relevant literature where applicable. 
 
Firstly, an argument that has repeatedly been made in the contemporary UK-Africa literature 
is that British prime ministers’ discussions around Africa have mainly (although not 
exclusively) been a ‘conversation’ about the moral nature of Britishness (Harrison, 2013). 
However, this argument is currently largely centred on New Labour, specifically under Blair’s 
premiership (Gallagher, 2013). This chapter offers an opportunity to assess whether this 
framing of Africa is unique to Blair by expanding the time period of focus, as well as to 
explore in greater depth how this is achieved. This chapter finds that both Blair and 
Cameron emphasise the moral dimension overtly in their speeches.  
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Secondly, there are examples of all four prime ministers referencing Christianity in their 
speeches when they speak about the moral aspect of Britain’s involvement in Africa. 
However, Brown also tends to draw on the moral teachings of a number of religions, rather 
than just Christianity. Although Steven (2011) contends that religion is generally an 
underappreciated motivating force in modern British politics, Harrison (2013: 542) argues 
that Africa’s place in British global imaginings speaks to ‘aspirations to see Britain as the 
‘home’ of good, pragmatic, liberal and Christian citizens’.  
 
Thirdly, there is a common thread through the speeches of the four prime ministers that 
Africa is a place they refer to in order to (explicitly or implicitly) assert that the values they 
champion – personally, for their party, and for Britain – transcend British party politics; that 
they are universal and apply as much to some of the poorest countries in the world as they 
do to Britain. In doing so, they seek to lend moral weight to their philosophy. Major and 
Cameron use narratives of Africa to promote the virtues of conservatism – that trade, 
investment and entrepreneurship are the best way out of poverty. Blair meanwhile speaks 
about Africa to give weight to his ‘Third Way’ philosophy whilst also using narratives about 
Africa to try and unite the Labour Party behind New Labour, and to attack the 
Conservatives.  
 
The main finding from this chapter is that the rhetoric of Blair and Cameron is most similar 
out of the four prime ministers; both Blair and Cameron frame Africa as an overtly moral 
cause. This is noteworthy because they were from different parties, did not govern 
consecutively, and the 2007/2008 Global Financial Crisis separates their administrations. 
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One explanation for this similarity is that Blair and Cameron were elected prime minister 
after a long period in opposition97, and were both elected to office at the young age of 43. 
The argument that both Blair and Cameron used Africa to present themselves as statesmen 
on the world stage to help combat the idea they were inexperienced is explored in detail in 
Chapter 9.  
 
This chapter begins with a continuation of the quantitative analysis in Chapter 5, but with a 
specific focus on the morality dimension. It then moves on to a thematic content analysis of 
the speeches and critical discourse analysis around this theme.  
 
7.1 Quantitative Analysis 
For this morality chapter, the keywords selected for input into the Python code are: ‘moral’, 
‘morality’, Christian, Christianity, corruption, duty, rights, and values. This information is 
plotted in Table 7:1, where mentions of selected keywords are shown in terms of their raw 
numbers by prime minister. In Figure 7.1, these are plotted as percentages of each prime 




                                                 
97 Labour had spent 18 years in opposition when Blair was elected, and the Conservatives had spent 
13 years in opposition when Cameron was elected 
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Table 7:1. Frequency of selected morality-related keywords in the context of Africa by prime minister 
 John Major Tony Blair Gordon Brown David Cameron 
Moral(ity) 1 14 2 1 
Christian(ity) 2 1 0 1 
Corruption 0 19 3 5 
Duty 0 10 4 0 
Rights 4 14 21 7 
Values 8 14 4 1 
 
 
Figure 7:1. Frequency of selected keywords related to ‘Morality’ in the context of Africa (as a 




It is significant that Blair uses the words ‘moral’ and ‘morality’ in this context far more than 
the other prime ministers. This supports the argument put forward by Gallagher (2013) that 
Blair sought to project a new framing of Africa in terms of British morality. There appears to 
be a decrease in references to ‘values’, perhaps indicating that such language no longer befits 
an environment that is increasingly focused on the language of partnership. This is 
supported by the increase in references to ‘rights’ from Major to Brown – although it does 
not explain why this suddenly decreases under Cameron.  
 
Having captured a broad picture of references to specific morality-related keywords, this 
section moves on to look in more detail at the context of these keywords using the sentences 
extracted using the Python code. This information is plotted here for each prime minister as 
a word clouds, where word size is directly proportional to frequency of usage.  
 
Figure 7:2 and Figure 7:4 indicate that the dataset that generated these wordclouds were not 
large enough to plot a complete figure. Nevertheless, the usage of the Commonwealth in this 
context by Major and Blair is noteworthy, and requires a closer examination to understand 
whether this is significant. The prominence of ‘human’ by Major and Brown, and to a lesser 
extent, Blair, suggests that discourses of morality are perhaps linked to human rights (the 
word ‘rights’ has been removed as per the approach used to generate these figures).   
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Figure 7:2. Word cloud showing frequency of words in John Major’s sentences containing specific 
morality keywords, excluding those keywords 
 
Figure 7:3. Word cloud showing frequency of words in Tony Blair’s sentences containing specific 
morality keywords, excluding those keywords 
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Figure 7:4. Word cloud showing frequency of words in Gordon Brown’s sentences containing 
specific morality keywords, excluding those keywords 
Figure 7:5. Word cloud showing frequency of words in David Cameron’s sentences containing 
specific morality keywords, excluding those keywords 
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7.2 Content Analysis 
Having conducted the quantitative analysis and having made some initial observations about 
references to morality in British prime minister’s speeches about Africa, this section focuses 
on these in more detail through the content analysis. Within this overarching theme of 
morality, there are three sub-themes that signify important differences in how Africa is 
constructed. The first section focuses on the argument that British prime ministers’ 
discussions around Africa have mainly (although not exclusively) been a ‘conversation’ about 
the moral nature of Britishness. Specifically, it looks at whether this became and remained a 
prominent theme under Blair alone, or whether it is part of a broader trend. The second 
section looks at the role of religion, and in particular Christianity, in British prime ministers’ 
speeches about Africa. The third section of this chapter examines the extent to which this 
emphasis on morality is for the purpose of party political arguments, and in turn what the 
implications of this are for British national identity. 
 
7.2.1 Moral Posturing 
The notion that British prime ministers’ speeches about Africa have largely been a 
conversation about the moral nature of Britishness is highlighted in this section. However, 
this section also reveals subtleties to the argument made in the literature that are important 
to note. There is a clear discontinuity between the way in which Major and Blair spoke about 
Britain’s moral duty to Africa, supporting arguments made by Gallagher (2013). For Blair, 
Africa is overtly a moral cause – but for Major, this is not so. A further finding from this 
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chapter is that the rhetoric of Blair and Cameron is most similar out of the four prime 
ministers, as they both frame Africa as an explicitly moral cause.  
 
The quantitative analysis indicates that Major did not talk about Africa in terms of morality 
per se. However, he did talk about Africa in terms of values and rights, and here we will focus 
on this more closely. By contrast, Blair and Cameron talk about Africa more frequently and 
explicitly in terms of morality, corruption and religion. This reinforces the argument made in 
the literature by Gallagher that Britain’s relationship with Africa under New Labour 
represented something new, and that it was focused on the idea of the state’s capacity to 
embody and represent good. British state actors, in attempting to ‘do good’ in Africa, 
enabled the formation of a conception of the British state as involved in a disinterested, 
idealised project. This was enabled through the sanitisation of historical engagement, and an 
apparent lack of British interests in Africa. 
 
Gallagher claims that this gave British policy in Africa a moral rather than political tone, and 
that narratives of Africa are more accurately the narrative Britain creates for itself, about its 
history, identity, and role in the world (Gallagher, 2009: 449). The propensity of British 
politicians to treat Africa differently to the rest of the world stems from shared tendency to 
idealise Africa and Africans. That is, when British politicians interact with Africa, they 
assume that their actions rise above their own national self-interest – that they are engaged in 
a ‘noble cause’, transcending political and economic interests. Chandler (2003: 310) concurs. 
He contends that one important factor behind major western powers making foreign policy 
concerns central to their administrations is the difficulty of generating moral authority 
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through domestic policy initiatives. Foreign policy initiatives have become an important 
mechanism for cohering western governments and international institutions, often appearing 
to be bereft of any clear consensus-building political agenda of their own.  
 
However, the literature around this focuses largely on Blair (Vallely, 2009; Gallagher, 2013). 
One of the aims of this thesis is to understand continuity and discontinuity over the period 
1990-2016. In order to achieve this, it is important to examine these arguments for the other 
three prime ministers, as well as re-assessing Blair’s premiership. This chapter finds that 
throughout Blair’s premiership, he does indeed repeatedly and unequivocally makes the 
claim that Africa is a moral cause. For example, in a speech delivered to the EastWest 
Institute on receiving the Statesman of The Decade award six months into his third term 
(TB05l)98, Blair says:  
 
I believe passionately in Africa as a moral cause, but I also have to say to you that if I 
think of Africa, and I think of hundreds of millions of young people growing up in poverty, 
uncertain of their future, then I think it is not merely a moral cause, but how foolish it 
would be if we in the wealthy part of the world allowed the obscenity of such poverty to 
continue.  
 
This framing of Africa as an explicitly moral cause is echoed using similar language 
throughout many of Blair’s speeches to a variety of audiences. The context of the speeches 
                                                 
98 Tony Blair (8th December, 2005), EastWest Institute Statesman of the Decade award, London, UK 
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in which Blair talks about Africa helps to explain Africa’s role in identity construction. The 
focus on Africa as a moral cause in this speech suggests that this is central to the way in 
which Blair views his own time in office. It is also perhaps an attempt to build the legacy he 
would like to be remembered for – foregrounding some aspects whilst skipping over others, 
such as the Iraq War. Similarly, in Pebble Beach, California, towards the end of his time in 
office in 2006, Blair told News Corp. (TB06r)99:  
 
I know some of my fellow leaders think I am trifle obsessed with Africa. It’s true. I am. 
For reasons of moral purpose of course: how can we tolerate millions, literally millions, 
dying every year preventably from famine, conflict and disease?  
 
Blair does not only use this framing when addressing western audiences. In Addis Ababa, for 
example, Blair again made this case (TB04h) using this same language:  
 
And so there is this immense and powerful moral cause […] In all the things that I deal 
with in politics, and the things that make people cynical and disengaged from the political 
process, when I come and see what is happening here [in Ethiopia] and see what could happen, 
I know that however difficult politics is, there is at least one noble cause worth fighting 
for.  
 
                                                 
99 Tony Blair (30th July, 2006). News Corp., Pebble Beach, California. 
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The argument can first be seen in the aftermath of 9/11. He told the Labour Party 
Conference in 2001 (TB01f)100 that ‘the state of Africa is a scar on the conscience of the 
world. But if the world as a community focused on it, we could heal it. And if we don't, it 
will become deeper and angrier’. He used this conference speech to also set out the moral 
case for humanitarian intervention to his party: ‘And I tell you if Rwanda happened again 
today as it did in 1993101, when a million people were slaughtered in cold blood, we would 
have a moral duty to act there also’.  
 
The metaphor of Africa as a scar on the conscience of the world was repeated a number of 
times by Blair; he used it again a year later at the Nigerian Assembly (TB02c), the World 
Summit on Sustainable Development in South Africa (TB02g), and the G8 Summit in 
Canada (TB02f):  
 
Before the last Election I said that Africa would be a big priority for the government in 
our second term. And I described Africa as a scar on the conscience of the world. And 
that is for a very simple reason. There are round about 200 million people in Africa who don't 
have either proper sanitation, access to clean water or proper health care. There are literally 20 
million Africans that have died of AIDS in the past three years. Every 3 seconds a child in 
Africa will die, either of conflict, famine or disease. And yet we know that it is not possible to 
change Africa unless Africa itself takes responsibility for leading that process of 
change. So what we have agreed is a plan that is comprehensive, that deals with all the issues 
                                                 
100 Tony Blair (2001) Labour Party Conference Speech, Brighton 
101 See footnote 84  
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that need to be dealt with, but deals with them not on the basis of old fashioned aid...simply 
handing out money to people...but on the basis rather of a deal. We are going to help Africa 
to help itself. This isn't old fashioned aid. It is a genuine partnership for the renewal of Africa 
and I believe that today's document will send out a signal of hope. 
 
Having confirmed that Blair explicitly frames Britain’s interest in Africa in moral terms, and 
having seen from the quantitative analysis that Major rarely does this, it is important to look 
closely into Major’s speeches to understand if this is perhaps achieved in different ways or if 
it is absent altogether. The usage of the language of rights and values by all four prime 
ministers – as highlighted in the quantitative analysis (Figure 7:1) – provides a starting point. 
When talking about rights and values, Major frequently uses the Commonwealth as an 
institution to talk about the common values between Britain and Africa. In doing so, there is 
the implicit notion that Britain’s place at the centre of the Commonwealth provides it with 
the ability to speak on behalf of (and make claims about shared moral values on behalf of) 
other Commonwealth members in a way that they are not able to make because their voices 
are not given equal weight as Britain’s. Or, to put it another way, Britain is primus inter pares in 
the Commonwealth. This argument has been explored in some detail in relation to history in 
6.2.2, but its frequent usage by Major here points toward also a moral purpose.  
 
For example, when Major welcomes Namibia to the Commonwealth in a speech to the 
Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Harare in 1991 (JM91h), he frames this 




And in welcoming Namibia to the Commonwealth we are doing more than simply inviting 
her to join a club. Namibia is joining an organisation which stands for certain values and 
which can use its collective strength to help its individual members and to wield influence in 
world affairs.    
 
In his keynote address on his tour of South Africa in 1994, Major again made this point, this 
time (JM94f) about South Africa. He again frames it in terms of values: 
 
South Africa's re-entry to the Commonwealth, her coming home to the Commonwealth 
where she belongs should do more than just heal a wound, it should provide a stimulus to the 
Commonwealth family of one-third of the world's nations. Madam Speaker, I am a dedicated 
believer in the Commonwealth, its values are our values, its values are your values. 
 
These two extracts also demonstrate how references to familial relationships are important 
in Major’s references to Africa and the Commonwealth, and are explored in more detail in 
the CDA section of this chapter.  
 
This reinforces Gallagher’s argument that Blair’s framing of Africa represented something 
new. Blair certainly discussed Africa in more explicit moral terms. However, Blair is not 
alone in making this argument. Out of the four prime ministers, there is most similarity in 
the way in which Africa is moral cause for Blair and Cameron – a finding that has not yet 
been discussed in the literature. Whilst this is not apparent from the quantitative analysis 
(Figure 7:1), it can be seen through this content analysis. Making the moral case in similar 
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language to Blair, Cameron goes on to say that Britain’s altruism shapes Britain’s standing in 
the world and it defines Britain’s identity. At the G8 Nutrition for Growth event in 2013 
(DC13g) he said:  
 
“Why does Britain always have to be out in front?” Let me tell you why. It’s because of the 
kind of people we are - and the kind of country we are. We are the kind of people who 
believe in doing what is right. We accept the moral case for keeping our promises to 
the world’s poorest - even when we face challenges at home. When people are dying, we 
don’t believe in finding excuses. We believe in trying to do something about it. Look at Band 
Aid and Live8. Look at Red Nose Day. Look at the way the British public respond to appeals 
from the Disasters Emergency Committee. During the famine in East Africa, British people 
gave £79 million. This is British families looking at the images on their televisions and 
responding with their hearts. It says something about this country. It says something 
about our standing in the world and our sense of duty in helping others. In short – it 
says something about the kind of people we are. And that makes me proud to be 
British. 
 
This speech is looked at in more detail in the Critical Discourse Analysis section of this 
chapter. It is important to see, however, that this is a theme throughout Cameron’s speeches; 
there are further echoes of Blair’s framing of Africa in Cameron’s speeches, such as in 




it is morally right to honour our promises to the poorest in the world. Every 6 minutes a 
woman who did not want to become pregnant will die in pregnancy or childbirth. Every 6 
minutes. So how many minutes do we wait? I say we don’t wait at all.  
 
One final example can be seen in Cameron’s speech to the European Council regarding 
Ebola. Cameron says in DC14f:  
In facing Ebola we are facing one of the worst public health emergencies in a generation, and I 
have been absolutely determined that Britain, with other countries, will lead the way in 
dealing with this. Dealing with it because there is a massive crisis in West Africa, and we 
should feel some moral obligation as a wealthy country to help.  
 
Thus, the idea that British prime ministers’ references to Africa are centred on projecting the 
moral nature of Britishness can be backed up with the evidence presented here. However, 
this section also reveals subtleties to the argument made in the literature that are important 
to highlight. There is a clear distinction between the way in which Major and Blair spoke 
about Britain’s moral duty to Africa. For Blair, and to a slightly lesser extent Cameron, Africa 
is overtly a moral cause – but for Major, this is not so. Major uses the Commonwealth to talk 
about shared values between Britain and Africa – but this is an indirect way of asserting 
moral authority. This sharp contrast could be attributed to Blair and Cameron coming to 
power after long periods in opposition, and wanting to assert themselves whilst also making 
a statement about their leadership over their party and Britain. The sharp contrast could also 
be a way to emphasise the break from their predecessor. For example, Major’s 
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administration was plagued by scandals – particularly around the conduct of Conservative 
MPs.102 This explanation is explored in more detail in Chapter 9.  
 
7.2.2 Christian Values 
As discussed in the previous section, the narrative of Britain’s relationship with Africa being 
based on morality has been covered in some detail in the literature. As this section shows, 
however, the religious or missionary aspect of it has been left underexplored. The literature 
that does examine this link between religion and British foreign policy tends to view it in a 
very historical sense. Robbins and Fisher (2010), for example, do focus on this – but their 
period of focus is 1815-1941. Elbourne (2002), meanwhile, investigates the role of 
Christianity in linking, constraining, and changing the lives of disparate peoples: African 
nomads, white settlers in Africa, the self-proclaimed members of the British ‘religious world’, 
and parliamentary and colonial officials, but the timeframe of her research is even earlier: 
1799-1853.  
 
Steven (2011) argues that scholars have broadly ignored the role of religion in modern 
British politics. He says ‘this is primarily an institutionalist failing, with an over-emphasis on 
the decline of traditional church attendance, the absence of a confessional party and, linked 
to this, any significant social conflict related exclusively to religion’ (Steven, 2011: ix). 
                                                 
102 At the 1993 Conservative Party Conference, John Major launched the ‘Back to Basics’ campaign, 
which was about returning to the moral and family values associated with the Conservative Party. 
Over the course of 1992-1997, however, almost a dozen Conservative politicians were caught having 
extra-marital affairs. This led to the label of ‘Tory Sleaze’, which stuck with the party.  
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However, Harrison (2013: 542) argues that Africa’s place in British global imaginings speaks 
to ‘aspirations to see Britain as the ‘home’ of good, pragmatic, liberal and Christian (or 
crypto-Christian) citizens who can campaign on behalf of Africans to ensure that the British 
state does the right thing and remains something of a primus inter pares in regards to how 
the west concerns itself with Africa’.  
 
Religion is a notable aspect of British prime minister’s speeches about Africa, as can be seen 
in Figure 4:3, Figure 4:4, Figure 4:5,Figure 4:6; all four Prime Ministers spoke to religious 
audiences about Africa. The religious aspect of Britain’s engagement with Africa is used to 
present Britain as an actor whose motivations are grounded not in self-interest but in 
religious morality. Importantly, not all the prime ministers make this argument in terms of 
Christian morality. Throughout Gordon Brown’s time in office, when talking about the 
moral underpinning of the concern for international poverty, he draws on many faiths – and 
secularism too – rather than just Christianity, despite famously drawing inspiration from his 
father who was a minister for the Church of Scotland (Taylor, 2005; Gay, 2007).  
 
Major praises the way in which ‘philanthropic explorers and Christian missionaries travelled 
courageously through Africa, but in turn they unwittingly paved the way for the harsh 
incursions of rival empire builders’ (JM94f)103. A decade later, Blair praises the role of 
                                                 




Christianity in the abolition of the slave trade, and stated that it was the role of faith leaders 
to continue the campaign against poverty (TB05b)104: 
 
The churches are among the most formidable campaigning organizations in history.  I 
think of the campaign to abolish the slave trade, led by William Wilberforce with so 
many Christian organizations in support - culminating, after two decades of tireless 
persuasion in and beyond Parliament, in the abolition of the slave trade throughout the British 
empire in 1807.  2007 marks the two hundredth anniversary of that great reform.  The 
Government enthusiastically supports the work of the churches not only to mark the 
bicentenary, but also to explain the legacy and highlight the great campaigns against 
injustice and poverty in our world today. 200 years ago slavery was the moral challenge. 
Today it is poverty, and faith leaders are in the forefront of the campaign to Make Poverty 
History. 
 
In his speech to the Church of Scotland in 2008 (GB08h)105, Brown echoes these arguments 
by bringing together the points made by Major and Blair. He says: 
 
In the Church this work of building a good society has never been limited to the 
boundaries of the parish or the presbytery but has always stretched out across the world —- 
from the service and sacrifice of Scottish missionaries we were brought up to remember - 
David Livingstone, Mary Slessor, Eric Liddell, Jane Haining - to more recently Kenneth 
                                                 
104 Tony Blair (22nd March, 2005), Faithworks, London, UK. 
105 Gordon Brown (19th May, 2008), Church of Scotland General Assembly, UK. 
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Mckenzie’s and then Robert Craig’s struggles for multiracial justice in post-colonial 
Africa. And as the Moderator’s coming visits to Zambia, Nepal and Malawi will again show, 
the Church can honourably claim a global vision that long predated the modern 
concept of globalisation and perhaps even anticipated it too. 
 
Completing the continuity of this theme throughout the 1990-2016 period – across all four 
prime ministers – Cameron references the role of the Bible in spurring people to champion 
equality and human rights, citing its role in the abolition of slavery. He says (DC11k106):  
 
I am proud to stand here and celebrate the achievements of the King James Bible. Not as some 
great Christian on a mission to convert the world. […] The Judeo-Christian roots of the Bible 
also provide the foundations for protest and for the evolution of our freedom and democracy. 
[…] when every human being is of equal and infinite importance, created in the very image of 
God… we get the irrepressible foundation for equality and human rights… a foundation that 
has seen the Bible at the forefront of the emergence of democracy, the abolition of slavery 
[…] Just as our language and culture is steeped in the Bible, so too is our politics. […] the 
Bible has been a spur to action for people of faith throughout history, and it remains so today. 
[…]  And when it comes to the great humanitarian crises – like the famine in Horn of Africa 
– again you can count on faith-based organisations… like Christian Aid, Tearfund, CAFOD, 
Jewish Care, Islamic Relief, and Muslim Aid… to be at the forefront of the action to save 
lives. 
 
                                                 
106 David Cameron (16th December, 2011), Christ Church Cathedral, Oxford, UK. 
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Although Gordon Brown’s speech to the Church of Scotland focused on the role of the 
church, looking at his speeches more broadly reveals that throughout his time in office, 
when talking about the moral underpinning of the concern for Africa international poverty, 
he draws on many faiths – rather than just Christianity. This can be seen in speeches to 
audiences as varied as the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, the Church of Scotland 
General Assembly, the New York interfaith conference, St Paul’s Cathedral and the Lord 
Mayor’s Banquet (GB08e107, GB08h108, GB08ee109, GB09b110 and GB09e111). 
 
This is noteworthy because Brown is often referred to as a ‘son of the manse’112, and 
regularly spoke of having drawn inspiration from his father who was a minister for the 
Church of Scotland. It was one of his father’s sermons that inspired Brown – at the age of 
11 – and his brother John to found The Gazette, which proudly boasted that it was the only 
newspaper in Scotland sold in aid of African charities (Brown, 2017). One such example can 
be seen in Brown’s speech to the Interfaith Conference in New York (GB08ee):  
 
We cannot be one world when 30,000 children die unnecessarily every day from diseases we 
know how to cure and that we must together respond to this poverty emergency by redoubling 
                                                 
107 Gordon Brown (18th April, 2008), John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, Boston, 
USA. 
108 Gordon Brown (16th May, 2008), Church of Scotland General Assembly, Scotland, UK. 
109 Gordon Brown (13th November, 2008), New York interfaith conference, New York, USA. 
110 Gordon Brown (31st March, 2009), St Paul’s Cathedral, London, UK. 
111 Gordon Brown (16th November, 2009), Lord Mayor’s Banquet, London, UK. 




our efforts to meet the Millennium Development Goals? This is the power of faith: to force 
the greatest possible coalition for the common good. […] But today we know we are not, 
and never can be, moral strangers to each other. Because we find that through each of our 
heritages, our traditions and faiths, runs a single powerful moral sense  
 
7.2.3 Party Political Messaging 
A third reoccurring theme throughout the period 1990-2016 is that British prime ministers 
use Africa as an arena in which they attempt to factualise and universalise the virtues of their 
personal political philosophy as well as that of their party. The trend over this period is 
divided along party lines – by whether the Labour Party or the Conservative Party is in 
government.  
 
Major and Cameron reference Africa to highlight the virtues of conservatism and capitalism 
– that trade, investment, and entrepreneurship are the best route out of poverty. This is their 
domestic philosophy too. For example, at a speech in Birmingham, Cameron says (DC12g,): 
‘We say help people become independent from welfare… our opponents call it: ‘cruel 
Tories, leaving people to fend for themselves.’ No: there is only one real route out of 
poverty and it is work’. This message is echoed in Major and Cameron’s speeches about 
Africa (JM95b; DC11e). Blair, meanwhile, references Africa to give a moral grounding to his 
‘Third Way’ philosophy. Additionally, Blair also speaks about Africa to try and unite the 
Labour Party behind New Labour, and also to attack the Conservatives. A common theme 
through all of these is that Africa represents a place where prime ministers can assert that 
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their ideas transcend British party politics; they are universal and apply as much to some of 
the poorest countries in the world as they do to Britain.  
 
In Major’s speech to the Britain in the World Conference in 1995 (JM95b113), for example, 
he questions the efficacy of aid, and suggests that investment and entrepreneurship are more 
effective.  
 
How do we play our proper part in tackling world poverty? Official development aid can point 
to some successes, for example in South Asia, but it is trade, investment, education and 
entrepreneurship which have fuelled the more spectacular development of South East Asia. 
Hundreds of millions of people in sub-Saharan Africa have seen little improvement in 
their living standard despite huge flows of official aid over many years. How can we 
promote investment and entrepreneurship there? 
 
Cameron echoes this theme in many speeches, arguing that trade and investment are the key 
to lifting Africa and Africans out of poverty. In a joint press conference with President 
Zuma in 2011 (DC11e)114, he says, for example:  
 
we must also though seize the opportunity of a booming Africa where trade and growth 
can lift millions out of poverty and where Britain too can benefit from seizing the 
                                                 
113 John Major (29th March, 1995), Britain in the World Conference, London, UK. 




chance to increase its trade and investment. That is why I brought a top-flight delegation 
of British businesses to Africa and I wanted to come, Mr President, to South Africa first 
because this is the gateway to that new economic future. Britain is already South Africa’s 
biggest long-term foreign investor. Our trade is worth £9 billion a year and exports of British 
goods to South Africa in the first third of this year are up nearly 50% compared with the year 
before. 
 
There is, however, a difference between Major and Cameron in respect to their views on aid. 
In contrast to Major, Cameron is more sympathetic to the argument that aid can help 
African economies. Cameron’s appreciation of the role of aid can be explained by a number 
of factors, including his first-hand experience of the Conservative’s social action project, 
Project Umubano, his desire to project a more moderate image of the Conservative Party, 
and that the Labour government from 1997-2010 ‘won’ the battle of ideas regarding the 
value of the official development assistance spending. However, Cameron is clear that aid 
should be a catalyst for private enterprise and trade, and that aid should in time be stopped. 
In his speech to the Pan African University in Nigeria (DC11f)115, he says:  
 
we can spend aid in a catalytic way to unleash the dynamism of African economies, kickstarting 
growth and development and ultimately helping Africa move off aid altogether. So getting 
aid right - that’s the first thing we have to do. The second thing we must do is together 
unleash economic growth through private enterprise and trade. This is what has lifted 
                                                 
115 David Cameron (19h July, 2011), Pan African University, Lagos, Nigeria. 
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hundreds of thousands out of poverty in Brazil, China and Indonesia… and it can do the 
same here in Africa 
 
Throughout his time in office, Cameron promotes free trade with almost missionary zeal. In 
his speech to the Global Investment Conference in London (DC12d)116, he repeats this 
message: 
 
I’ll continue to champion a free trade area in Africa, which could play such a vital role in 
lifting Africa further out of poverty. And I will make trade a core priority when Britain hosts 
the G8 here in the United Kingdom next year. 
 
Cameron reinforces this point in a speech in 2013 (DC13h)117, in which he says his emphasis 
on trade, tax and transparency is ‘morally right’. He also uses this speech as an opportunity 
to attack increased regulation: 
 
When trade is choked by barriers and bureaucracy – developing countries miss out on the 
chance to grow. These issues are not just important they are ever more urgent too. 
Developing countries are finding new sources of natural wealth like offshore oil and 
gas in Ghana and Tanzania and the forces of globalisation are driving ever greater 
opportunities for growth and trade. Just think what missing out on this growing income 
means for a country where thousands of children are dying every day because of malnutrition 
                                                 
116 David Cameron (26th July, 2012), Global Investment Conference, London, UK. 
117 David Cameron (15th June, 2013), Lancaster House, UK. 
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or where sick parents have to choose between whether to buy medicine to save their own lives, 
or pay for food for their hungry children. […] And the extraordinary thing about this tax, 
transparency and trade agenda is that it’s not just the right thing for us to do morally 
it’s right for our economies too. Because when some businesses don’t pay their taxes, it 
corrodes public trust. When some companies don’t play by the rules, that drives more 
regulation and makes it harder for other businesses to turn a profit. And when Africa doesn’t 
trade to its potential, we all lose the chance to benefit from trading with one of the 
fastest growing continents on the planet. 
 
The historical context of Major’s premiership is important in understanding his emphasis on 
free trade. As Major’s premiership began just after the fall of the Berlin Wall, he also uses 
discussions about Africa – such as his 1991 speech in Zimbabwe (JM91h) – to warn against 
what he saw as the moral shortcomings of socialism and highly state-centred systems of 
government.  
 
 There is no wish to impose particular models. Different parts of the world have different 
traditions, different means of establishing a consensus, different institutions and different 
problems. Of course each society will strike its own balance between individual rights and the 
responsibilities of the state. But recent history shows us that stifling individual rights 
leads to discontent and economic failure and ultimately collapse. 
 
This section has shown how both Conservative prime ministers use references to Africa to 
echo and highlight the moral virtues of capitalism and free trade. In a similar way, Blair links 
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Africa to the core principles of New Labour. In doing so, he attempts to universalise the 
truths of this philosophy, as seen in his speech to the French National Assembly (TB98a118): 
  
What impresses me most is not the differences in the challenge this change poses for our 
countries. It is the similarities. […] in Latin America, in Eastern Europe, in the Far East, even 
in parts of Africa. All of us struggle with these two questions: How do we equip ourselves for 
economic change? How do we impose some order in the face of social change? In other words 
how to provide security in a world of change. Our guide has to be our values. And here let 
me explain what I mean when I talk of a Third Way or New Labour. My conviction is 
that we have to be absolute in our adherence to our basic values, otherwise we have no 
compass to guide us through change.  
 
It is noteworthy that Blair also references Africa to try and unite the Labour Party. The 
move towards the political centre under the New Labour brand risked creating divisions in 
the party. In his speech to the Labour Party conference in 1999 (TB99b)119, Blair references 
New Labour’s policies around debt in Africa whilst invoking the Labour Party’s founder, 
first leader, and first MP, Kier Hardie. This juxtaposition is used to argue that New Labour 
values are Labour values and British values. He argues:  
 
Solidarity, social justice, the belief not that society comes before individual fulfilment but that it 
is only in a strong society of others that the individual will be fulfilled. That it is these bonds of 
                                                 
118 Tony Blair (24th March, 1998), French National Assembly, France. 
119 Tony Blair (28th September, 1999), Labour Party Conference, Bournemouth, UK. 
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connection that make us not citizens of one nation but members of one human race. And 
wouldn’t Keir Hardie have been proud when under Britain’s leadership, this week we 
cancelled the debt of those African nations deep in poverty so that their people too can 
realise their potential, have the hopes and dreams for their children we want for ours? 
 
Blair also references Africa at the Labour Party conference in 1998 in order to create a 
dividing line between Labour and the Conservatives. In doing so, Blair sought to calm those 
in the Labour Party who felt he had abandoned the Labour Party’s principles in the pursuit 
of power. By referencing Africa, Blair tried to project an image of a Labour Party that could 
win power whilst also retaining a strong moral purpose. In his speech to the Labour Party 
conference in 1998 (TB98c)120, he states: 
 
And you tell me what Tory government would have given the peoples of Africa and Asia 
a 25 per cent increase in aid and development. Thousands of communities, tens of 
thousands of people, many starving and destitute, will live not die, have hope, not despair and 
may never know it was a new Labour government in Britain that had the courage to say: ‘You 
are our brothers and sisters and we accept our duty to you as members of the same human 
race.’ But more than that, we have done all this with the public behind us. Why? For a reason 
that should give every one of you confidence. The centre-left may have lost the battle of 
ideas in the 1980s, but we are winning now and we have won a bigger battle today - the 
battle of values. 
 
                                                 
120 Tony Blair (29th September, 1998), Labour Party Conference, Blackpool, UK. 
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In this extract, Blair’s reference to ‘brothers and sisters’ is used to argue that a shared 
humanity trumps national boundaries, and that Britain’s national identity under a Labour 
government holds a greater moral value.  Blair himself says as much in his speech in Pebble 
Beach, California (TB06s): ‘If we are championing the cause of development in Africa, it is 
right in itself but it is also sending the message of moral purpose that reinforces our value 
system as credible in all other aspects of policy’. 
 
In Brown’s acceptance speech on becoming leader of the Labour Party (GB07a)121, he 
references Africa as one of the achievements that defines Blair’s premiership (and by 
extension the legacy of New Labour).  
 
“So let me begin by personally thanking Tony Blair – a man who for ten years has borne the 
burden of leadership of our country. All of us will remember his leadership – his leadership 
has made Britain stronger, more tolerant, more prosperous and fairer. And let us never 
forget his towering presence in the international community, his work on Africa, 
climate change, his work to win the Olympics for Britain, and the skills and determination he 
brought to securing peace in Northern Ireland. Tony Blair’s achievements are unprecedented, 
historic and enduring. Tony – on behalf of the Labour party, thank you”. 
 
In this section, we have seen that a continuity across all four prime ministers is that Africa is 
a place British prime ministers refer to (explicitly or implicitly) in order to assert that the 
                                                 
121 Gordon Brown (24th June, 2007), Special Labour Party Conference, Manchester, UK.  
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values they champion – personally, for their party, and for Britain – transcend British party 
politics; that they are universal and apply as much to some of the poorest countries in the 
world as they do to Britain. Major and Cameron use narratives of Africa to promote the 
virtues of conservatism – that trade, investment and entrepreneurship are the best way out 
of poverty. Blair meanwhile speaks about Africa to give weight to his ‘Third Way’ 
philosophy whilst also using narratives about Africa to try and unite the Labour Party behind 
New Labour, and to attack the Conservatives.    
 
7.3 Critical Discourse Analysis 
The content analysis focused on the three sub-themes about in the way in which British 
prime ministers refer to morality in speeches relating to Africa.  In this section, particular 
speeches will be analysed in greater detail using the Discourse-Historical Approach. The 
speeches selected for analysis in terms of the economy are given below in Table 7:2, along 
with details about the speeches. As with the previous thematic chapters, they were selected 
based on quantitative tools (such as frequency of key words and coding using NVivo), the 
extracts analysed in the thematic content analysis, and from reading speeches during the data 







Table 7:2. Morality-related speeches selected for critical discourse analysis 
Prime Minister Date of Speech Location 
John Major 20/09/1994 
South African 
National Assembly, 
Cape Town, South 
Africa 
Tony Blair 07/10/2004 Ethiopia 
Gordon Brown 19/05/2008 
Church of Scotland 
General Assembly 
David Cameron 8/06/2013 




John Major’s speech, delivered to the South African National Assembly in 1994, is a useful 
example for exploring using DHA. Although this speech has been explored in the History 
chapter, there is an overlap between history and morality, and therefore it is explored in 
further detail in this section too. In this speech, Major criticises Apartheid in South Africa 
whilst also praising the transformation it has undergone and the elections it held that year. 
As shown in the Content Analysis section of this chapter, however, Major does not criticise 
South Africa directly, he again uses the Commonwealth as an institution to talk about the 
common values between Britain, South Africa, and other members. There is the implicit 
notion that Britain’s place at the centre of the Commonwealth provides it with the ability to 
speak on behalf of (and make claims about shared moral values on behalf of) other 
Commonwealth members in a way that they are not able to make because their voices are 





Instead of actively criticising South Africa about Apartheid, Major passively says that 
Apartheid struck at the very roots of the Commonwealth.   
 
With so many Commonwealth members in Africa, the two are of course closely linked. 
Apartheid, even after South Africa's departure, struck at the very roots, the very foundations, 
of the modern multi-racial Commonwealth. The Commonwealth was unanimously against 
apartheid but deep divisions opened within it, at times they threatened the very existence of the 
organisation. The Commonwealth was more strongly committed to ending apartheid and very 
heavily preoccupied with it than any other body in the world. The emergence, therefore of the 
new South Africa is a particular cause for rejoicing across the Commonwealth. When Deputy 
President Mbeki presented your new flag to the Commonwealth Secretary-General in 
Westminster Abbey in July, the congregation burst into spontaneous applause; South African 
participation in the Commonwealth Games in Victoria was greeted with equal delight and so it 
was at Lords cricket ground at that memorable moment when South Africa took the field. 
South Africa's re-entry to the Commonwealth, her coming home to the Commonwealth 
where she belongs should do more than just heal a wound, it should provide a stimulus to the 
Commonwealth family of one-third of the world's nations. 
 
The family metaphor that Major uses is intended to show unity and harmony within the 
Commonwealth. This also demonstrates how references to familial relationships are 
important in Major’s references to Africa and the Commonwealth. Johnstone (2017) argues 
that since the days of Empire, members of the British Royal family and political elites have 
frequently employed familial metaphors and discourse to describe the relationship with 
British colonies. The metaphor of the Empire as a family blurs the distinction between the 
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domestic and the international arena. This links back to Blair’s argument in the previous 
section that ‘it was a new Labour government in Britain that had the courage to say: ‘You are 
our brothers and sisters and we accept our duty to you as members of the same human 
race.’’ This blurring of boundaries across the domestic and international arenas helps lend 
weight to Britain’s moral standing and authority in the world. 
 
Johnstone argues that this familial discourse continues in the form of the Commonwealth – 
which often referred to as ‘a family of nations’. This practice can be seen here in not only in 
Major’s use of ‘her’ in describing South Africa and Namibia, but also in the way in which he 
does this. South Africa is ‘coming home’ to the ‘Commonwealth family’ of nations where 
‘she belongs’. This may indicates a way for Britain to hold on to some semblance of power, 
and therefore reflects a Britain’s national identity and place in the world that has seen decline 
since the British Empire.  
 
In stark contrast, in Blair’s speech in Ethiopia, he frequently refers to himself in the first 
person, and to the audience in the third. There are times where he does so in order to 
indicate the overlap, the common ground, but he does not attempt to close the gap entirely.  
 
Today I want to look ahead to a year when Africa will be in the spotlight of international 
attention, and I want to set out for you how I think that international attention can be 




There is no point where the ‘I’ and ‘you’ turns into an unequivocal ‘we’ and remains as such. 
He goes on to say that: ‘In all the things that I deal with in politics, and the things that 
make people cynical and disengaged from the political process, when I come and see what 
is happening here [in Ethiopia] and see what could happen, I know that however difficult 
politics is, there is at least one noble cause worth fighting for.’ This is unusual as many 
politicians prefer using the first-person plural personal pronoun ‘we’ to suggest a common 
goal. For Blair, this is not the case.  As Blair consistently spoke in this way, it can be argued 
that his speeches were often about himself.  
 
There is a division in this speech between the moralistic, highly personalised discursive 
strategy and the occasional shift towards more collective pronouns. For example, Blair says 
‘We also know that progress in Africa must be led by Africa’. However this is soon 
contrasted with Blair returning to the first person and taking credit for helping Sudan: ‘I 
have just been to Sudan, where an appalling humanitarian disaster is happening, with 
thousands of people dying every month as a result of disease, malnutrition and violence.  I 
set out the necessary action yesterday and look forward to it being implemented.’ 
 
In Gordon Brown’s speech to the Church of Scotland General Assembly, we find a 
significant contrast to Blair. Brown begins by referring to himself in the first person as Blair 
does, but he weaves this into a broader moral discussion about poverty in Africa using ‘we’. 
This ‘we’ refers not only to the immediate audience – the Church of Scotland – but more 
broadly as a way of asking what Britain should collectively be doing. For example, he says, 
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‘And while I would respectfully suggest that our country is fairer today than in the past, I 
accept with humility today that our country is not yet fair enough and we must do more.’  
 
Cameron’s framing is similar to Brown’s. At the G8 Nutrition for Growth event in 2013 
(DC13g) he focuses on Britain as a whole, using ‘we’:  
 
“Why does Britain always have to be out in front?” Let me tell you why. It’s because of the 
kind of people we are - and the kind of country we are. We are the kind of people who 
believe in doing what is right. We accept the moral case for keeping our promises to 
the world’s poorest - even when we face challenges at home. When people are dying, we 
don’t believe in finding excuses. We believe in trying to do something about it. Look at Band 
Aid and Live8. Look at Red Nose Day. Look at the way the British public respond to appeals 
from the Disasters Emergency Committee. During the famine in East Africa, British people 
gave £79 million. This is British families looking at the images on their televisions and 
responding with their hearts. It says something about this country. It says something 
about our standing in the world and our sense of duty in helping others. In short – it 
says something about the kind of people we are. And that makes me proud to be 
British. 
 
In David Cameron’s speech to the Family Planning Summit in London, he uses a 
combination of the discursive techniques used by Blair and Brown. He refers to himself in 
the first person frequently, but also uses ‘we’ to speak on behalf of Britain. He says: ‘There 
are those who will say we can’t afford to spend money on aid at a time like this. […] I think 
it’s vital that we confront these arguments head on. Let me do so. First, it is morally right to 
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honour our promises to the poorest in the world. Every 6 minutes a woman who did not 
want to become pregnant will die in pregnancy or childbirth. Every 6 minutes. So how many 
minutes do we wait? I say we don’t wait at all.’ 
 
These ways of talking about moral issues in relation to Africa suggest different ideas about 
Britain’s national identity. For Major, Britain’s identity is about its place at the centre of the 
Commonwealth and still not sure of its place in the world post-Empire. For Blair, talking in 
the first person means that he is the embodiment of the nation, or that he would like to take 
personal credit for progress in Africa. Brown’s and Cameron’s use of the first-person plural 
personal pronoun ‘we’ is supposed to appeal to a collective common goal.  
 
7.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has focused on the extent to which Britain’s post-Cold War engagement with 
Africa is presented by British prime ministers as being based on morality, and how this 
shapes British national identity. It deals with three specific sub-themes about morality.  
 
Firstly, this chapter has shown that the idea that British prime ministers’ discussions around 
Africa have broadly been a ‘conversation’ about the moral nature of Britishness can be 
backed up with the evidence presented here. However, it also reveals subtleties to the 
argument made in the literature that are important to highlight. There is a clear distinction 
between the way in which Major and Blair spoke about Britain’s moral duty to Africa. For 
Blair, Africa is overtly a moral cause – but for Major, this is not so. Secondly, the rhetoric of 
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Blair and Cameron is most similar out of the four prime ministers, as they both frame Africa 
as an explicitly moral cause. This is noteworthy because they were from different parties, did 
not govern consecutively, and the 2007/2008 Global Financial Crisis separates their 
administrations. Thirdly, all four prime ministers spoke to religious audiences about Africa. 
The religious aspect of Britain’s engagement with Africa is used to present Britain as an actor 
whose motivations are grounded not in self-interest but in religious morality. Importantly, 
not all the prime minsters make this argument in terms of Christian morality. Throughout 
Gordon Brown’s time in office, when talking about the moral underpinning of the concern 
for international poverty, he draws on many faiths – and secularism too. 
 
A continuity across all four prime ministers that is not addressed in the literature is that 
Africa is a place British prime ministers refer to in order argue that the values they champion 
transcend British party politics, and have a moral backing by being applicable to the poorest 






Africa’s Economic Prosperity: A Rising Tide that Lifts All Boats                                
Or The End of British Influence? 
This chapter focuses on the extent to which British prime ministers in the post-Cold War 
period have – in their speeches relating to Africa – talked about Africa in terms of the 
economy. It then moves on to consider how this shapes British national identity. Narratives 
that emphasise the importance of the economy in the relationship between Britain and 
Africa can be traced back to the days of colonialism and empire – when British politicians 
saw Africa as both an economic opportunity and an economic problem for Britain 
(Havinden and Meredith, 1993). The process of decolonisation – beginning in the late 1950s 
– put an end to the narrative from British politicians that Africa was an economic problem 
for Britain. As this chapter details, however, the speeches of British prime ministers in the 
post-Cold War period show that narratives of Africa as both an economic opportunity and 
problem have begun to re-emerge – but in a new way.  
 
In the speeches of British prime ministers, the rapid economic growth across Africa is – on 
the one hand – a cause to be promoted and celebrated, providing many African countries 
with the economic prosperity and freedom to be able to exercise greater agency over their 
own affairs. This idea can be summarised by the aphorism ‘a rising tide lifts all boats’, and is 
broadly the framing used by Blair and Brown. On the other hand, this economic 
independence and growth has led Africa to be increasingly free of its historical ties with 
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Britain, and has also paved the way for a variety of actors from around the world to compete 
with Britain (and other former colonial powers) for the natural resources and human 
resources in Africa – in what is frequently described as the ‘New Scramble for Africa’ (Ayers, 
2013; Scholvin, 2016). This narrative is about Britain’s economic self-interest, and centres on 
the idea that the emergence of Africa as a potential problem or missed opportunity for 
Britain. This framing is present in the speeches of Major, Blair and Cameron – but is 
particularly marked in the speeches of Major and Cameron.  
 
The central contradiction between these two narratives is that the former views African 
economic prosperity as inherently positive to Africa, Britain, and the world – whilst the latter 
is an admission of a loss of British influence, and a lost or dwindling economic opportunity 
for Britain. Also occasionally implicit in this second narrative is the idea that Britain deserves 
priority in access to Africa’s natural and human resources because of the historic relations 
and because of Britain’s aid and development programmes. Importantly, in this theme, the 
party political divide appears to play an important role. Both Labour prime ministers tend 
emphasise the first narrative, whilst both Conservative prime ministers tend emphasise the 
second. 
 
The increasing focus on Africa as a source of economic opportunity for actors around the 
world has been the subject of much discussion in the contemporary Africa literature (Alden, 
2007; Taylor, 2012; Alden et al., 2018), including specific consideration of the role of 
economic factors in UK-Africa relations (Williams, 2004; Cargill, 2013; Reid, 2014). This 
chapter begins with a continuation of the quantitative analysis in Chapter 5, but with a 
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specific focus on the economy dimension. It then moves on to a content analysis of the 
speeches and critical discourse analysis around this theme.  
 
8.1 Quantitative Analysis 
For this economy chapter, the keywords selected for input into the Python program are: 
economy, economic, China, export, invest, investment, and trade. This information is plotted 
in Table 8:1, where mentions of selected keywords are shown in terms of their raw numbers 
by prime minister. In Figure 8:1, these are plotted as percentages of each prime minister’s 
corpus. These keywords were selected based on the literature review and the author’s own 
reading of the speeches during the data collection stage.  
 
Table 8:1. Frequency of selected economy-related keywords in the context of Africa by prime 
minister 
 John Major Tony Blair Gordon Brown David Cameron 
Econom(y/ic) 29 51 34 18 
China 4 16 10 16 
Export 7 4 0 4 
Invest(ment) 38 31 6 12 
Trade 24 80 19 66 
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Figure 8:1. Frequency of selected keywords related to ‘Economy’ in the context of Africa (as a 
percentage of each prime minister’s corpus). 
 
Figure 8:1 indicates a decrease in references to the ‘economy’ and ‘investment’ in plain 
terms, and instead an increase in language about ‘trade’. This indicates an increased 
reluctance by British prime ministers to speak prescriptively or paternalistically about African 
countries’ economies. The move towards the language of trade appears to be more 
appropriate in an environment that is more focused on partnership and mutual benefit. 
However, it is noteworthy that Brown is an outlier in these trends. These initial observations 




It is clear from Figure 8:2 that South Africa is central to how Major talks about Britain’s 
economic relationship with Africa. In contrast, the other three prime ministers frequently 
reference Africa in a broader sense. There is a party political divide, with Blair and Brown 
focusing on development related words – such as ‘world’, ‘education’, ‘poverty’, and 
‘climate’. In contrast, business related words are more prominent in the speeches of Major 
and Cameron – such as ‘growth’, ‘business’, and ‘jobs’. 
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Figure 8:2. Word cloud showing frequency of words in John Major’s sentences containing specific 
economy keywords, excluding those keywords 
 
Figure 8:3. Word cloud showing frequency of words in Tony Blair’s sentences containing specific 
economy keywords, excluding those keywords 
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Figure 8:4. Word cloud showing frequency of words in Gordon Brown’s sentences containing 
specific economy keywords, excluding those keywords 
 
Figure 8:5. Word cloud showing frequency of words in David Cameron’s sentences containing 
specific economy keywords, excluding those keywords 
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8.2 Content Analysis 
With the help of the quantitative tools, this section examines the content of the speeches 
more closely to better understand the initial observations. In particular, the similarity 
between Major and Cameron, in contrast to the similarity between Blair and Brown, are 
explored in more detail here. Before this, however, it is important to refer back to the 
literature on contemporary narratives of Africa in terms of the economy.  
 
Williams (2004) contends that that ever since Britain’s retreat from colonialism in Africa, the 
primary concern of successive governments towards the continent has been appropriately 
summarised by James Mayall (1986) as one of ‘damage limitation’. Mayall argues that 
Britain’s Africa policy revolved around the need to turn its imperial legacies ‘from liabilities 
into assets [which required the creation of] a network of low key, but still special, 
relationships between Britain and her former colonies’ (Mayall, 1986: 54). Williams contends 
that successive British governments have achieved this through three main mechanisms: the 
organisation and management of the international economy; bilateral relations – primarily 
economic in character; and the political organisation of international society.  
 
This view is echoed by Reid (2014), who argues that international engagement with Africa 
continues to be, indeed will increasingly be, economic in essence. The idea that GDP growth 
is inherently ‘good’ prevails in the West’s economic engagement with Africa, and the growth 
rates in most African countries far exceed that of Britain’s – especially since the 2007/2008 
Financial Crisis. Africa achieved average real annual GDP growth of 5.4% between 2000 and 
2010, adding $78 billion annually to GDP (in 2015 prices). The IMF forecasts that Africa 
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will be the second-fastest growing region in the world between 2016 and 2020 with annual 
growth of 4.3% (Leke and Barton, 2016). In contrast, over the period 2000 – 2017, the UK 
averaged just 2%. The best-performing African economies have achieved 6-8%, and 
regularly feature in the global top ten.122 This trend appears set to continue, with forecasts of 
spiralling oil and other resource revenues, and a rapid expansion in middle-class 
consumerism (Reid, 2014). The implication of this for British national identity is significant; 
it carries with it the notion that Britain is stagnating or declining as an economic power; 
Britain is seeking out economic partnerships with countries whose economic growth rates 
are far higher than Britain’s, many of whom were former British colonies.123  
 
However, this content analysis finds a more mixed approach than the one suggested by 
either Williams (2004) or Reid (2014). It finds a contradiction in the narratives used by 
British prime ministers, and one that is broadly divided by party lines. The first narrative – 
broadly used by Blair and Brown – is that rapid economic growth across Africa is inherently 
positive, providing many African countries with the economic prosperity and freedom to be 
able to exercise greater agency over their own affairs. The second – most prominent in the 
                                                 
122 For example: Ethiopia, Angola, Nigeria, Chad, Mozambique, Rwanda, Tanzania, Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Ghana, and Zambia 
123 Nominal GDP is central to many Western countries’ perception of themselves, their national 
identity, and the story they tell about their place in the world. Nominal GDP is just one of a number 
of metrics that can be used to measure a county’s economic prosperity. As an indicator, it also tells a 
very specific story. Based on nominal GDP, the UK is the fifth largest economy. Based on other 
measures such as Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), for example, it ranks ninth – behind Indonesia and 
Russia. The gap between the UK and large African economies such as Egypt and Nigeria is smaller 
when measured by PPP. 
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speeches of Major and Cameron – is that this economic independence and growth has led 
Africa to be increasingly free of its historical ties with Britain, and has also paved the way for 
a variety of actors from around the world to compete with Britain (and other former colonial 
powers) for the natural resources and human resources in Africa. These two narratives will 
be explored further here as separate sub-themes in 8.2.1. and 8.2.2.  
 
8.2.1 Africa’s Economic Prosperity as a Mutually Beneficial 
The first sub-theme, most notable in the speeches of Blair and Brown, is that Africa’s fast 
economic growth is beneficial to the world, and that this will provide Africa with greater 
freedoms. During Blair’s first term, for example, in his 2000 Mansion House Speech 
(TB00c)124, he suggests that a number of African countries are on the rise and that they could 
soon be significant powers in their own right. He juxtaposes old powers (Britain and 
Europe) and potential future powers (South Africa, Nigeria, and Egypt), but importantly this 
is not framed as a zero-sum game – it is framed as prosperity all nations can attain. 
 
A thumbnail sketch of international politics shows us that there is the USA - the only 
superpower. There are the older European powers, including Britain. There is China, with its 
great history, culture, vast population and, now economic dynamism. […] There may be 
others who because of size, population and position join them - Brazil, South Africa, 
Nigeria, Indonesia, Egypt and Saudi Arabia.  
                                                 
124 Tony Blair (13th November, 2000), Mansion House Speech, London, UK 
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There are echoes of this in Blair’s second and third terms. In speeches delivered in his 
second term in Addis Ababa and in his third term in South Africa, Blair speaks warmly of 
Chinese involvement in Africa as a driver of economic prosperity. This contrasts with 
Cameron’s presentation of Chinese trade with Africa as trade that Britain is missing out on – 
as explored in the next sub-theme (see 8.2.2). In the Addis Ababa speech (TB04h)125, Blair 
argues: 
 
we should not wait for the WTO to increase the opportunities for Africa to trade, we can 
increase those opportunities now. For example once Lesotho was allowed to import cotton 
from China to turn it into clothing, which is then sold to America, business boomed, it 
increased from less than $100 million to over $300 million in three years. 
 
Likewise, in the speech delivered in South Africa at the end of his time in office (TB07n)126, 
Blair acknowledges the increasing presence of China in Africa, but talks about working with 
China, the EU and the G8 to support development in Africa. This implies that Africa should 
be a concern for all countries, not just former colonial powers.  
  
We now have a broad political consensus for Africa in the UK. Excellent. We need the same in 
the EU. We need each G8 to be bolder than the last. If we do this, and Africa responds as an 
equal partner, we will have set a strategic goal that in time we will achieve; and in a continent in 
which the power of China is rising dramatically, we can work with China to serve the 
                                                 
125 Tony Blair (7th October, 2004), Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 
126 Tony Blair (31st May, 2007), South Africa 
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development of Africa in a way which benefits us all. But if we give up, we will lose the 
chance in this continent - rich as it is - though its people are poor - for our values to take root. 
It would be a calamitous misjudgement. 
 
This ‘global’ approach to Africa is a continuity throughout Blair’s time as prime minister. 
Although delivered in a very different context – to the Lord Mayor’s Banquet during his first 
term TB01h127– Blair makes a similar argument:  
 
I hope […] that a plan for Africa will be agreed at the G7/8 Summit in Canada. […] But at this 
time of economic uncertainty it is essential we agree on the agenda for a new trade round. 
Success means increased trade flows and rising living standards around the world. Failure 
would mean a retreat into protectionism and isolationism. All parties should show the 
necessary flexibility to achieve this. 
 
Brown is unique amongst the four prime ministers in that he rarely frames Africa as an 
economic issue – it is more often framed in terms of poverty or international 
development. Nevertheless, there are instances in which he takes the same multilateral 
approach as Blair. In 2007 (GB07l)128, he frames economic reconstruction for Zimbabwe 
(a former British colony) as a problem for South Africa and the African Union, rather 
than for Britain:  
 
                                                 
127 Tony Blair (12th November, 2001), Lord Mayor’s Banquet, London 
128 Gordon Brown (20th September, 2007), unspecified domestic audience 
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for the day that democracy returns in Zimbabwe, we want to work with South Africa which 
is trying very hard under President Mbeki to resolve this situation, and with the rest of the 
African countries to design a programme of economic reconstruction for Zimbabwe. And we 
want to play our part with the African Union and with others in making it possible for 
people to restore and to build some prosperity in the future in a free country with a democracy. 
 
8.2.2 Africa’s Economic Prosperity as a (Missed) Opportunity for Britain 
In contrast to the previous sub-theme, the second sub-theme is based on the same 
underlying facts about the strong economic growth across many countries in Africa – but it 
reaches a different conclusion. It argues that this economic prosperity and independence 
leads Africa to be increasingly free of its historical links with Britain, and has also led to 
actors from around the world to compete with Britain for the natural resources and human 
resources in Africa – in what is described as the ‘New Scramble for Africa’ (Ayers, 2013; 
Scholvin, 2016). This sub-theme is particularly notable in the speeches of Major and 
Cameron.  
 
This narrative is about Britain’s economic self-interest – which is subtly (but importantly) 
different to the previous sub-theme – because it views the emergence of Africa as a missed 
economic opportunity for Britain. The emphasis in this narrative is bilateral – between 
Britain and Africa, which is in contrast to some of the multilateral approaches explored in 
the previous sub-theme. The key difference between these two narratives is that the former 
views African economic prosperity as unquestionably positive to Africa, Britain, and the 




Speaking in South Africa (JM94f)129, Major claims South Africa’s economic success is rooted 
in the institutions left behind by Britain’s colonial legacy. Using ‘we’ to mean Britain and 
‘you’ to mean South Africa, Major argues that having helped bring about this economic 
success, Britain should get to reap the rewards of this. 
 
The new South Africa’s second great asset is to have inherited by far the most modern 
and effective economy and social infrastructure in all of Africa. We British want to work 
with you as you develop those efforts. Like you, we want all of South Africa's people to enjoy 
the fruits of success. And I say this not as a pious sentiment but because we British have a 
direct interest, a very great stake, in your future.  
 
It is important to point out, however, that Major’s remarks are often limited to South Africa, 
rather than about Africa more broadly. An extract from this same speech makes this 
distinction particularly clear, where Major highlights a specific lack of commitment to the 
rest of Africa. He says:   
 
And Britain has a very substantial economic interest in South Africa. British investment in 
South Africa has an estimated market value of between 40 - 50 billion Rand, this is greater 
than our investment in the whole of the rest of Africa combined, it shows the depth of 
Britain's national commitment to South Africa. For Britain, South Africa is already an 
export market of the same scale as India, close to the markets of Hong Kong, Saudi Arabia and 
                                                 
129 John Major (20th September, 1994), South African National Assembly, Cape Town, South Africa 
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Singapore. But this is not one-way, but two-way trade. The United Kingdom is South Africa's 
second largest supplier, we are also your second largest export market. 
 
In David Cameron’s speeches, he frequently makes the case that Britain has not been 
reaping the economic benefits of its relationship with Africa. Cameron also expresses the 
belief that Britain’s aid budget is something that should give Britain priority in trade with 
Africa. Speaking to the International Festival of Business in Liverpool in DC14b130, he 
argues that:   
 
I think this is a major opportunity for Britain and one we haven’t always taken up in 
the past. I led a trade mission to Africa, to Nigeria and South Africa. And I want to do more 
of that because I think if you look at the – you know which economies are growing the fastest, 
you will see that some of the fastest growing are in Africa. And I think for too long politicians, 
particularly, have thought of Africa as a destination for aid and a source of global difficulties 
and problems rather than an immense market opportunity. […] Let’s use the advantages that 
we have. We do have and have kept large aid programmes, particularly to sub Saharan 
Africa, that should give us a good relationship with these countries from which we can 
build better business and investment links; I think that makes a difference. 
 
This speech extract is important because it is a criticism of the New Labour approach to 
Africa – although Cameron does not criticise his predecessors directly. This reference to 
politicians thinking of Africa as ‘a destination for aid and a source of global difficulties and 
                                                 
130 David Cameron (11th June, 2014), 11th International Festival of Business, Liverpool, UK 
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problems rather than an immense market opportunity’ represents an important difference in 
the approaches to Africa between these administrations – despite their similarities in other 
aspects.  
 
In his speech to the Pan African University in Nigeria (DC11f)131, Cameron talks of trade 
with Africa as a zero-sum game; Chinese trade with Africa is trade that Britain is missing out 
on: 
 
Today, Britain accounts for less than four percent of Africa’s exports. That’s almost three 
times less than China - and one of the reasons I’m here is to make sure we catch up. It’s 
why I’ve brought a plane full of business leaders. And it’s why we want to do more to 
extend loan guarantees and trade finance to British companies that are looking to do 
business in Africa. Because we see Africa in a new way, a different way. 
 
Although this sub-theme is largely linked to the Conservative Party, it is not unique to it. 
Cameron’s focus on the economy in his speech about Africa, unapologetic in its focus on 
British economic self-interest, provides a contrast to Blair’s language of partnership. 
Nevertheless, Blair’s speech to the Nigerian Assembly (TB02c)132 strikes very much the same 
tone.   
 
                                                 
131 David Cameron (19th July, 2011), at the Pan African University, Lagos, Nigeria 
132 Tony Blair (7th February, 2002), Nigerian Assembly, Abuja, Nigeria 
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Britain has long enjoyed a special bond with Nigeria. It is not just a question of history. British 
companies are major investors. Trade is growing. […] Nigeria is a nation, which vibrates with 
energy. It personifies the richness and sense of possibility that is Africa. […] Africa should 
not be seen as a victim but as a partner. Africa demands a new partnership not out of 
desperation but out of promise for the future. This is about what we do together, as 
equals, with mutual respect and shared determination. If Africa gains, we gain. The 
world will be safer and more just. Let us not forget: Africa is a market of 750 million people 
on Europe's doorstep. […]. Britain also has a special responsibility to Africa. […] My 
purpose today and in the coming three days is to develop support for a new partnership 
between Africa and the developed world. I stress the word 'partnership.' This is not just 
about aid. It is not only about what we give. You need our support. But we need you to 
succeed. 
 
The final line of this speech extract also presents a problem that has not yet been 
encountered in this thesis. Blair’s line “You need our support. But we need you to succeed” 
can be read in two different ways giving two slightly different meanings. This could be better 
interpreted through an audio recording of this speech, however this could not be found. 
One reading places the emphasis on Nigerian success, the other places the emphasis on 




John Major’s speech to the CBI/RIIA/COSAT Investment Conference in South Africa 
(JM96d)133 is similar in tone to Blair’s. A common factor between these two speeches is that 
they were both delivered in Africa, and so this focus on mutual economic benefit is perhaps 
to be expected – as opposed to Cameron’s, which was delivered in Liverpool to the 
International Festival of Business.  
 
Trade between us has leapt. British exports rose 25 per cent in 1994 and a further 30 per cent 
in 1995. South Africa has a substantial investment in Britain. And Britain is the biggest 
foreign investor in South Africa. I am very keen that British business should continue to 
lead the way. It is important they do so, because investment from overseas will be one of the 
keys to South Africa’s future prosperity. Investment flows will dwarf any government-to-
government assistance. […] A British company is by far South Africa’s largest foreign 
employer. Nine of the top twenty foreign employers in South Africa, are British. Today, South 
Africa is an important political and economic force. […] Economically, she has the potential 
not only to attain the growth rate she needs, but also to lead the way to greater growth 
throughout Southern Africa. 
 
This narrative of economic benefit to Britain in speeches delivered in Africa can also be seen 
in Cameron’s speech in South Africa (DC11e)134, representing a continuity between Major, 
Blair and Cameron.  
 
                                                 
133 John Major (10th July, 1996), CBI/RIIA/COSAT Investment Conference, South Africa. 
134 David Cameron (18th July, 2011), Pretoria, South Africa. 
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I think it is important for the Prime Minister to get out there with British business at a time 
when we need investment and growth and jobs back at home to see our exports expand, to 
open up new markets, to seek new contracts and new deals. That is what I have done in 
India, what I have done in China and now I am here in Africa. I think it is a good thing to do 
and I am going to press ahead with that. I think it is a worthwhile thing and Britain should not 
be put off that. [… ]  I think it is right for Britain to be engaged with South Africa and to be 
engaged with Africa as a whole. There is a huge opportunity for trade, for growth, for jobs 
– including jobs at home in the UK – and I think it is right for the British Prime Minister to 
be out there with British businesses trying to drum up export support and growth that will be 
good for both our countries. 
 
Later on this same trip – in a speech to the Pan African University in Nigeria (DC11f)135, 
Cameron makes the same point. 
 
‘today I’ve come here to Lagos because there’s another story unfolding on this continent – 
something that many in the West are only just waking up to. Tell me this: which part of the 
world has seen its number of democracies increase nearly eight-fold in just two decades? 
Eastern Europe? No, it’s Africa. Which continent has six of the ten fastest growing economies 
in the world? Asia? No, it’s Africa.  Which country is predicted by some to have the highest 
average GDP growth in the world over the next 40 years? You might think Brazil, Russia, India 
or China. No. Think Africa. Think Nigeria. The point I want to make today, is this: This can be 
Africa’s moment. Africa is transforming in a way no-one thought possible 20 years ago… 
                                                 
135 David Cameron (19th July, 2011), Pan African University, Lagos, Nigeria. 
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and suddenly a whole new future seems within reach. […] And we need change in Britain too, 
because, frankly, we’re just not doing enough to pursue the possibilities of trading with you. 
Right now, Britain is in danger of missing out on one of the greatest economic 
opportunities on the planet. And we cannot let that happen. 
 
There is the implicit (and sometimes explicit) notion that Britain is stagnating or declining as 
an economic power; Britain is seeking out economic partnerships with countries whose 
economic growth rates are far higher than Britain’s (and are projected to remain much 
higher), many of whom were former British colonies. Two short extracts of these speeches 
about Africa succinctly capture this view: Blair’s ‘We need you’ (TB02c)136, and Cameron’s 
‘Britain is in danger of missing out’ (DC11f)137.  
 
8.3 Critical Discourse Analysis 
The content analysis focused on two sub-themes about in the way in which British prime 
ministers refer to the economy in speeches relating to Africa.  In this section, specific 
speeches will be analysed in greater detail using the Discourse-Historical Approach. The 
speeches selected for analysis in terms of the economy are given below in Table 8:2, along 
with details about the speeches. As with the previous thematic chapters, they were selected 
based on quantitative tools (such as frequency of key words and coding using NVivo), the 
                                                 
136 Tony Blair (7th February, 2002), Nigerian Assembly, Abuja, Nigeria 
137 David Cameron (19th July, 2011), Pan African University, Lagos, Nigeria 
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extracts analysed in the thematic content analysis, and from reading speeches during the data 
collection stage.  
 
Table 8:2. Economy-related speeches selected for critical discourse analysis 
Prime Minister Date of Speech Location 
John Major 20/09/1994 
South African 
National Assembly, 
Cape Town, South 
Africa 
Tony Blair 07/02/2002 Nigeria 
Gordon Brown 23/09/2009 
United Nations 
General Assembly 





The first speech selected for Critical Discourse Analysis in relation to economy is Major’s 
1994 address to the South African National Assembly in Cape Town. This speech has 
already been studied in the History Chapter (Chapter 6), but there is more that can be said 
about this in relation to the economy. 
 
Throughout this speech, Major frequently talks about a new ‘beginning’ for South Africa. 
This constructive discursive strategy enables Major to arbitrarily define South Africa in a way 
that is beneficial for him; a new beginning draws a line under Britain’s historical legacy and 
South Africa’s more recent history of Apartheid, despite being referenced in other parts of 
the speech. The references to a new beginning are complemented by Major’s use of 
justification and relativisation strategies.  
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For instance, Major merely refers to Britain being ‘deeply involved’ in South Africa rather 
than go into detail about the nature of that involvement. This is an example of what Wodak 
et al. (2009) refer to as a ‘euphemistic verb obscuring agent’ – a way to trivialise and 
downplay the seriousness of that involvement. Major goes on to argue that South Africa has 
inherited ‘the most modern and effective economy and social infrastructure in all of Africa’. 
Despite these references to history – which are vital in explaining South Africa’s current 
place in the world – Major nevertheless feels he has the authority to define a new era.  
 
But this is not one-way, but two-way trade. The United Kingdom is South Africa's second 
largest supplier, we are also your second largest export market. This is a formidable 
relationship, but I hope it represents no more than a beginning. The global economy today 
is marked by the growth and dynamism of its newcomers. South Africa has great human and 
national resources. The potential is there, the need is there, your people are impatient for 
results. Yet no government on earth, however benevolent, can develop an economy with 
strokes of the pen. Prudent management, alertness to the challenges of the market, the 
acquisition and retention of international business confidence, that global economy offering 
hope and progress remains one of competition and a drive for success. You have achieved an 
historic launch towards it and you will need to hold to that momentum over the years ahead. 
[…] South Africans are trading, improving roads and air links and developing communications 
into the heart of Africa and some of our British companies are proud to be partnering you in 
that remarkable and necessary work but welcome though it is, this is just the beginning. In 
aid, in trade and in diplomacy, Britain would like to work closely with South Africa to turn the 
tide at last in this Continent in which my nation has been so deeply involved for so many years. 
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Furthermore, Major switches between a variety of ‘voices’, which help to show how he views 
Britain’s relationship with South Africa, and can be used to explore how he views Britain’s 
national identity. Major switches between speaking on behalf of Britain (‘we British’), to 
speaking on behalf of the people of South Africa (‘your people are impatient for results’), to 
making broader claims about the ‘truth’ (‘no government on earth, however benevolent, can 
develop an economy with strokes of the pen’). Such pronouncements about South Africa’s 
domestic policy show a more involved approach than is suggested by Major’s ‘we want to 
work with you’. 
 
The second speech studied in closer detail is Blair’s 2002 address to the Nigerian Assembly 
in Abuja (TB02c). In this speech, Blair speaks about the economy in terms of mutual self-
interest. In contrast to Blair’s often highly-personalised style of speaking, here he uses short 
clauses to give weight to these assertions, as they are presented as facts. For example, ‘if 
Africa gains, we gain’. Blair also mixes facts in amongst these assertions, which helps lend 
weight to his overall argument – such as ‘Africa is a market of 750 million people’.  
 
If Africa gains, we gain. The world will be safer and more just. Let us not forget: Africa is a 
market of 750 million people on Europe’s doorstep. And the events of September 11 and their 
aftermath illustrate dramatically that the security of each of us depends on the prosperity of us 
all. In today’s interdependent world, there can be no secure future for any of us unless we 
manage globalisation with greater justice. Britain also has a special responsibility to Africa. 
The British people as a whole care deeply about it. Many were active for years in the 
struggle against the evil of apartheid in South Africa. British people donate £200 million every 
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year to charities dedicated to development and disaster relief, and tens of thousands 
demonstrated for the Jubilee 2000 debt relief campaign. And Nigeria has a special role in any 
partnership for African development. It is a continental powerhouse - the giant of Africa, with 
120 million people, one sixth of all Africans. My purpose today and in the coming three days is 
to develop support for a new partnership between Africa and the developed world. I stress the 
word ‘partnership.’ This is not just about aid. It is not only about what we give. You 
need our support. But we need you to succeed. 
 
In contrast to Major, Blair’s discourse about Africa’s economy is not framed solely in 
terms of self-interest. Later in this speech, Blair focuses on the role of aid and growth in 
encouraging education and decreasing poverty.  
 
Better governance is key in fostering higher and more inclusive economic growth. More 
than 20 African countries achieved growth rates of 4 per cent last year. Uganda is among the 
10 fastest growing economics in the world. Countries which have strengthened their public 
expenditure management include Mali, Senegal, Mozambique, Malawi, Ghana, Uganda and 
Tanzania. But if Africa is to achieve the UN Millennium Development Goal of halving poverty 
by 2015, it needs annual economic growth of more than 7 per cent. And Africa’s current 
average annual growth rate is less than half that. Aid is one important component of helping 
Africa to grow. But it is time to view aid in a different context. […] But this money should 
not be seen as a handout to the poor. It is, rather, an investment in our collective 
future. It should be specifically directed to the areas we know can make a difference, like 




The third speech selected for Critical Discourse Analysis in relation to economy is Brown’s 
2009 speech to the UN General Assembly (GB09d). Although the content analysis section 
showed similarities between Blair and Brown in the way they talk about the economy in 
relation to Africa, a closer look reveals that Brown’s approach is unique. This can partially be 
attributed to the 2007/2008 Global Financial Crisis, and Brown’s view of globalisation. 
Brown presents Britain as a global leader and standard-bearer for economic cooperation and 
aid funding.  
 
We need strong economic co-ordination now as we navigate the uncertainties of recovery. […] 
And we must strengthen our targeting of tax havens with, from next March, real sanctions 
against those jurisdictions which fail to meet global standards. But the voice of Africa will 
have to be heard and heeded to bring recovery in areas devastated by the events of the 
past year and to assure that we do not put the millennium development goals beyond 
reach as a result of a wider failure of global responsibility. In London, the G20 agreed 
measures to result in $50 billion for poor countries to help them weather the crisis. Because of 
London, the IMF can lend $8 billion instead of $2 billion over this year and next. This is 
already helping Kenya and Tanzania to increase government spending in response to 
the crisis. For amid all the challenges we face, we must remember a promise we made 
10 years ago. And this is the fifth and final imperative: to achieve a vision for 2015 we are 
now in danger of betraying. On present trends it will take not five years as we pledged and not 





The fourth speech selected for critical discourse analysis in relation to economy is Cameron’s 
2011 speech in Lagos, Nigeria (DC11f). He begins with the use of a number of rhetorical 
questions in order to make the point that Africa is misunderstood, which have been 
emphasised in the extract below. This is partially aimed at distinguishing himself from his 
New Labour predecessors, and their focus on aid spending in Africa through DFID.    
 
But today I’ve come here to Lagos because there’s another story unfolding on this continent… 
something that many in the West are only just waking up to. Tell me this: which part of the 
world has seen its number of democracies increase nearly eight-fold in just two 
decades? Eastern Europe? No, it’s Africa. Which continent has six of the ten fastest 
growing economies in the world? Asia? No, it’s Africa. Which country is predicted by 
some to have the highest average GDP growth in the world over the next 40 years? You 
might think Brazil, Russia, India or China. No. Think Africa. Think Nigeria. The point I want to 
make today, is this: This can be Africa’s moment. Africa is transforming in a way no-one 
thought possible 20 years ago… and suddenly a whole new future seems within reach.  
 
The urgency is stressed throughout this speech. Cameron frequently emphasises words 
that stress immediacy – ‘today’, ‘suddenly’, ‘only just’, as well as later ‘seize’ and ‘grab’, as 
if these opportunities will disappear if not taken now. This suggests that now that people 
are realising Africa’s potential for growth, there will be a race to help shape and benefit 
from this growth.  
 
I have seen the passion and enterprise of Nigerians changing my country for the better. But 
what I have seen in London I have seen a hundred-fold here today. From Eko Atlantic and 
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Balogun Street Market to the biggest port in the most populous country in Africa… you are 
transforming your city. And your fellow Africans are doing the same all over the continent. 
Today there are unprecedented opportunities to trade and grow, raise living standards and 
lift billions from poverty. So I urge you: seize these opportunities, grab them, shape them. 
 
Having encouraged people in Africa to make the most of these opportunities, Cameron then 
turns to state that Britain has a self-interest in this prosperity.  
 
Today, Britain accounts for less than four percent of Africa’s exports. That’s almost three 
times less than China - and one of the reasons I’m here is to make sure we catch up. It’s why 
I’ve brought a plane full of business leaders. And it’s why we want to do more to extend 
loan guarantees and trade finance to British companies that are looking to do business in 
Africa. Because we see Africa in a new way, a different way. Yes, a place to invest our aid.  
But above all a place to trade. 
 
Throughout the speech, Cameron shifts between ‘I’ and ‘we’. As such, this makes it unclear 
which capacity he is speaking in. For example, in this extract, he begins by talking about his 
own purpose in coming to Africa in a personal capacity. However, the phrase ‘we want to do 
more’ and ‘we see Africa in a new way, a different way’ may imply his government or that he 
is speaking on behalf of Britain. This is complicated further by the section of the speech 
devoted to critiquing ‘aid sceptics’ who mostly come from his own party. Nevertheless, these 




This chapter has focused on the extent to which Britain’s post-Cold War engagement with 
Africa is presented by British prime ministers as being based on economic factors, and how 
this shapes British national identity. It finds a more mixed approach than the one suggested 
by either Williams (2004) or Reid (2014). It finds a contradiction in the discourses used by 
British prime ministers, and one that is largely divided by party lines.  
 
The first narrative – broadly used by Blair and Brown – is that rapid economic growth across 
Africa provides many African countries with the economic prosperity and freedom to be 
able to exercise greater agency over their own affairs. This narrative is also multilateral in 
focus. The second narrative by contrast is primarily bilateral in focus. Most prominent in the 
speeches of Major and Cameron, it contends that economic independence and growth has 
led Africa to be increasingly free of its historical links with Britain. This economic growth 
has also paved the way for a variety of actors from around the world to compete with Britain 
for the natural resources and human resources in Africa. This narrative is primarily about 
Britain’s economic self-interest, and views the emergence of Africa as a missed opportunity 
for Britain.  
 
The key distinction between these two narratives is that the former views African economic 
prosperity as inherently positive to Africa, Britain, and the world – whilst the latter is an 
admission of a loss of British influence and a lost or dwindling economic opportunity for 
Britain. As seen in this chapter, the second narrative also encompasses the idea that Britain 
deserves priority in access to Africa’s natural and human resources because of the historic 
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relations and because of Britain’s aid and development programmes. Importantly, this is the 
first theme in which the party political divide appears to play an important role. Both Labour 
prime ministers tend emphasise the first narrative, whilst both Conservative prime ministers 




The Role of Africa in the Construction of British National Identity 
This chapter identifies cross-cutting themes across the last four chapters, expands on them, 
and links them back to national identity. It also returns to debates in the literature – as 
identified in Chapter 2 – and situate this research within them. The previous four chapters 
have found links between different prime ministers for different themes. It is useful at this 
point to understand how these linkages connect the four prime ministers.  
 
Firstly, there are similarities across all four prime ministers. In relation to security and Africa, 
the argument that deprivation in Africa leads to extremism is a continuity across all four 
prime ministers (at least, up until the penultimate year of Cameron’s premiership). 
Additionally, all four prime ministers are divided about the extent to which African countries 
or institutions can be peacekeepers in Africa, or whether Britain needs to have an active 
military presence in Africa. Nevertheless, there is a consistency amongst the prime ministers’ 
comments about Britain’s place in the world and its duty to intervene.  It also suggests that 
there has not been a clear trend in terms of Britain’s role in relation to peacekeeping in 
Africa; prime ministers are no clearer on this now than at the end of the Cold War. Another 
common thread across the four prime ministers is that they all refer to Africa in order to 
assert that the values they champion – personally, for their party, and for Britain – transcend 
British party politics; that they are universal and apply as much to some of the poorest 
countries in the world as they do to Britain. 
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Secondly, there are notable examples where party politics plays an important role in the 
discourses prime ministers use. At times, Blair speaks about Africa to lend weight to his 
‘Third Way’ philosophy whilst also using narratives about Africa to try and unite the Labour 
Party behind New Labour, and to attack the Conservatives. In contrast, Major and Cameron 
use narratives of Africa to promote the virtues of conservatism – that trade, investment and 
entrepreneurship are the best way out of poverty. For Major, this is also linked to the end of 
the Cold War and wanting to steer countries towards sound economic policies. On one 
hand, for Blair and Brown, the rapid economic growth across Africa is a cause to be 
promoted and celebrated, providing many African countries with the economic prosperity 
and freedom to be able to exercise greater agency over their own affairs. On the other hand, 
for Major and Cameron, even if this is celebrated, there is a worry that economic 
independence and growth has led Africa to be increasingly free of its historical ties with 
Britain, and has also paved the way for a variety of actors from around the world to compete 
with Britain (and other former colonial powers) for the natural resources and human 
resources in Africa. References to Africa in relation to the Commonwealth is a strategy used 
by Major, although it reappears towards the end of Cameron’s time in office with the Brexit 
vote, suggesting that this is linked to party identity too.  
 
Thirdly, there are strong parallels between Blair and Cameron. Their emphasis on hard 
power sets them apart from Major and Brown. However, whereas in the Blair years there 
was a clearer assertion of global cosmopolitan purpose, the emphasis under Cameron is less 
controversially on building the capacity and resilience of people from the bottom up. Both 
Blair and Cameron frame Africa as an explicitly moral cause. This is noteworthy because 
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they were from different parties, did not govern consecutively, and the 2007/2008 Global 
Financial Crisis separates their administrations. One explanation for this similarity is that 
Blair and Cameron were elected prime minister after a long period in opposition, and were 
both elected to office at the age of 43 – and perhaps used Africa to present themselves as 
statesmen on the world stage to help combat the idea they were inexperienced. This is 
explored in more detail in section 9.5.2 of this chapter.  
 
Fourthly, there are similarities between Major, Blair, and Cameron, with Brown being an 
outlier. These three prime ministers speak about Britain’s colonial history in Africa, but 
employ different discursive strategies to sanitise Britain’s colonial history in Africa. 
Additionally, when referencing Africa in moral terms, Major, Blair, and Cameron, can be 
found to use overtly Christian messages, while Brown draws on a wider group of faiths.  
 
Finally, Major is unique in the way in which emphasised the role of sport (cricket in 
particular), as it offered him a way to talk about the commonalities between Britain and 
Africa in an uncontroversial way that largely transcends politics, and enables him to suggest 
shared values and shared history that go beyond British self-interest. 
 
At the same time, the previous chapters reveal important discontinuities in language about 
Britain and Africa by British prime ministers between 1990 and 2016. The analysis 
conducted in the previous chapters – together with the findings in this chapter – indicates 
that there is an overarching trend from the language of paternalism to partnership over this 
timeframe. However, it would be incorrect to frame it solely in such simple terms; there is a 
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plethora of examples that complicate such a straightforward assessment – such as 
discontinuities by time, party, and prime minister. There is evidence to argue for a 
discontinuity for every prime minister, which highlights a problem – discontinuities can be 
self-fulfilling and so can be found wherever one looks for them. As discussed in Chapter 10, 
this appears to be a shortcoming in some of the literature that focuses solely on Cameron in 
contrast to Blair (Pugh et al., 2013; Daddow and Schnapper, 2013). It is certainly correct that 
there is a discontinuity between Blair and Cameron, however they are incorrect in their 
assertion that this discontinuity begins with Cameron. That is to say, discontinuities should 
not be overstated – and therefore the shift in language from paternalism to partnership 
should also be qualified. 
 
Such findings add complexity to the contemporary UK-Africa literature, and constitute an 
important contribution to knowledge on both sides of the debate about continuity versus 
discontinuity over this period. For instance, on the one hand, this research lends weight to 
the argument made by Taylor (2012) that New Labour’s Africa policies largely continued on 
the same path as previous governments, preserving a ‘calculating eye to the national interest 
and Britain’s international reputation’. On the other, it reaffirms the argument that Blair’s 
election in 1997 marked a new turn in the conceptualisation of Africa – in which the 
continent represents a ‘noble cause’, transcending politics and economic interests (Gallagher, 
2013). These two findings, whilst apparently mutually exclusive, are found in the speeches 
simultaneously as shown in this chapter. This helps to underline how rhetoric is far more 




These findings from the previous chapters begin to illuminate how British national identity is 
constructed in these speeches. Two overarching trends emerge. One is a general shift from 
the language of paternalism to partnership – which shows how prime ministers’ discourses 
of British national identity show a coming to terms with Britain’s post-empire, post-
superpower status. The other signifies continuity across this period – which shows that in 
some ways British prime ministers’ discourses about Britain’s relationship with Africa have 
not changed that much over this time period. This chapter builds on the findings from the 
previous chapters by focusing specifically on discursive strategies. In doing so, it expands on 
the explanation of how British national identity is constructed through speeches about 
Africa, and also offers an explanation as to why different identities of Africa exist in the 
speeches.  
 
In this chapter, four discourses are identified, building on the analysis conducted in the 
thematic chapters. It is important to note that these are separate from the themes of the 
previous four chapters, and do not directly correlate with them. The four themes – history, 
economy, morality, and security – are content oriented. By contrast, the four discourses are 
purpose orientated. Each discourse is distinguished by the combination of discursive 
strategies employed by the prime ministers, and the relative prominence of each of these. 
Before moving on to explain these four discourses, however, it is important to revisit the 
discursive strategies briefly – which were detailed in the Analytical Framework (Chapter 4). 
(Wodak et al., 2009) outline four macro-strategies. These are: constructive strategies, 




Constructive strategies are the linguistic acts that build and establish a particular national 
identity. One such example is Major’s repeated use of ‘we British’, which discursively 
establishes ‘us’ and ‘them’ groups. This highlights his perception of the unequal power 
dynamic between Britain and South Africa, as opposed to invoking a shared purpose. This 
can be contrasted with other constructive strategies, such as simply referring to African 
countries in name – a strategy common in the speeches of Major, Brown and Cameron – or 
referring to Africa as a whole continent, a hallmark of Blair’s speeches. Studying these 
constructive strategies gives the analysis a depth beyond the explicit content of the speeches 
and into the subtle and implicit construction of national identity.   
 
Perpetuation strategies attempt to maintain or reproduce already established groups. They 
are frequently used when the status quo is under dispute and needs to be justified in order to 
be preserved. Justification and legitimisation strategies are specific types of perpetuation 
strategies and are employed to defend and preserve a problematic narrative of ‘national 
history’. This can be seen, for example, when Major acknowledges Britain’s colonial history 
and its legacy in Africa but seeks to justify it by pointing out that other European countries 
also engaged in empire building in Africa (JM94f) .138   
 
Transformative strategies attempt to transform the meaning of a relatively well-established 
aspect of national identity into another. An example of such a strategy is the way in which 
Blair acknowledges Britain’s role in the slave trade and its horrific impact on Africa, but 
                                                 
138 John Major (20th September, 1994), South African National Assembly, Cape Town, South Africa. 
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changes the frame of the debate to focus on Britain’s role in abolishing it (TB07e)139.   
Dismantling strategies serve to de-mythologise or demolish existing national identities or 
elements of them. For example, Cameron’s speeches that made reference to Africa often 
sought to dismantle the notion that Africa’s success depended on British aid (DC14b)140.  
 
Having revisited the strategies, the four discourses are outlined here, as well as which prime 
ministers they are most common under, how each is distinguished by the type of discursive 
strategies used, and the level of prominence given to each. 
 
The first discourse, ‘paternalism’ is primarily seen in the speeches of Major, but there are 
examples of it in speeches by Blair and Cameron too. In this discourse, British prime 
ministers present the biggest power gap between Britain and Africa – which presents a neo-
colonial dynamic. It is distinct in two ways. Firstly, by the use of nomination strategies that 
discursively separate Britain and Africa into ‘us’ and ‘them’ groups. Secondly, through use of 
perpetuation strategies that diminish the legacy of colonialism, and justify Africa as an arena 
to project British hard-power.  
 
The second discourse, ‘tutelage’, is predominantly found in the speeches of Blair. 
Importantly, although Blair’s language was ostensibly focused on partnership, his insistence 
on Africa as a special case aligns him more with this ‘tutelage’ discourse. Blair’s tendency to 
                                                 
139 Tony Blair (25th March, 2007), Video recording played in Elmina Castle, Ghana, on the 200th 
anniversary of the British Parliament legislating to abolish the slave trade in the British Empire  
140 David Cameron (11th June, 2014), 11th International Festival of Business, Liverpool, UK 
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talk about Africa as a monolithic entity with intractable problems shows little focus on 
details – and his personal devotion echoes the missionary zeal of Victorian explorers. As 
such, this is perhaps more about himself than it is about Africa. This narrative uses a number 
of discursive strategies, such as nomination, justification and transformation strategies.  
 
The third discourse, referred to here as ‘partnership’, is one in which British prime ministers 
speak about countries in Africa like they would any other – that is, Africa is not treated as a 
special case. This discourse does not ignore the poverty in Africa, but rather the solutions to 
these problems are not paternalistic as in the first two discourses. This discourse is present in 
speeches of all four prime ministers, however it is most associated with the speeches of 
Brown. It is distinguished by the nomination and transformation strategies used. Instead of 
the nomination strategies of ‘us’ and ‘them’ groups of the first paternalism discourse, this 
one more often uses collective pronouns such as ‘we’ to indicate that Africa and Britain are 
united in their aims. This discourse suggests that Britain has moved out of the shadow of 
being the former British Empire, and is comfortable with its new identity as an 
internationalist soft-power superpower.  
 
The fourth discourse is similar to the ‘partnership’ discourse in that it is also based on a 
belief that Africa is on the brink of great transformations. However, it reaches a different 
conclusion about what this means for Britain and British national identity. Labelled ‘insecure 
former empire’, this discourse views the rapid economic growth of many African countries 
as a missed opportunity for a sluggish British economy. This presents a national identity of 
Britain as a country on the decline and still insecure with its place in the world without the 
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empire. As Dean Acheson, US Secretary of State under President Truman, noted: ‘Great 
Britain has lost an Empire and has not yet found a role’ (Acheson, 1963: 163). Although 
Acheson made this remark over half a century ago, this appears to still carry some weight, 
especially in light of a small but noteworthy resurgence in references to the Commonwealth 
in the lead up to the referendum on Britain’s membership of the European Union.  
Prominent in the speeches of Cameron, this discourse also appears to be a reaction to the 
New Labour consensus that British national identity is tied to its aid budget in Africa and as 
a global soft power leader. This may seem contradictory given that Cameron ring-fencing of 
ODA spending at a time of significant domestic austerity, and his personal commitment to 
aid spending. However, the transformation and dismantling strategies of this discourse 
represent a tension between Conservatism – primarily in the Conservative Party, but also in 
the media and public – and attempts to change perceptions of the Conservative Party. 
 
These four discursive strategies are summarised in Table 11.1 below. Having laid out this 
overview of the four discursive strategies, it is important to note that this is a broad outline. 
As this chapter details, there are a plethora of examples that show greater complexity than 
































High Medium Low Low 
Table 11.1. The four discourses identified from the analysis in the thematic chapters 
 
The next sections will expand on this in more detail, with particular emphasis on the 
discursive strategies used in selected British prime ministers’ speeches.  
 
9.1 Paternalism Discourse 
The defining characteristic of the ‘paternalism’ discourse is that it presents Britain as still 
having great power over Africa – resulting in a neo-colonial dynamic. This discourse is most 
prominent in speeches made by Major, however there is a certain continuity in this discourse 
as it can also be found in some speeches by Blair, Brown and Cameron – albeit to a lesser 
degree. There are two main discursive strategies that define this discourse. The first is the 
use of nomination strategies that discursively separate Britain and Africa into ‘us’ and ‘them’ 
groups. The second is through uses of perpetuation strategies that diminish the legacy of 




This discourse is epitomised in Major’s 1994 address to the Conservative Party Conference 
(JM94m)141, in which he said: ‘time after time it has been British initiatives that have led the 
way in achieving this, to use our age-old links with Africa to help prepare that troubled 
continent for a better future’. This extract is useful because it highlights a number of 
discursive strategies that are central to this discourse – including the two main strategies of 
nomination and perpetuation. Firstly, the use of the nomination strategies of ‘Britain’ and 
‘Africa’ shows the distance between these two subjects, as it implies there are no 
commonalities. Secondly, the homogenisation of the continent ‘Africa’, as highlighted by 
Brown and Harman (2013) is also important to this. Thirdly, the use of ‘time after time’ is 
emblematic of the way in which discourse views Africa’s problems as intractable. Fourthly, 
the use of ‘age-old’ links is a way of sanitising Britain’s historical role on the continent 
without having to address atrocities committed. Finally, the view that it is British initiatives 
that have helped change Africa’s fate shows the lack of agency afforded to Africa.  
 
Nomination strategies can be used to serve different purposes. As in the extract from 
Major’s speech, in this discourse, they are used to separate out Africa and Britain into ‘them’ 
and ‘us’ categories – as seen the speeches of Major, Blair, and Cameron. For example: ‘We 
British were relative late-comers to Africa’ (JM94f) 142, ‘we British have a direct interest, a 
very great stake, in your future’ (JM94f) 143, ‘do what we can to save African nations from 
                                                 
141 John Major (14th October, 1994), Conservative Party Conference, Bournemouth, UK 
142 John Major (20th September, 1994), South African National Assembly, Cape Town, South Africa. 
143 John Major (20th September, 1994), South African National Assembly, Cape Town, South Africa. 
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barbarism and dictatorship and be proud of it’ (TB00c) 144, ‘look after our national interest’ 
(DC10a)145. This strategy constructs Britain and Africa as unequal actors with little shared 
interest, and of a British national identity still rooted in its colonial history. It is important to 
note that this strategy is used in both domestic and international contexts. 
 
Alongside this nomination strategy, perpetuation strategies are also common in the 
construction of this ‘paternalism’ discourse. As explored in the History chapter (Chapter 6), 
Major, Blair and Cameron all diminish the impact of colonialism by shifting the 
responsibility for crimes committed away from Britain and using selective accounts of 
Britain’s history in Africa. At the core of this discursive strategy is a claim to ‘truth’. In John 
Major’s speech to the South African National Assembly (JM94f)146, for example, he argues 
that the British were ‘late-comers to Africa’. He justifies Britain’s ‘benign’ history in Africa 
by presenting Britain as a reluctant coloniser with benevolent intentions. This continues with 
the assertion that Britain’s intentions were ‘trade rather than colonisation’ and ‘benign 
commerce’, and then transforms into a claim to moral superiority by noting that Britain 
abolished the slave trade before the Dutch. 
 
This is similar to the discursive strategy employed by Blair in his 2007 video speech marking 
the 200th anniversary of the British Parliament legislating to abolish the slave trade in the 
British Empire (TB07e). Blair’s speech is slightly different to Major’s because British 
                                                 
144 Tony Blair (13th November, 2000), Mansion House, London, UK. 
145 David Cameron (24th June, 2010), HMS Ark Royal. 
146 John Major (20th September, 1994), South African National Assembly, Cape Town, South Africa. 
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responsibility for atrocities is accepted at first. However, the transformation to focus on 
Britain’s moral superiority is achieved in the same way. After calling the transatlantic slave 
trade ‘one of the most shameful enterprises in history’, Blair qualifies this acknowledgement 
of wrongdoing with a shift of focus to abolitionism, and with it Britain’s claim to rightness. 
As mentioned in the History chapter, Blair offers one African, and two British abolitionists 
in his example: ‘the people who fought against slavery came from all walks of life. They 
include former enslaved Africans like Olaudah Equiano, church leaders like Thomas 
Clarkson and statesmen like William Wilberforce’. This is significant because it shows a 
transformation in conceptualisation of national identity from Britain’s role as a colonising 
nation to one of an emancipator, just as Major did. 
 
Another way in which this perpetuation strategy can be seen is in the metaphors used by 
Blair. As noted by Reisigl and Wodak (2009) metaphors are important discursive strategies 
used in the construction of national identity. Blair (TB01f)147 told the Labour Party 
Conference in 2001 that ‘the state of Africa is a scar on the conscience of the world. But if 
the world as a community focused on it, we could heal it. And if we don’t, it will become 
deeper and angrier.’ He repeated this metaphor whilst addressing the Nigerian Assembly in 
Abuja (TB02c)148, at the G8 Summit in Canada (TB02f) 149, and again to the World Summit 
on Sustainable Development in South Africa (TB02g)150. This violent metaphor removes all 
                                                 
147 Tony Blair (2nd October, 2001), Labour Party Conference, Brighton, UK. 
148 Tony Blair (7th February, 2002), Nigerian Assembly, Abuja, Nigeria. 
149 Tony Blair (28th June, 2002), G8 Summit, Canada. 
150 Tony Blair (28th September, 2002), World Summit on Sustainable Development, South Africa. 
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agency from Africa, presents Africa as an intractable problem, and also depicts Africa as 
incapable of solving its problems. It also removes historical context from the problems, and 
draws on imagery used by the missionary-explorer David Livingstone in the mid-nineteenth 
century – that the Central African slave trade was ‘the open sore of the world’ (Provenzano, 
2010).   
 
The ‘paternalism’ discourse constructs a British national identity that is similar to the 
dynamic under colonialism – that Africa is incapable of solving its own problems and 
requires British assistance. As detailed, it is most prominent in speeches made by Major, but 
can also be found in some speeches by Blair and Cameron. It is important to note, however, 
that Major’s interest in Africa is primarily around South Africa. In contrast, the next 
discourse of ‘tutelage’ refers to Africa in very general terms.  
 
The specific focus on prime ministers’ discourse and its role in the construction of national 
identity in this thesis can lead to a contradiction of the literature. For example, Dowden 
(2007) would contend that Brown belongs to this discourse as well. He argues that when 
Brown visited Mozambique in 2006 as chancellor, he said ‘that Britain had nothing to 
apologize for in its colonial record in Africa. What he probably meant was that he was proud 
of the British missionaries and teachers and doctors who had given their lives to building 
schools and clinics and churches in Africa. But many Africans saw it as a shocking 
endorsement of British imperialism’. As this research has focused exclusively on prime 
ministers’ words, this speech was not part of the sample studied.  
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9.2 ‘Tutelage’ Discourse 
In contrast to the first discourse, the ‘tutelage’ discourse is slightly less paternalistic. 
Nevertheless, it retains the idea that Britain is central to solving Africa’s problems. The 
‘tutelage’ discourse is primarily found in the speeches of Blair – although it can also be seen 
in speeches by Major. Although Blair championed the language of partnership in Africa, his 
frequent and highly general references to Africa demonstrate this is part of a separate 
discourse. Blair showed a propensity to speak about Africa as a continent rather than 
focusing on countries – and his sweeping references to the ‘state of Africa’ with its ‘grinding 
poverty, pandemic disease, a rash of failed states’ (TB01h)151 are unrepresentative of the 
whole of Africa. This tendency to portray Africa as having intractable problems shows little 
focus on details, such as Blair’s incorrect assertion to the Labour Party conference that the 
Rwandan genocide occurred in 1993 (TB01f)152. As such, this discourse is perhaps more 
about Blair himself than it is about Africa – and his personal devotion echoes the missionary 
zeal of Victorian explorers. This discourse uses a range of strategies, including nomination 
and transformation strategies, as seen in the sub-themes of the Commonwealth, Sport, moral 
posturing and party political messaging.  
 
The ‘paternalism’ discourse emphasised difference through the nomination strategy of ‘us’ 
and ‘them’ groups. By contrast, this discourse focuses primarily on nomination strategies 
                                                 
151 Tony Blair (12th November, 2001). Lord Mayor’s Banquet, UK 
152 Tony Blair (2nd October, 2001). Labour Party Conference, Brighton, UK 
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centring on the first person pronoun ‘I’. For example, in Blair’s 2005 speech at the launch of 
the Commission for Africa report153, he said: 
 
I fear my own conscience on Africa. I fear the judgement of future generations, where history 
properly calculates the gravity of the suffering. I fear them asking: but how could wealthy 
people, so aware of such suffering, so capable of acting, simply turn away to busy themselves 
with other things?  […]  I feel that judgement of the future alongside the now. It gives me 
urgency. It fills me with determination.   
 
This is also apparent in other speeches. For example, in his 2005 speech to the East-West 
Institute (TB05k)154, ‘I believe passionately in Africa as a moral cause, but I also have to say 
to you that if I think of Africa […] I think of hundreds of millions of young people 
growing up in poverty’. Similarly, in his speech to News Corp. in 2006 (TB06s)155, he said: ‘I 
know some of my fellow leaders think I am trifle obsessed with Africa. It’s true. I am.’  
 
In this way, Blair’s speeches about Africa are often about himself. According to Abrahamsen 
(2005: 55), Blair was ‘almost messianic’ in his mission to help Africa. Abrahamsen is not the 
only one to make this comparison. Blair’s former friend Robert Harris accused him of 
having ‘a messiah complex’ (Bowie, 2014). This may help to explain why Blair’s speeches 
about Africa focus on it as a monolithic continent. As noted in the initial quantitative 
                                                 
153 Tony Blair (11th March, 2005), launch of the Commission for Africa report, British Museum, 
London. 
154 Tony Blair (8th December, 2005). East-West Institute, Guildhall, London. 
155 Tony Blair (30th July, 2006). News Corp., Pebble Beach, California. 
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analysis (Chapter 4, Figure 4.8), this is a unique aspect of Blair’s speeches that distinguishes 
him from the other prime ministers. Thus, whilst there are other areas of continuity, this is 
one important way in which Blair did represent a substantially new approach to the discourse 
on Britain and Africa. This nomination strategy is echoed by Cameron in the final discourse, 
however it serves a different purpose, as detailed in 10.4.  
 
Having looked at the nomination strategy used in this discourse, this section will now look at 
the transformation strategies used by Major and Blair. The Commonwealth and the role of 
sport act in similar ways in this discourse; they are both transformation strategies that seek to 
maintain British influence in Africa. In a speech in Harare, for example, Major talks about 
the common factors that unite the Commonwealth. ‘The superficial differences are clearly 
vast - size, wealth, colour, religion - but sitting down together we do all speak the same 
language both literally and metaphorically’ (JM91j).156 Blair echoes this sentiment about 
shared values and language in the Commonwealth at the beginning of his premiership 
(TB97b)157, in an address to the Commonwealth Business Forum.  
 
The Commonwealth [has] a common language in a global economy in the information age. 
We have common values that can shape the way we work. We have many shared 
practices, similar legal and accounting systems. And we can do more business with each 
other if we make more of these advantages. 
                                                 
156 John Major (21st October, 1991), Harare, Zimbabwe. 
157 Tony Blair (22nd October, 1997), Commonwealth Business Forum. 
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Importantly, both Major and Blair explicitly reference the Commonwealth as an arena in 
which Britain’s history of empire and colonialism can be transformed into a new identity. 
Major’s discussions of the Commonwealth, however, do have a unique aspect to them. He 
uses his position to advocate for democracy and human rights, and to push for ‘sound 
economic and political management’ in the Commonwealth. In the context of the fall of the 
Berlin Wall, this is about the virtues of capitalism over socialism.  This usage of the 
Commonwealth in this way is an attempt to steer former British colonies without appearing 
paternal by suggesting that these are collective values that must be upheld by all members.  
 
John Major uses the role of sport as a transformation strategy in a similar way. For Major, 
sport is a way to talk about the commonalities between Britain and Africa (or the 
Commonwealth more broadly) in a way that transcends politics, and suggest shared values 
and shared history that go beyond self-interest.  
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9.3 ‘Partnership’ Discourse 
The ‘partnership’ discourse is distinguished primarily by the nomination and transformation 
strategies used. Instead of the nomination strategies of ‘us’ and ‘them’ groups of the first 
discourse or the first person pronoun ‘I’ of the second, this discourse more often uses 
collective pronouns such as ‘we’ to indicate that Africa and Britain are united in their aims, 
or by referring to countries in name. In doing so, British prime ministers speak about 
countries in Africa like they would any other. This discourse does not ignore the poverty in 
Africa, but rather the solutions to these problems are not paternalistic as in the first two 
discourses. This discourse is present in speeches of all four prime ministers. Brown most 
often uses this discourse, and rarely uses the others. This consistency marks him out from 
the other three prime ministers, who use combinations of at least three of the discourses. 
Within this discourse, there is an acknowledgement that some African countries will grow 
very quickly over the coming decades, and this is presented as positive and to be celebrated. 
This discourse suggests that Britain has moved out of the shadow of being the former 
British Empire, and is comfortable with its new identity as an internationalist soft-power 
superpower. There is evidence for this discourse in speeches by all four prime ministers.  
 
One important way in which this discourse is may be distinguished is in the nomination 
strategies used by British prime ministers. In contrast to the distance of ‘you’ and ‘us’ groups 
of the first discourse, and the personalised ‘I’ of the second, this discourse of partnership 
focuses more often on countries in Africa by name. This hints at a changing relationship 
between Britain and Africa, and one that has moved on from the legacy of colonialism. A 
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normalising of relations to the sort of relationship Britain has with any country. It also shows 
more attention to country-specific issues rather than broad generalisations.  
 
Significantly, Major and Cameron use this discourse because it ties in with their focus on 
bilateral trade, which they place more emphasis on as Conservative prime ministers than 
Blair or Brown. For example, Major’s primary interest in Africa was South Africa – and 
working to ensure sanctions on South Africa were lifted. ‘South Africa is a potential giant in 
the African Continent not only economically but politically and diplomatically over years and 
I think its example will spread elsewhere.’ (JM94l)158. Major made two visits to South Africa 
during his time as prime minister. Returning in 1996, he said: ‘No British Prime Minister had 
visited South Africa for 34 years. When I addressed the National Assembly, I spoke of a 
fellowship for the future between Britain and South Africa. Since then, we have been 
putting that fellowship into practice in practical ways’ (JM96d)159. Similarly, much of 
Cameron’s interest in Africa focused on bilateral trade, and the nomination strategies used 
reflect this spirit of partnership. For instance: ‘Our trade is worth £9 billion a year and 
exports of British goods to South Africa in the first third of this year are up nearly 50% 
compared with the year before’ (DC11e)160. There are examples of such nomination 
strategies in the context of trade from Blair and Brown. Blair, for example, says: ‘On trade, I 
know that Ghana has a particular interest in securing improved trading opportunities. 
Developed countries retain significant barriers to trade, particularly in agriculture.’ However, 
                                                 
158 John Major (22nd September, 1994). Pretoria, South Africa.  
159 John Major (10th July, 1996). CBI / RIIA / COSAT Investment Conference, South Africa.  
160 David Cameron (18th July, 2011). Pretoria, South Africa.  
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this has to be looked at in the context of all of their speeches to understand that these are 
exceptions to the rule.  
 
For Brown, this nomination strategy is the norm – but it is rarely in relation to trade. One 
such instance is a speech in Downing Street in 2008: ‘And when you ask about the 
cooperation between our two countries, we are ready to support the Nigerian government, 
both in restoring peace in the Niger Delta, and also in taking all the measures necessary to 
deal with lawlessness in the area. But we will work to the ideas that the President has about 
what can be done’. This is a significant contrast to the language and nomination strategies in 
the first and second discourses; Brown rarely speaks in the first person or creates a 
dichotomy between Africa and Britain through the use of ‘us’ and ‘you’.   
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9.4 ‘Insecure Former Empire’ Discourse 
The fourth discourse is similar to the previous ‘partnership’ discourse in that it is also 
centred on a belief that Africa is on the threshold of great economic and social 
transformation. The ‘insecure former empire’ discourse, however, views the rapid growth of 
many African countries as a missed opportunity for a slow British economy. This presents a 
national identity of Britain as a country on the decline and still insecure with its place in the 
world without the empire. This discourse is marked out by its use of transformation and 
dismantling strategies. Prominent in the speeches of Cameron, this discourse appears to be a 
response to the Blair-Brown concept that British national identity is tied to its aid budget. 
This may seem contradictory given that Cameron protected – indeed, increased – ODA 
spending at a time of significant domestic austerity. However, the transformation and 
dismantling strategies of this discourse represent a tension between Conservatism – primarily 
in the Conservative Party, but also in the media and public – and attempts to change 
perceptions of the Conservative Party. 
 
There are two main points that stand out. The first is that it returns to the nomination 
strategies that create a perceived power gap – such as ‘we’ and ‘you’ – that were common in 
the ‘paternalism’ discourse. However, the dynamics are reversed. Instead of Britain doing 
things for or to Africa, it is about what Africa can do for Britain. The second point that 
emerges from this discourse is that Cameron uses it to bring the focus to himself, echoing 
the example of Blair in the ‘tutelage’ discourse. This is significant because it echoes Blair’s 
rhetoric but has not been detailed in the existing literature. 
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Cameron uses this discourse to focus attention on himself as someone to right the ‘wrong’ 
of New Labour’s aid paradigm. It creates a dividing line between himself and the previous 
Labour government, and enables him to present himself as the solution – as shown through 
his frequent use of ‘I’.  
 
I think this is a major opportunity for Britain and one we haven’t always taken up in the past. I 
led a trade mission to Africa, to Nigeria and South Africa. And I want to do more of that 
because I think if you look at the – you know which economies are growing the fastest, you 
will see that some of the fastest growing are in Africa. And I think for too long politicians, 
particularly, have thought of Africa as a destination for aid and a source of global 
difficulties and problems rather than an immense market opportunity. […]We do have and 
have kept large aid programmes, particularly to sub Saharan Africa, that should give us a good 
relationship with these countries from which we can build better business and investment 
links; I think that makes a difference. (DC14b)161 
 
Cameron’s use of ‘we’ in the following extract is also significant because he uses it to signify 
that Britain has a new leader who is a Conservative, with the implication being that Africa 
had hitherto been a source of untapped economic potential by his New Labour 
predecessors. This also presents a national identity tied the idea of Britain as entrepreneurial 
and capitalist country.  
 
                                                 
161 David Cameron (11th June, 2014), 11th International Festival of Business, Liverpool, UK 
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‘today I’ve come here to Lagos because there’s another story unfolding on this continent – 
something that many in the West are only just waking up to. […] Africa is transforming in a 
way no-one thought possible 20 years ago… and suddenly a whole new future seems within 
reach. […] It’s why I’ve brought a plane full of business leaders. And it’s why we want to do 
more to extend loan guarantees and trade finance to British companies that are looking to do 
business in Africa. Because we see Africa in a new way, a different way (DC11f). 
 
Cameron’s discursive strategy can been seen more clearly by contrasting it with the way in 
which Blair speaks about the same issue. Blair does not use the ‘insecure former empire’ 
discourse, but instead uses the ‘tutelage’ discourse. In Blair’s speech to the Nigerian 
Assembly (TB02c), for example, although the content is comparable to Cameron’s, his 
framing is very different. Blair’s use of ‘we’ is not tied to his role as a Labour prime minister, 
or even his role as prime minister at all, he uses ‘we’ to speak on behalf of Britain.  
 
Britain has long enjoyed a special bond with Nigeria. It is not just a question of history. British 
companies are major investors. Trade is growing. […] Nigeria is a nation, which vibrates with 
energy. It personifies the richness and sense of possibility that is Africa. […] Africa should not 
be seen as a victim but as a partner. Africa demands a new partnership not out of desperation 
but out of promise for the future. This is about what we do together, as equals, with 
mutual respect and shared determination. If Africa gains, we gain. The world will be 




John Major’s speech to the CBI/RIIA/COSAT Investment Conference in South Africa 
(JM96d)162 is similar in tone to Blair’s – which show that Cameron’s discursive strategy is 
unique in this respect; Major rarely refers to himself.  
 
Trade between us has leapt. British exports rose 25 per cent in 1994 and a further 30 per cent 
in 1995. South Africa has a substantial investment in Britain. And Britain is the biggest foreign 
investor in South Africa. I am very keen that British business should continue to lead the way. 
It is important they do so, because investment from overseas will be one of the keys to South 
Africa’s future prosperity. Investment flows will dwarf any government-to-government 
assistance. […] A British company is by far South Africa’s largest foreign employer. Nine of 
the top twenty foreign employers in South Africa, are British.  
 
Cameron’s reaction to the aid focused New Labour was on the one hand to accept the new 
status quo of retaining aid spending, whilst simultaneously using his conservative instincts to 
push for trade over aid rhetoric. In this way, Cameron aligned himself whilst also distancing 
himself from New Labour.  
 
                                                 
162 John Major (10th July, 1996), CBI/RIIA/COSAT Investment Conference, South Africa. 
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9.5 Contextualising the Findings 
Although not the specific focus or aim of this research, this section seeks to understand the 
reasons for the trends in themes and discourses identified over the last five chapters. In 
order to do this, this section will move beyond prime ministers’ speeches to contextualise the 
findings using secondary sources. It is important to note, however, that it is difficult to 
identify causality. Instead, therefore, this section highlights correlations and seeks to explain 
trends on that basis. 
 
9.5.1 From Paternalism to Partnership 
Despite the continuities and discontinuities found in this thesis, of the main findings is that 
the language used by British prime ministers in referring to Africa moves from a framing 
that is largely paternalistic to one that is more about partnership. This reflects a broader 
paradigm shift that occurred around the end of the Cold War – namely, the rise of optimism 
about the ability of politics and institutions to improve the world, and an increase in African 
agency.  
 
The beginning of the post-Cold War shift can be seen in US President George H. W. Bush’s 
address to a joint session of Congress on September 11th 1990. In this speech, Bush spoke of 
his vision of a ‘new world order’, and argued that the crisis in the Persian Gulf and the end 




‘a rare opportunity to move toward an historic period of cooperation. […] Out of these 
troubled times […] a new world order - can emerge […] An era in which the nations of the 
world, east and west, north and south, can prosper and live in harmony. […] A world quite 
different from the one we’ve known. A world where the rule of law supplants the rule of the 
jungle. A world in which nations recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and justice. A 
world where the strong respect the rights of the weak.’ (Bush, 1990: 20).  
 
This optimism was based in particular on the assumption that globalisation would knit 
together the nations of the world into ‘a global community espousing common values and 
shared interests, backed by a rising tide of prosperity [that would] eliminate the need for 
zero-sum perspectives in world affairs’ (Reveron, Gvosdev and Owens, 2015: 244). It was 
this optimism also led Fukuyama to assert that the world had reached the ‘end of history’ 
with the triumph of liberal democracy and capitalism, and signalled the arrival of a post-
ideological world (Fukuyama, 1989). 
 
Cornwall and Nyamu-Musembi (2005: 13) argue that the end of the Cold War: ‘made 
possible a more comprehensive view of rights as encompassing all rights: civil, political, 
economic, social and cultural. From this point, it is not a long jump to framing 
“development” concerns such as food security and population as issues of rights. There is 
less contestation over their status as rights claims, unlike the sterile and polarised debates 




At the same time, it is important to acknowledge the role of increased African agency in 
bringing about this shift to partnership. Brown and Harman (2013: 1) argue, ‘the study of 
Africa’s international relations has for a long time been dominated by a concern to explain 
how the continent has been governed, shaped and marginalised by external actors’. In a 
period that has seen strong, sustained economic growth across the continent and assertive 
diplomacy from African actors, this approach looks ever more anachronistic. African 
interventions on the global stages of the UN, WTO, and World Bank have been highly 
visible and demonstrate growing assertiveness (Brown and Harman, 2013). Additionally, the 
legitimacy and representativeness of post-Second World War structures and institutions have 
been called into question. After all, African countries represent just over a quarter of the UN 
membership, yet have no permanent seat on the UN Security Council. However, Zondi 
(2013: 19) argues that Africa relies on ‘coordinated and common negotiating positions [to] 
re-centre itself in the multilateral system’.  
 
Cargill (2013: 76) argues that Cameron’s intervention in Libya shows that in some ways, little 
has changed with regards to Africa’s agency; ‘African agency remains limited. UK agency 
remains extensive’. Yet this intervention is an outlier in recent UK-Africa relations. ‘While 
the UK Government might deny it, issues of human rights and governance cannot be quite 
so forcefully raised as they once were, when purely developmental and humanitarian 
interests predominated’. This represents a ‘challenge to the UK’s historical self-defined 




9.5.2 The Blair-Cameron Link 
There are strong parallels between Blair and Cameron in how they reference Africa in their 
speeches. Indeed, out of the four prime ministers studied in this research, there is most 
similarity between Blair and Cameron. Their emphasis on Africa as a sphere to project hard 
power sets them apart from Major and Brown, as does their framing of Africa as an overtly 
moral cause. In addition, their passion for Africa is presented as a highly personal 
commitment. This parallel is particularly noteworthy because they are from different parties, 
did not govern consecutively, and the 2007/2008 Global Financial Crisis separates their 
administrations There are two obvious characteristics to their premierships that might 
explain the commonalities of their focus on Africa: their youth on entering office, and both 
entered government after a long period in opposition. These two explanations will be 
expanded on here. 
 
Blair was 43 years old when he entered Number 10 in 1997, making him the youngest prime 
minister since the Earl of Liverpool in 1812 (Seldon, 2007). Just over a decade later, 
Cameron was also elected at 43 years of age – but he was a few months younger than Blair 
on taking office, thus making him the youngest prime minister in the last two centuries (Hart 
and Carr, 2013). Their youth and perceived inexperience as challengers to incumbent prime 
ministers were part of attacks used against them.  
 
Philip Gould, a key Labour strategist and senior adviser to Tony Blair, wrote a memo in 
which he explained that Blair’s weakness was that he could be perceived as ‘too soft and not 
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tough enough’ and ‘inexperienced’ (Gould, 1999: 211). Moreover, an article in the New York 
Times notes, Blair’s ‘youth and relative inexperience have also caused him problems. 
Detractors on both sides of the political aisle portray him as out of his depth, and have hung 
on him the derisive nickname of Bambi’  (Stevenson, 1994).  
 
In a similar manner, Brown used his 2008 conference speech to make the remark ‘I am all in 
favour of apprenticeships, but let me tell you this is no time for a novice’ (BBC News, 2008). 
This made the headlines in a number of newspapers and was seen to be an attack at both 
Cameron, and Brown’s potential leadership challenger David Miliband. Various leaked 
communications also reveal how Cameron was viewed by people he met around the time of 
the 2010 election and – although Cameron would not have heard these criticisms directly – 
he would have been aware of his perceived inexperience and how necessary it was for him to 
reassure those who found him to be so. The release of Hillary Clinton’s emails to the state 
department, for example, show her aide (and former White House aide to Bill Clinton) 
Sidney Blumenthal thought Cameron was ‘aristocratic, unsure, inexperienced, oblique and 
largely uncommitted’ (Fenton, 2015). Meanwhile, a discussion between Mervyn King and the 
US ambassador revealed by WikiLeaks showed that King found both Cameron and Osborne 
to be inexperienced (Dorey and Garnett, 2016: 70).  
 
In this context, Blair and Cameron’s focus on foreign policy – and in particular, Africa – 
could be explained as a way to generate moral authority and project statesmanship on the 
world stage. Chandler (2003: 310) argues that foreign policy initiatives have become an 
important mechanism for cohering western governments and international institutions, often 
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appearing to be bereft of any clear consensus-building political agenda of their own. There 
are two aspects of Blair and Cameron’s speeches in relation to Africa that lend weight to this 
argument: their emphasis on projecting power and their highly personalised style of talking 
about Africa. Theakston (2012: 207) argues, ‘Cameron and Blair fit the model of the more 
emotionally literate leader that modern politics seems to require’. Langer (2010: 65), 
meanwhile, contends there are ‘interesting similarities regarding which aspects of the 
personal sphere of [Blair and Cameron] were emphasized [sic]’. 
 
The second factor that unites Blair and Cameron is that both became prime minister after 
their parties had spent a long period in opposition. The Labour Party had spent 18 years in 
opposition when Blair entered Downing Street, while the Conservative Party had spent 13 
years out of office when Cameron formed the Coalition government. In their time as leader 
of the opposition, both Blair and Cameron made a concerted effort to change, reposition, 
and rebrand their parties. Blair changed Clause 4 of the Labour Party’s constitution which 
had previously represented the party’s commitment to common ownership, rebranded the 
party as ‘New Labour’, and adopted a ‘Third Way’ ideology. Cameron abandoned the 
Conservative Party’s logo of 30 years, a torch of freedom, in favour of an oak tree in order 
to promote an image of modern, softer, and more environmentally-friendly party (Dommett, 
2015). This was reinforced by Cameron’s visit to the Arctic to witness the effects of climate 
change, a commitment to lead the ‘greenest government ever’, and his softening of the 




Importantly, both Blair and Cameron also used foreign policy to emphasise change. Daddow 
and Schnapper (2013) argue that  ‘policy substance, policy style and party political dilemmas 
prompted [Blair and Cameron] to reconnect British foreign policy with its ethical roots, 
ingraining a bounded liberal posture in British foreign policy after the moral bankruptcy of 
the John Major years’. Little (2000: 251) argues that ‘there has been an active and persistent 
attempt to identify ‘clear blue water’ between New Labour’s approach to foreign policy and 
the measures adopted by both Conservative and Labour administrations of the past’.   
 
Notably, less than a fortnight after New Labour’s 1997 landslide victory, the foreign 
secretary, Robin Cook, launched a mission statement for the FCO in which he stated 
Britain’s foreign policy must have an ‘ethical dimension’ (Little and Wickham-Jones, 2000).   
In 1997, Blair separated DFID from the FCO, establishing it as an independent department 
headed by a Cabinet Minister (Morrissey, 2005). As noted in the Security Chapter (Chapter 
7) and Morality Chapter (Chapter 8), Blair also contrasts his approach in Sierra Leone with 
the failure of Major’s government to intervene in Rwanda. He told the Labour Party 
Conference in 2001 (TB01f): ‘And I tell you if Rwanda happened again today as it did in 
1993, when a million people were slaughtered in cold blood, we would have a moral duty to 
act there also’.  
 
Cameron also made changes in foreign policy to underline his commitment to modernisation 
and to detoxify the image of the Conservatives as the ‘nasty party’ (Heppell and Lightfoot, 
2012: 133). He signalled a commitment to international development through maintaining 
official development assistance target and DFID as a separate government department. 
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Cameron made two visits to Africa as leader of the opposition – to Darfur and South Africa 
in August 2006 and Rwanda in July 2007. Beswick (2019) argues that in doing so, Cameron 
sought to ‘demonstrate his credentials as a potential international statesman’ and ‘position 
engagement with Africa as part of Conservative Party modernisation’. The Observer 
newspaper suggested that this represented an ‘audacious bid to seize the issue of African aid 
and development from Gordon Brown’ (Temko, 2006). Cameron further signalled a 
changed Conservative Party by meeting with Nelson Mandela on his visit to South Africa, 
and calling Mandela ‘one of the greatest men alive’ in an article in The Observer (Cameron, 
2006). This marks a sharp contrast to views expressed by Margaret Thatcher and other 
Conservative MPs in the 1980s.  
 
Cameron’s rebranding and repositioning of the Conservative Party was also demonstrated 
on his visit to Rwanda in 2007. As noted by Beswick (2019), Cameron’s trip to partake in the 
Conservative’s social action project in Rwanda, Project Umubano, coincided with severe 
flooding in his parliamentary constituency. Despite receiving criticism in the press and 
rumours of a vote of no confidence in his leadership from members of the 1922 committee, 
Cameron chose to continue with his trip to Rwanda. The study of Cameron’s party 
modernisation from 2005-2015 by Dommett (2015) would benefit from including such 
considerations of the role of foreign policy and Africa. Although Dommett cites Cameron’s 
reference to Africa in a foreword to a statement of Conservative Party aims and values, this 
is more by accident than design – and she does not pick up on this reference or delve into it 
any further, choosing instead she focuses on the other aspects of the foreword.  
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In contrast, for Blair, this argument about party modernisation does not seem to stand up to 
the same level of scrutiny. As the analysis in this thesis has shown, Blair’s focus on Africa, 
whilst present in his first term – most notably the intervention in Sierra Leone in 2000 – 
started properly in his second term (Porteous, 2005: 289-90). The ethical dimension to 
Blair’s foreign policy rhetoric did not fully occur until after 9/11 (Mumford and Selck, 2010). 
Potential explanations for Blair’s unique focus on Africa are therefore explored in further 
detail in the next section.  
 
9.5.3 Explaining Blair’s Focus on Africa 
As discussed in the literature review, there are conflicting accounts about why and when 
Africa came to play a central role in Blair’s foreign policy. The explanations highlighted n 
this research include the personal (Taylor, 2012; Vallely, 2009), somewhat more calculated 
explanations about projecting a moral identity for Britain (Gallagher, 2013), and security 
concern post 9/11 (Abrahamsen, 2005). However, one aspect that hasn’t been explored is 
the involvement of external actors such as President Mbeki  and Bob Geldof (Vallely, 2009).  
As the first three of these have been explored already in some detail, this section will reflect 
predominantly on those explanations that have not yet been covered.  
 
According to Taylor (2012: 450), Blair was the most media-obsessed leader Britain has had in 
modern times, and he projected himself as a ‘personal savior [sic]’ of Africa. Similarly, 
Abrahamsen (2005: 55) argues that Blair was ‘almost messianic’ in his mission to help Africa. 
However, Vallely (2009) argues that Blair’s focus on Africa did not stem from narrow 
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political self-interest because it sometimes it ran counter to usual political considerations. 
Blair knew that his continued lobbying of other G8 leaders on Africa was irritating them; 
Vallely (2009: 199) states:  
 
At one point the German Chancellor, Gerhard Schroeder – in a desperate attempt to find 
some common ground with George Bush, with whom relations were still icy after Germany’s 
opposition to the invasion of Iraq – said privately to Bush: “Blair is being a real pain in the 
arse about this Africa stuff, isn’t he?” To which Bush replied: “Yeah, I wish he’d give it a rest.” 
 
Near the conclusion of Blair’s time in office, in a speech in South Africa (TB07p)163 Blair 
credits President Mbeki for his focus on Africa, a point which has not been picked up in the 
literature on this area.  
 
I remember conversations I had with you very early on in your Presidency and my 
Premiership when you emphasised to me that in the end the solutions to Africa’s 
problems come from within Africa, it is the duty and obligation of those of us outside 
of Africa to give support and help but in the end Africa wants to take responsibility for 
its own destiny and future. And you made a great impression on me in the sense of trying 
to get away from a relationship between Africa and the outside world that was about donor 
and recipient, and to one of partnership and equality, where there were obligations on the 
African side as well as on the side of the developed world and where we move together 
recognising those mutual obligations are interchangeable […] So in a sense that very 
                                                 
163 Tony Blair (31st May, 2007), South Africa. 
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formative analysis that you gave me was what led to us trying to develop a different way 
of approaching these problems and that culminated in the Gleneagles G8. 
 
Meanwhile, Vallely (2009) argues that Bob Geldof had a significant role in placing Africa 
high on Blair’s foreign policy agenda. Vallely claims that Geldof travelled to Ethiopia in 2003 
and found that the famine was on a level similar to the 1984-1985 famine which had led to 
the Live Aid concert. Vallely (2009: 194) says that Geldof phoned Blair, who was attending 
the G8 summit in France, and said:  
 
“It’s happening again […] Twenty years after Live Aid and things are no better. In some ways 
they’re getting worse […] None of it is working. And there are all these new forces of the 
globalized economy at play which nobody properly understands. Africa is fucked.” 
 
Vallely goes on to say that Blair asked Geldof to meet him, and that this was significant in 
raising the profile of Africa on Blair’s agenda. 
 
9.5.4 Why is Brown an Outlier? 
When accounting for length of time in office, the corpus of speeches indicates that Brown 
delivered twice as many speeches that referenced Africa compared to Major, Blair, and 
Cameron – as shown in Table 3.3 and Figure 4:2. Throughout this thesis, Brown has 
emerged in an outlier in other ways. Whereas Major, Blair, and Cameron refer to Britain’s 
colonial history in Africa (albeit in different ways), Brown does not do this. Additionally, 
when making the moral argument for engagement with Africa – historical or recent – Major, 
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Blair, and Cameron, can be found to use overtly Christian messages, while Brown draws on a 
wider group of faiths. The analysis of Brown in the literature tends to focus on his time as 
chancellor (Taylor, 2005; Dowden, 2007). As such, it represents a continuation of literature 
that focuses on Blair’s premiership to the exclusion of other prime ministers. Prime Minister 
Brown is largely unaddressed in the UK-Africa literature due to his being preceded and 
succeeded by more consequential prime ministers and because of his short tenure. As such, 
the findings on Brown represent an important new contribution to knowledge.  
 
Explanations in the literature focus on Brown’s faith and upbringing. According to Brown’s 
biographer, ‘helping the Third World had been a special interest for Brown since childhood’ 
(Bower, 2004: 206), while Wheeler (2007) simply states that ‘Africa was […] an early 
concern’. Brown often cites his father, who was Presbyterian Church of Scotland minister, as 
inspiration. Dowden (2007) argues that Brown inherited his father’s ideals; strictly moral, 
puritanical and serious, careful with money and caring for others. It was one of his father’s 
sermons that inspired Brown – at the age of 13164 – and his brother John to found The 
Gazette, which proudly boasted that it was the only newspaper in Scotland sold in aid of 
African refugees (Allport, 2009: 24). This explanation of Brown’s interest in Africa being 
long-standing is further underlined by the fact that when he was a student at the University 
of Edinburgh, he was elected rector and exposed the university’s investments in Apartheid 
South Africa, and ended them (Dowden, 2007).  
                                                 





David Livingstone had also been a Scottish Presbyterian minister. As noted in the Literature 
Review (Chapter 2), Livingstone’s Missionary Travels sold 70,000 copies within a few months 
of its publication in 1857 (Brantlinger, 1985). Livingstone had called for missionaries to 
bring Christianity to ‘the Dark Continent’, and the Church of Scotland had responded 
enthusiastically, sending thousands of young idealistic Christians to Africa for more than a 
century to bring their religion and education to Africans. Dowden (2007) argues that their 







This conclusion summarises the findings of this thesis and highlights its original 
contributions to knowledge. It then situates these findings within the literature explored in 
Chapter 2 and referenced throughout. It finishes by offering two ways this research can be 
expanded on in further research. 
 
10.1 Findings And Original Contributions To Knowledge 
This thesis has answered the three central research questions set out in Chapter 1. It finds 
that British prime ministers’ references to Africa can be categorised into four ‘themes’; that 
their references to Africa are about British ‘history’, ‘security’, ‘morality’, and ‘economy’. 
Each of these can be further categorised into ‘sub-themes’ that signify important nuances 
within each theme. By analysing the themes and sub-themes in prime ministers’ speeches, 
this thesis finds four discourses about Britain’s relationship with Africa, which highlight 
different conceptions of British national identity. These are: ‘paternalism’, ‘tutelage’, 
‘partnership’, and ‘insecure former empire’. When viewed together, these themes, sub-
themes and discourses reveal two competing but coexisting notions of British national 
identity. The main finding of this thesis is that British prime ministers’ discourses of Africa 
reveal an attempt to forge a new soft-power British national identity, and – simultaneously – 
a reluctance to entirely renounce Britain’s colonial identity.  
 
311 
The first shows that British prime ministers’ conception of British national identity changes 
from one of paternalism towards Africa to one of partnership. The second shows that some 
discourses of Africa’s place in British foreign policy used by British prime ministers have 
remained continuous throughout this period, and are also rooted discourses about Africa 
from the 19th Century. As noted in the literature review, there is no such thing as one 
national identity. Instead, different identities are discursively constructed in relation to 
context, such as the audience and zeitgeist. However, the two prominent identities found in 
this research are notable because they exist concurrently whilst being contradictory. The 
findings of this thesis can also be considered a response of sorts to Dean Acheson’s remark 
that ‘Great Britain has lost an empire and not found a role yet’ (Acheson, 1963: 163). In their 
discourses about Africa, British prime ministers from 1990-2016 construct two prominent 
identities for Britain; one comfortable with its post-Empire status, and the other reluctant to 
let go of its imperial legacy.  
 
Furthermore, this thesis makes a number of original contributions, which can be broken 
down into six areas. Firstly, the corpus of speeches collected for this research is new and can 
be made available to other researchers. Secondly, the approach taken in this thesis represents 
a unique take on existing methods. Thirdly, this thesis studies the overt content of the 
speeches to derive ‘themes’ and ‘sub-themes’ that represent important substantive topics 
British prime ministers reference in relation to Africa. Fourthly, this research explores the 
implicit content of the speeches to understand the ways in which national identity is 
constructed – such as through selective ‘we-groups’, forms of othering, and metaphors. 
Fifthly, it provides potential explanations for these findings. Sixthly, it details how these 
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original contributions speak to debates in the existing literature on UK – Africa relations. 
These contributions are expanded on in more detail here.  
 
First, this research has provided a new dataset that can be utilised for further research. The 
corpus contains 273 speeches, totalling 668,281 words. The corpus of speeches took many 
months to compile, and required searching and sorting through online archives and physical 
archives. The online archives used to collect this data are: the Political Speech Archive 
(www.ukpol.co.uk), the British Political Speech archive (www.britishpoliticalspeech.org), 
John Major’s website (www.johnmajor.co.uk), the European Archive (www.collections. 
europarchive.org), the British government website (www.gov.uk), and the Wayback Machine 
Internet Archive (www.archive.org). It would be challenging and time-consuming to re-
collect this data, especially as the domain address of the European Archive has expired and 
speeches from this archive must now be accessed via the Wayback Machine Internet Archive 
using the specific URL for each speech. These online sources were complemented by visits 
to the Conservative and Labour Party archives at the Bodleian Libraries in Oxford and The 
People’s History Museum in Manchester respectively. Speeches from the physical archives 
were digitised using optical character recognition (OCR) technology. This dataset is provided 
in Appendix A, and can also be made available online as Open Access (OA) content, which 
can benefit other researchers interested in UK-Africa relations. 
 
Second, this thesis has made a contribution in terms of its approach. As highlighted in 
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, speeches are understudied in the British context, especially in 
relation to what Tulis (1987) terms ‘the Rhetorical Presidency’. The focus solely on prime 
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ministers’ speeches instead of policy or actions represents a novel approach to the field of 
UK-Africa research. As Finlayson and Martin (2008: 60) argue, a political speech is a 
‘proverbial grain of sand through which, if we are prepared to look closely and for a while, 
we may glimpse some of the turns taken by a political universe’. Additionally, this research 
builds on a number of existing approaches to develop an innovative way of approaching 
national identity construction. The critical approach set out by Wodak et al. (2009) is too 
focused for a large dataset such as this, so combining their detailed Discourse-Historical 
Approach with quantitative tools and thematic content analysis provides a framework that 
can be borrowed and built on in further research. Fairclough (2000: 96) explains that a 
‘rhetorical style is not an invariable way of using language; it is rather a mixture of different 
ways of using language, a distinctive repertoire. Tony Blair does not always speak in the same 
way, but he has a distinctive repertoire of ways of speaking which he moves between in a 
recognisable way’. It is difficult to capture the range of repertoires and themes of such a 
broad dataset using only critical discourse analysis. Therefore, this additional thematic 
content analysis stage is crucial in gaining this understanding, and also helps to develop 
arguments in the literature on this subject. The Python code written for this thesis to help 
understand the context of keywords within each theme (provided in Appendix B) is a useful 
tool for researchers wanting to analyse large text corpuses regardless of the field of study, 
and represents another contribution of this research. 
 
Third, this research studies the overt content of the speeches and argues that the ‘themes’ 
for understanding the rationale for Britain’s post-Cold War engagement with Africa are: 
‘history’, ‘security’, ‘morality’, and ‘economy’. This finding corroborates assumptions made in 
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the literature, such as Tugendhat and Wallace (1988) – whose work predates the period of 
this study but who sought to forecast Britain’s foreign policy options in the 1990s. In 
addition, this research finds eleven ‘sub-themes’ that signify important nuances within these 
themes: ‘commonality rooted in colonial history’, ‘the Commonwealth’, ‘sport’, ‘Africa’s 
underdevelopment as a security threat’, ‘peacekeeping’, ‘force projection’, ‘moral posturing’, 
‘Christian values’, ‘party political messaging’, ‘Africa’s economic prosperity as mutually 
beneficial’, and ‘Africa’s economic prosperity as a (missed) opportunity for Britain’. 
 
Fourth, this thesis focuses on the implicit content of the speeches, centring on discursive 
strategies – such as who is included and excluded when prime ministers use ‘we-groups’, as 
well as the types of metaphors they use in relation to Africa. In doing so, this research 
identifies four ‘discourses’ that show different conceptions of British national identity. These 
are: ‘paternalism’, ‘tutelage’, ‘partnership’, and ‘insecure former empire’. While there has been 
a shift in discourse from ‘paternalism’ to ‘partnership’ over this period of study, there is also 
a concurrent discourse that has remained constant throughout this period and signals British 
reluctance to renounce its imperial identity entirely.  
 
Fifth, this research provides potential explanations for the continuities and discontinuities 
found in the themes and discourses, and provides avenues for building on this research. This 
research argues that the discontinuities in prime ministers’ discourses in relation to Africa 
can be explained by a variety of factors including prime ministers’ party affiliation, their 
personalities, and broader changes that took place around the period focused on in this 
thesis. For example, differences in British prime ministers’ references to Africa in relation to 
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Britain’s economy correlate to the party affiliation of the prime minister. Whereas the two 
Labour prime ministers refer to Africa’s increasing economic prosperity and freedom as a 
source of increased African agency which is mutually beneficial for Britain, Africa, and the 
world, the two Conservative prime ministers tend to refer to Africa’s rapidly growing 
economy as a zero-sum economic opportunity for Britain. In other areas, prime ministers’ 
individual personalities help explain their discourses about Africa and, in turn, the 
construction of British national identity. For instance, Major focused on sports to suggest 
common values between Britain and Africa in an uncontroversial way that transcends 
politics. This thesis also argues that the young age at which Blair and Cameron entered 
office, their perceived inexperience by the media and their opposition, and that both entered 
office after their parties had spent a long period in opposition helps to explain the 
similarities in their discourses around projecting hard power in Africa. There are other 
changes that occurred around the period of focus in this thesis that may explain the broad 
shift in discourse from paternalism to partnership, such as increased African agency and 
post-Cold War optimism about the triumph of liberal values. Yet for all these explanations 
centred on the discontinuities in prime ministers’ discourses about Africa, this thesis has also 
shown that there is considerable continuity throughout this period – particularly in relation 
to British prime ministers’ discourses about security in Africa and the notion of Africa as a 
moral cause. The explanation for this continuity is that British prime ministers value the 
power projection and economic opportunities that come from this national identity.  
 
Sixth, this thesis maps the literature regarding the rationale for post-Cold War UK-Africa 
engagement, and it makes a number of important contributions to the debates in the current 
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literature. The contribution of this research to debates in the literature is detailed in the next 
section.  
 
10.2 Situating This Research In The Existing Literature 
This thesis has engaged with, developed, and challenged key debates in the existing literature 
throughout. The most notable contributions it makes are presented in this section. It 
primarily builds on the existing literature by focusing on prime ministers who were ignored 
in the literature because of their apparent insignificance – often Major and Brown – or 
because the literature around Cameron’s premiership is still growing.  
 
This research finds that in contrast to the argument made by Martin and Garnett (1997: 58) 
that, under Major, the Commonwealth was ‘an institution relegated to the back burner’, this 
thesis finds that the Commonwealth is a powerful imagined community in his speeches. Its 
role in these speeches is to project a British national identity of primus inter pares – that is, first 
among equals. This under-appreciation of the role of Commonwealth stems from a 
consideration of the institution in strictly policy terms, rather than its role in less overt ways. 
The Commonwealth occupies an important role in Major’s narration of British national 
identity in relation to Africa in terms of history and morality. Therefore, it is also inaccurate 
for Williams (2005a) to argue that it ‘remained’ an institution of little importance under New 
Labour. This research argues that there has been an increasing decline in emphasis on the 
Commonwealth from Major to Cameron. However, this should be qualified by the 
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acknowledgement that in the lead up to the vote on Britain’s membership of the European 
Union, there was a slight resurgence in references to the Commonwealth under Cameron. 
 
Further, this thesis makes a number of important contributions in relation to UK-Africa 
narratives framed in terms of security. This thesis supports the finding by Abrahamsen 
(2005) that Britain’s engagement with Africa moved towards a category of ‘risk/threat’ post-
9/11. However, the thematic content analysis in Chapter 7 provided evidence of this 
securitisation of Africa before 9/11, and even in the speeches of Major. While this does not 
contradict the argument made by Abrahamsen, as she cites Blair’s 2001 Labour Party 
conference speech as evidence of the ‘ongoing’ securitisation of the continent, the 
confirmation in this dataset of Africa being presented as a security threat in speeches years 
prior to 9/11 is an important contribution to discussions of the securitisation of UK Africa 
relations.  
 
In a similar manner, this research concurs with findings around peacekeeping by Pugh et al. 
(2013) and Daddow and Schnapper (2013), but disagrees with their assertions about when 
these changes took place. Both argue that Cameron learnt from Blair’s intervention in Iraq, 
and used a less ideological, less controversial ‘post-interventionist’ approach. This research 
has found evidence of this rhetoric in the speeches of Brown which therefore pre-dates their 
arguments. Their unquestioning focus on Cameron’s premiership as an indication of change 
in policy whilst ignoring Brown’s premiership is short-sighted. Pugh et al. make no reference 




In the morality chapter, this thesis finds a wealth of evidence to support the argument by 
Gallagher (2013) that under Blair, Britain’s relationship with Africa represented a new 
approach focused on the state’s capacity to embody and represent good. That is, attempting 
to ‘do good’ in Africa enabled the formation of a conception of the British state as involved 
in a disinterested, idealised project. However, this research also builds on this by finding that 
Cameron echoed many of Blair’s arguments in this respect, in contrast to Major and Brown 
– for whom Africa in not an explicit moral cause.  
 
As well as expanding the timeframe of the research on UK-Africa relations, this research 
also responds to broader debates in the literature. In this respect, it is important to consider 
the competing arguments of Reid (2014) and Harrison (2013). Reid argues that Africa has 
long been seen in terms of economic opportunity, and although immediate contexts have 
changed over time, international engagement with Africa remains essentially economic and 
military. By contrast, Harrison (2013) argues that British campaigning around Africa has 
mainly (although not exclusively) been a ‘conversation’ about the moral nature of 
Britishness. This thesis finds that while Reid’s argument is somewhat applicable to Cameron 
and Major, and Harrison’s argument captures some of Blair’s focus on Africa, neither of 
these explanations adequately capture the nuances found in this thesis. Both of these 
arguments must be combined in order to appreciate British prime ministers’ references to 
Africa over the period 1990-2016, and their implications for British national identity. 
 
This research has also added to smaller debates in the literature, such as to the literature on 
the role of sports in UK-Africa relations under Major. It does not support or contradict the 
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argument by Nauright and Amara (2018: 2) that Major saw Africa as holding ‘a vast reserve 
army of athletic talent that could be used as sports labor [sic] in the global sports economy’. 
However, it does add to this literature by showing in some detail in section 6.2.3 that sports 
played an important role in allowing Major to talk about the relationship between Britain and 
Africa and suggest a sense of shared history and values.  
 
This chapter has detailed ways in which this research has made original contributions to 
knowledge and progressed debates in the existing literature. In doing so, it shows why this 
research matters. However, there is also one further point to emphasise on why this research 
is important: this thesis has made notable findings by focusing on continuities and 
discontinuities over a significant period. In the existing literature, however, the tendency to 
focus on prime ministers deemed to be more consequential has led to gaps in understanding. 
In this field of research it has led to an over-emphasis on Blair, and an underappreciation of 
Major and Brown’s administrations. The next section explores two ways this research can be 
expanded on. 
 
10.3 Further Research 
There are a number of ways the research in this thesis can be expanded upon. This section 
sets out two ways this can be achieved. The first changes the timeframe to focus specifically 
on the role of Africa in the construction of British national identity in the post-Brexit 
context; the political landscape is too volatile for this to be feasible currently. The second 
applies the framework used here to the French context. In particular, by looking at how 
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French presidents talk about France’s relationship with its former African colonies 
(Françafrique) and the discursive construction of French national identity.  
 
10.3.1 The Post-Brexit Context 
On 23rd June 2016, Britain voted to withdraw from the European Union, a process 
commonly referred to as Brexit (a portmanteau of ‘British’ and ‘exit’). Brexit has profound 
implications for Britain’s place in the world, including Britain’s relationship with Africa.  As 
detailed in Chapter 3, one of the reasons for the time period chosen for this study (1990-
2016) is that the context during this time remained similar enough to allow for meaningful 
comparison across these four prime ministers in the post-Cold War period.  
 
The Brexit vote, however, has been described as the biggest political change for Europe 
since the fall of the Berlin Wall (Penny and O'Donnell, 2016). This context is so different 
that it requires investigating in itself – and as such is an area that should be explored in 
further research. The high level of uncertainty and fluctuation in British politics at the time 
of the publication of this thesis means it is currently difficult to make clear arguments about 
the post-Brexit vote context.  
 
In August 2018, Theresa May made a brief tour of Africa in the middle of Brexit 
negotiations. Although much media attention focused on May dancing with school children 
in Cape Town and scouts in Nairobi, the speeches she gave are noteworthy and should be 
studied in more detail. During her three day visit, she travelled to South Africa, Nigeria and 
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Kenya – all Commonwealth countries – and was accompanied by a 29-member trade 
delegation (Sabbagh, 2018). May was clear that her intention was to ‘deepen and strengthen 
[Britain’s] global partnerships’ (Madowo, 2018) as it prepared to leave the EU. However, she 
also touched on other themes highlighted in this thesis. Her agenda included security issues 
as she spoke of the threat of Boko Haram in Nigeria, and the role of British forces based in 
Kenya helping fight al-Shabab in Somalia.  
 
This visit was the subject of much discussion in the press, and further academic research 
could situate it in the broader context of post-Cold War UK-Africa literature. The Telegraph 
hailed May’s visit as an ‘important signal of renewed British political and economic interest 
in Africa. It was long overdue: a British prime minister has not visited Africa since 2013, and 
there has been a comparative decline in the UK’s visibility in many parts of the continent 
over the last decade, just as many other states, including France, Turkey, China and Japan, 
have been upgrading their Africa engagement’  (Vines, 2018). Other news organisations were 
more sceptical about May’s visit; Quartz Africa used the comic headline: ‘New phone, who 
dis? The United Kingdom is looking for new post-Brexit friends in Africa’ (Kazeem, 2018).  
On 24th July 2019, Boris Johnson became British prime minister. He has not yet delivered a 
speech in relation to Africa, but his past record indicates that his view of the relationship 
between Britain and Africa may display marked discontinuities from previous prime 
ministers. Responding to Blair’s quote that ‘Africa is a scar on the conscience of the world’, 
Johnson wrote in his Spectator column that Africa ‘may be a blot, but it is not a blot upon 
our conscience. The problem is not that we were once in charge, but that we are not in 
charge any more’ (Johnson, 2002). As foreign secretary, Johnson told the Financial Times 
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that his post-Brexit vision includes ‘“unparalleled” ties with the Commonwealth’ – and that, 
in Africa, Britain is doing more than just sending aid. ‘We’re opening about 10 new 
embassies there. We’re opening embassies in, well, the Pacific, in the Caribbean. The flag is 
going up around the world rather than coming down’ (Payne, 2019). Arguments linking 
Brexit to nostalgia for the British Empire or ‘British Empire 2.0’ should, in particular, be 
explored in more detail in further research as they currently enjoy prominence in journalistic 
literature (Tharoor, 2017; Saunders, 2019) but are not yet properly scrutinised in academic 
literature (see Sykes, 2018: 152).  
 
10.3.2 Françafrique and French National Identity 
Africa also occupies a significant place in French consciousness and national identity. 
France’s relationship with its former African colonies is known as ‘Françafrique’. As noted in 
Chapter 5, Major said that Britain and France have a joint obligation to Africa, and that this 
obligation is rooted in their historic ties to Africa (JM95d).165 These historical ties manifest 
themselves in a variety of ways. Yates (2018) points out that France has a history of military 
intervention and peacekeeping operations in Africa – including recent operations such as 
Mali (Operation Serval), the Sahel (Operation Barkhane), and the Central African Republic 
(Operation Sangaris). France also has a large African diaspora community who make 
substantial contributions to French arts, culture and sports; many of France’s best football 
players are from African diaspora communities and propelled them to victory in the FIFA 
                                                 
165 John Major (30th October, 1995), joint press conference with President Chirac, London, UK. 
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World Cup in 1998 and 2018. This context would make for interesting research in how 
‘Frenchness’ is defined by French presidents, and would make for a good extension to this 
research by applying the same framework to a study of speeches by French presidents with a 
focus on French national identity.   
 
Emmanuel Macron was elected at the age of 39, becoming the youngest ever president of 
France. In a speech at Ouagadougou University in Burkina Faso, he uses a similar framing to 
Cameron to distance himself from France’s colonial history by focusing on his youth. He 
stated: ‘I am from a generation that doesn’t come to tell Africans what to do. I am 
from a generation for whom Nelson Mandela’s victory is one of the best political memories. 
I will not stand by those who say the African continent is one of crises and misery. I will be 
alongside those who believe that Africa is neither a lost continent or one that needs to be 
saved’ (O'Connor, 2017). Six years earlier, in a speech to the Pan-African University in 
Nigeria (DC11f)166, Cameron had set out a similar argument in very similar language: ‘I 
passionately believe in liberal democracy… and I believe Africa can do it too. Let me be 
clear: this isn’t about imposing Western beliefs on Africa or neo-colonialism. I’m from the 
generation free of this shadow. I wasn’t even born when Harold MacMillan made his 
winds of change speech.’ 
 
François Mitterrand, French minister of the interior (and later France’s longest ever serving 
president) wrote in 1957: ‘sans l’Afrique il n’y aura pas d’histoire de la France au XXIe siècle’ 
                                                 
166 David Cameron (19th July, 2011), Pan-African University, Lagos, Nigeria. 
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(Le Monde, 2017) – meaning ‘without Africa, France will have no history in the 21st 
century’. Yet French presidents have not always chosen their words in relation to Africa so 
carefully. In Nicolas Sarkozy’s infamous 2007 Dakar speech, which was supposed to 
emphasise partnership and African renaissance, he caused outrage by saying that the African 
man had failed to ‘enter into history’ (Cumming, 2013). A decade later, Emmanuel Macron 
also received heavy criticism for his assertion that ‘civilisational’ problems and women 
having ‘seven or eight children’ were hampering development in African nations (Dearden, 
2017).  
 
In 2012, François Hollande claimed on visiting Senegal that ‘the time of La Françafrique is 
over’ (France 24, 2017). Yet such a claim is perhaps more rhetoric than reality. Haski (2013) 
argues that Hollande strengthened France’s ties with Africa, recognising that ‘Africa – and 
not only the French-speaking countries – is France’s hinterland, an integral part of its past, 
but also of its future. With new generations rising and high global growth rates in many 
countries, Africa offers new opportunities for a European nation with diminishing global 
clout’. 
 
These two competing visions of France’s relationship with Africa and its implications for 
French national identity has parallels with the central finding of this thesis about British 
national identity. British prime ministers’ discourses of Africa in the post-Cold War period 
reveal an attempt to shape a new British national identity around partnership with Africa 
instead of paternalism. Yet, at the same time, continuities in prime ministers’ discourses 
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throughout this period signal an unwillingness to entirely reject Britain’s old imperial identity 




List of Speeches 
This appendix contains a list of all the speeches that met the inclusion criteria (see Chapter 
3). Most were gathered from online archives, but some are from the Conservative and 
Labour Party archives. They are listed chronologically and have been labelled and numbered, 
and are referenced using the prime ministers initials and year of speech in the body of the 
thesis. Hyperlinks have been used where possible so that in the digital version these speeches 




Speaker (+ URL or 
archive) 
Date Location 
1 JM90a John Major [Archive] 29/11/1990 
Altrincham and Sale 
Conservative Association 
Dinner, Cresta Court Hotel, 
Manchester, UK 
2 JM90b John Major [URL] 15/12/1990 
European Council meeting, 
Rome, Italy 
3 JM91a John Major [URL] 01/02/1991 London, UK 
4 JM91b John Major [URL] 11/02/1991 
Federal Chancellor’s office, 
Bonn, Germany 
5 JM91c John Major [Archive] 15/04/1991 EBRD, London, UK 
6 JM91d John Major [URL] 08/07/1991 
Sunday Times Environmental 
Conference, London, UK 
7 JM91e John Major [URL] 19/09/1991 
National Sporting Club at the 
 
327 
Café Royal, London, UK 
8 JM91f John Major [URL] 25/09/1991 
Windsor Fellowship, London, 
UK 
9 JM91g John Major [URL] 11/10/1991 Blackpool, UK 
10 JM91h John Major [URL] 17/10/1991 
Commonwealth Heads of 
Government Meeting, Harare, 
Zimbabwe 
11 JM91i John Major [URL] 18/10/1991 Harare, Zimbabwe 
12 JM91j John Major [URL] 21/10/1991 Harare, Zimbabwe 
13 JM92a John Major [Archive] 24/03/1992 
Conservative Central Office, 
London, UK 
14 JM92b John Major [URL] 16/10/1992 Birmingham, UK 
15 JM92c John Major [URL] 24/10/1992 Cairo, Egypt 
16 JM93a John Major [URL] 24/03/1993 
Global Technology Partnership 
Venture Conference,  
Birmingham, UK 
17 JM93b John Major [URL] 16/06/1993 London, UK 
18 JM93c John Major [URL] 20/09/1993 
Nikkeiren Economic 
Organisation, Tokyo, Japan 
19 JM94a John Major [URL] 03/06/1994 
World Environment Day, 
QEII Conference Centre, 
London, UK 
20 JM94b John Major [URL] 28/07/1994 
Conservative Middle East 
Council, London, UK 
21 JM94c John Major [URL] 07/09/1994 
Leiden University, the 
Netherlands 
22 JM94d John Major [URL] 20/09/1994 Cape Town, South Africa 
23 JM94e John Major [URL] 20/09/1994 Cape Town, South Africa 
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24 JM94f John Major [URL] 20/09/1994 
South African National 
Assembly, Cape Town, South 
Africa 
25 JM94g John Major [URL] 21/09/1994 
Alexandra Township Cricket 
Ground, South Africa 
26 JM94h John Major [URL] 21/09/1994 
Alexandra Township Cricket 
Ground, South Africa 
27 JM94i John Major [URL] 21/09/1994 
Ivory Park Primary School, 
Tembisa, South Africa 
28 JM94j John Major [URL] 21/09/1994 Johannesburg, South Africa 
29 JM94k John Major [URL] 21/09/1994 Johannesburg, South Africa 
30 JM94l John Major [URL] 22/09/1994 Pretoria, South Africa 
31 JM94m John Major [URL] 14/10/1994 Bournemouth, UK 
32 JM94n John Major [URL] 26/10/1994 
Institute of Education, 
London, UK 
33 JM94o John Major [URL] 18/11/1994 Chartres, France 
34 JM94p John Major [URL] 24/11/1994 
Army Staff College, 
Camberley, UK 
35 JM95a John Major [URL] 24/01/1995 
British Retail Consortium, 
London, UK 
36 JM95b John Major [URL] 29/03/1995 
Britain in the World 
Conference, London, UK 
37 JM95c John Major [URL] 04/04/1995 Washington D.C, USA 
38 JM95d John Major [URL] 30/10/1995 London, UK 
39 JM95e John Major [URL] 09/11/1995 Aukland, Australia 
40 JM95f John Major [URL] 12/11/1995 Aukland, Australia 
41 JM96a John Major [URL] 23/03/1996 




42 JM96b John Major [URL] 20/04/1996 Moscow, Russia 
43 JM96c John Major [URL] 29/02/1996 
Standard Chartered Bank, 
Bangkok, Thailand 
44 JM96d John Major [URL] 10/07/1996 
CBI/RIIA/ COSAT 
Investment Conference, South 
Africa 
45 JM96e John Major [URL] 08/11/1996 Bordeaux, France 
46 JM97a John Major [URL] 09/01/1997 Calcutta, India 
47 JM97b John Major [URL] 09/01/1997 Calcutta, India 




[URL / URL / URL] 
23/06/1997 
UN General Assembly on the 
Environment and Sustainable 
Development, New York, USA 
2 TB97b Tony Blair [URL] 22/10/1997 
Commonwealth Business 
Forum, London, UK 
3 TB98a Tony Blair [URL] 24/03/1998 
French National Assembly, 
France 
4 TB98b Tony Blair [Archive] 21/09/1998 
UN General Assembly, New 
York 
5 TB98c Tony Blair [URL] 29/09/1998 Blackpool, UK 
6 TB99a Tony Blair [URL] 24/04/1999 Economic Club, Chicago, USA 
7 TB99b Tony Blair [URL] 28/09/1999 Bournemouth, UK 
8 TB00a Tony Blair [Archive] 18/01/2000 WEF, Davos, Switzerland 
9 TB00b Tony Blair [URL] 02/03/2000 
Active Community 
Convention and Awards, 
London, UK 
10 TB00c Tony Blair [URL] 13/11/2000 




11 TB01a Tony Blair [URL] 23/02/2001 Canadian Parliament, Canada 
12 TB01b Tony Blair [URL] 06/03/2001 London, UK 
13 TB01c Tony Blair [URL] 15/03/2001 AMEC Yard, Wallsend, UK 
14 TB01d Tony Blair [URL] 29/03/2001 
Westminster Central Hall, 
London, UK 
15 TB01e Tony Blair [Archive] 14/06/2001 London 
16 TB01f Tony Blair [URL] 02/10/2001 Brighton, UK 
17 TB01g Tony Blair [Archive] 11/10/2001 Egypt 
18 TB01h Tony Blair [URL] 12/11/2001 
Lord Mayor’s Banquet, 
London, UK 
19 TB01i Tony Blair [URL] 30/12/2001 Unspecified domestic 
20 TB02a Tony Blair [URL] 05/01/2002 Bangalore, India 
21 TB02b Tony Blair [URL] 02/02/2002 Ghana 
22 TB02c Tony Blair [URL] 
07/02/2002 
[?] 
Nigerian Assembly, Abuja, 
Nigeria 
23 TB02d Tony Blair [URL] 12/03/2002 LSE, London, UK 
24 TB02e Tony Blair [URL] 07/04/2002 
George Bush Senior 
Presidential Library, USA 
25 TB02f Tony Blair [URL] 28/06/2002 G8 summit, Canada 
26 TB02g Tony Blair [URL] 02/09/2002 
World Summit on Sustainable 
Development, South Africa 
27 TB02h Tony Blair [URL] 10/09/2002 
TUC Conference, Blackpool, 
UK 
28 TB02i Tony Blair [URL] 11/11/2002 




29 TB03a Tony Blair [URL] 01/01/2003 Unspecified domestic 
30 TB03b Tony Blair [URL] 07/01/2003 
Foreign Office Conference, 
London, UK 
31 TB03c Tony Blair [URL] 24/02/2003 London, UK 
32 TB03d Tony Blair [URL] 23/03/2003 
Speech broadcasted to British 
troops 
33 TB03e Tony Blair [URL] 07/05/2003 10 Downing Street, UK 
34 TB03f Tony Blair [URL] 30/05/2003 Warsaw, Poland 
35 TB03g Tony Blair [URL] 02/06/2003 
G8 summit, Évian-les-Bains, 
France 
36 TB03h Tony Blair [URL] 17/07/2003 
White House, Washington 
D.C., USA 
37 TB03i Tony Blair [URL] 18/07/2003 
US Congress, Washington 
D.C., USA 
38 TB03j Tony Blair [URL] 10/11/2003 
Lord Mayor’s Banquet, 
London, UK 
39 TB03k Tony Blair [URL] 24/11/2003 
Anglo-French Summit, 
London, UK 
40 TB03l Tony Blair [URL] 06/12/2003 Nigeria 
41 TB03m Tony Blair [URL] 16/12/2003 Unspecified domestic 
42 TB03n Tony Blair [URL] 05/01/2004 10 Downing Street, UK 
43 TB04a Tony Blair [URL] 05/03/2004 Sedgefield, UK 
44 TB04b Tony Blair [URL] 25/03/2004 Tripoli, Libya 
45 TB04c Tony Blair [URL] 26/04/2004 10 Downing Street, UK 
46 TB04d Tony Blair [URL] 27/04/2004 CBI, London, UK 
47 TB04e Tony Blair [URL] 27/04/2004 




48 TB04f Tony Blair [URL] 14/08/2004 London, UK 
49 TB04g Tony Blair [URL] 07/10/2004 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 
50 TB04h Tony Blair [URL] 07/10/2004 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 
51 TB04i Tony Blair [URL] 19/10/2004 Downing Street, London, UK 
52 TB04j Tony Blair [URL] 03/11/2004 Downing Street, London, UK 
53 TB04k Tony Blair [URL] 15/11/2004 
Lord Mayor’s Banquet, 
London, UK 
54 TB05a Tony Blair [URL] 26/01/2005 Davos, Switzerland 
55 TB05b Tony Blair [URL] 11/03/2005 British Museum, London, UK 
56 TB05c Tony Blair [URL] 22/03/2005 London, UK 
57 TB05d Tony Blair [URL] 06/05/2005 10 Downing Street, UK 
58 TB05e Tony Blair [URL] 23/06/2005 EU Parliament 
59 TB05f Tony Blair [URL] 14/09/2005 
UN Security Council on 
terrorism, New York 
60 TB05g Tony Blair [URL] 15/09/2005 UN World Summit, New York 
61 TB05h Tony Blair [URL] 16/09/2005 UN World Summit, New York 
62 TB05i Tony Blair [URL] 26/10/2005 
EU Parliament, Strasbourg, 
France 
63 TB05j Tony Blair [URL] 14/11/2005 
Lord Mayor’s Banquet, 
London, UK 
64 TB05k Tony Blair [URL] 25/11/2005 
Commonwealth Heads of 
Government Meeting, Malta 
65 TB05l Tony Blair [URL] 08/12/2005 
EastWest Institute, Statesman 
of the Decade award to Tony 
Blair, London, UK 
66 TB05m Tony Blair [URL] 31/12/2005 Unspecified domestic 
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67 TB06a Tony Blair [URL] 11/02/2006 South Africa 
68 TB06b Tony Blair [URL] 12/02/2006 South Africa 
69 TB06c Tony Blair [URL] 12/02/2006 South Africa 
70 TB06d Tony Blair [URL] 14/02/2006 Kliptown, South Africa 
71 TB06e Tony Blair [URL] 14/02/2006 Kliptown, South Africa 
72 TB06f Tony Blair [URL] 17/02/2006 Berlin, Germany 
73 TB06g Tony Blair [URL] 27/03/2006 Parliament of Australia 
74 TB06h Tony Blair [URL] 03/04/2006 
Ruach Ministries Christian 
Centre, Brixton, UK 
75 TB06i Tony Blair [URL] 04/04/2006 Online (MSN webchat) 
76 TB06j Tony Blair [URL] 25/04/2006 Unspecified domestic 
77 TB06k Tony Blair [URL] 16/05/2006 
CBI annual dinner, London, 
UK 
78 TB06l Tony Blair [URL] 23/05/2006 10 Downing Street, UK 
79 TB06m Tony Blair [URL] 24/05/2006 10 Downing Street, UK 
80 TB06n Tony Blair [URL] 26/05/2006 Georgetown University, USA 
81 TB06o Tony Blair [URL] 26/06/2006 King’s College London, UK 
82 TB06p Tony Blair [URL] 04/07/2006 Unspecified domestic 
83 TB06q Tony Blair [URL] 11/07/2006 10 Downing Street, UK 
84 TB06r Tony Blair [URL] 17/07/2006 
G8 Summit, St Petersburg, 
Russia 
85 TB06s Tony Blair [URL] 30/07/2006 Pebble Beach, California, USA 
86 TB06t Tony Blair [URL] 01/08/2006 
Los Angeles World Affairs 
Council, USA 
87 TB07a Tony Blair [URL] 12/01/2007 HMS Albion, Plymouth, UK 
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88 TB07b Tony Blair [URL] 27/01/2007 WEF, Davos, Switzerland 
89 TB07c Tony Blair [URL] 06/03/2007 Tate Modern, London, UK 
90 TB07d Tony Blair [URL] 14/03/2007 10 Downing Street, UK 
91 TB07e Tony Blair [URL] 25/03/2007 
Video speech broadcast in 
Elmina Castle, Ghana 
92 TB07f Tony Blair [URL] 25/03/2007 Berlin, Germany 
93 TB07g Tony Blair [URL] 18/04/2007 10 Downing Street, UK 
94 TB07h Tony Blair [URL] 24/04/2007 Berlin, Germany 
95 TB07i Tony Blair [URL] 27/04/2007 Unspecified domestic 
96 TB07j Tony Blair [URL] 10/05/2007 
Trimdon Labour Club, 
Sedgefield, UK 
97 TB07k Tony Blair [URL] 24/05/2007 10 Downing Street, UK 
98 TB07l Tony Blair [URL] 30/05/2007 Freetown, Sierra Leone 
99 TB07m Tony Blair [URL] 30/05/2007 Sierra Leone 
100 TB07n Tony Blair [URL] 30/05/2007 South Africa 
101 TB07o Tony Blair [URL] 31/05/2007 South Africa 
102 TB07p Tony Blair [URL] 31/05/2007 South Africa 
103 TB07q Tony Blair [URL] 01/06/2007 South Africa 
104 TB07r Tony Blair [URL] 07/06/2007 G8 Summit, Germany 
105 TB07s Tony Blair [URL] 08/06/2007 G8 Summit, Germany 
 
1 GB07a Gordon Brown  [URL] 24/06/2007 Manchester, UK 
2 GB07b Gordon Brown [URL] 12/07/2007 London, UK 
3 GB07c Gordon Brown [URL] 16/07/2007 Berlin, Germany 
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4 GB07d Gordon Brown [URL] 20/07/2007 Paris, France 
5 GB07e Gordon Brown [URL] 23/07/2007 10 Downing Street, UK 
6 GB07f Gordon Brown [URL] 30/07/2007 Camp David, USA 
7 GB07g Gordon Brown [URL] 31/07/2007 United Nations 
8 GB07h Gordon Brown [URL] 23/08/2007 10 Downing Street, UK 
9 GB07i Gordon Brown [URL] 28/08/2007 10 Downing Street, UK 
10 GB07j Gordon Brown [URL] 29/08/2007 
Parliament Square, London, 
UK 
11 GB07k Gordon Brown [URL] 06/09/2007 
International Health 
Partnership, London, UK 
12 GB07l Gordon Brown [URL] 20/09/2007 
Unspecified domestic (to 
journalists) 
13 GB07m Gordon Brown [URL] 09/10/2007 10 Downing Street, UK 
14 GB07n Gordon Brown [URL] 11/10/2007 10 Downing Street, UK 
15 GB07o Gordon Brown [URL] 16/10/2007 10 Downing Street, UK 
16 GB07p Gordon Brown [URL] 18/10/2007 EU Council, Lisbon, Portugal 
17 GB07q Gordon Brown [URL] 19/10/2007 EU Council, Lisbon, Portugal 
18 GB07r Gordon Brown [URL] 12/11/2007 
Lord Mayor’s Banquet Speech, 
London, UK 
19 GB07s 
Gordon Brown [URL 
/ URL] 
23/11/2007 
St Peter’s Primary School, 
Nsambya Uganda 
20 GB07t Gordon Brown [URL] 27/11/2007 10 Downing Street, UK 
21 GB07u Gordon Brown [URL] 30/11/2007 10 Downing Street, UK 
22 GB07v Gordon Brown [URL] 30/11/2007 Unspecified domestic 
23 GB08a Gordon Brown [URL] 21/01/2008 Delhi, India 
 
336 
24 GB08b Gordon Brown [URL] 20/02/2008 Camden, London, UK 
25 GB08c Gordon Brown [URL] 10/03/2008 Unspecified domestic 
26 GB08d Gordon Brown [URL] 16/04/2008 UN Security Council 
27 GB08e Gordon Brown [URL] 18/04/2008 
JFK Presidential Library and 
Museum, Boston, USA 
28 GB08f Gordon Brown [URL] 06/05/2008 Canary Wharf, London, UK 
29 GB08g Gordon Brown [URL] 19/05/2008 
Google Zeitgeist Conference, 
Hertfordshire, UK 
30 GB08h Gordon Brown [URL] 19/05/2008 
Church of Scotland General 
Assembly, Scotland, UK 
31 GB08i Gordon Brown [URL] 10/06/2008 10 Downing Street, UK 
32 GB08j Gordon Brown [URL] 12/06/2008 
Unspecified domestic (to 
journalists) 
33 GB08k Gordon Brown [URL] 13/06/2008 10 Downing Street, UK 
34 GB08l Gordon Brown [URL] 16/06/2008 10 Downing Street, UK 
35 GB08m Gordon Brown [URL] 17/06/2008 Lancaster House, UK 
36 GB08n Gordon Brown [URL] 24/06/2008 EU Council, Brussels, Belgium 
37 GB08o Gordon Brown [URL] 09/07/2008 Japan 
38 GB08p Gordon Brown [URL] 14/07/2008 
Union for the Mediterranean 
Summit, Paris, France 
39 GB08q Gordon Brown [URL] 15/07/2008 
Unspecified domestic (to 
journalists) 
40 GB08r Gordon Brown [URL] 18/07/2008 10 Downing Street, UK 
41 GB08s Gordon Brown [URL] 21/07/2008 Knesset, Jerusalem, Israel 
42 GB08t Gordon Brown [URL] 24/07/2008 Lambeth Palace, UK 
43 GB08u 
Gordon Brown 




44 GB08v Gordon Brown [URL] 25/09/2008 UN, New York, USA 














26/09/2008 New York, USA 







51 GB08cc Gordon Brown [URL] 06/11/2008 London, UK 
52 GB08dd Gordon Brown [URL] 10/11/2008 
Lord Mayor’s Banquet speech, 
London, UK 
53 GB08ee Gordon Brown [URL] 13/11/2008 









10/12/2008 Lancaster House, London, UK 
56 GB09a Gordon Brown [URL] 09/02/2009 Lancaster House, London, UK 
57 GB09b Gordon Brown [URL] 31/03/2009 
St Paul’s Cathedral, London, 
UK 
58 GB09c Gordon Brown [URL] 10/05/2009 Bournemouth, UK 
59 GB09d Gordon Brown [URL] 23/09/2009 
UN General Assembly, New 
York, USA 
60 GB09e Gordon Brown [URL] 16/11/2009 




61 GB10a Gordon Brown [URL] 19/02/2010 London, UK 
62 GB10b Gordon Brown [URL] 11/05/2010 Labour HQ, London, UK 
 
1 DC10a David Cameron [URL] 24/06/2010 HMS Ark Royal 
2 DC10b David Cameron [URL] 13/08/2010 Sandhurst, UK 
3 DC10c David Cameron [URL] 15/11/2010 
Lord Mayor’s Banquet, 
London, UK 
4 DC11a David Cameron [URL] 29/03/2011 London, UK 
5 DC11b David Cameron [URL] 13/04/2011 Paris, France 
6 DC11c David Cameron [URL] 14/04/2011 Romsey, Hampshire, UK 
7 DC11d David Cameron [URL] 27/05/2011 G8 Summit, Deauville, France 
8 DC11e David Cameron [URL] 18/07/2011 Pretoria, South Africa 
9 DC11f David Cameron [URL] 19/07/2011 
Pan African University, Lagos, 
Nigeria 
10 DC11g David Cameron [URL] 25/07/2011 10 Downing Street, UK 
11 DC11h David Cameron [URL] 22/08/2011 10 Downing Street, UK 
12 DC11i David Cameron [URL] 12/09/2011 Moscow, Russia 
13 DC11j David Cameron [URL] 22/09/2011 UN General Assembly 
14 DC11k David Cameron [URL] 16/12/2011 
Christ Church Cathedral, 
Oxford, UK 
15 DC12a David Cameron [URL] 26/01/2012 Davos, Switzerland 
16 DC12b 
David Cameron [URL 
+ URL pt2] 
13/04/2012 
University of Nottingham, 
Malaysia 
17 DC12c David Cameron [URL] 11/07/2012 




18 DC12d David Cameron [URL] 26/07/2012 
Global Investment 
Conference, London, UK 
19 DC12e David Cameron [URL] 01/08/2012 Global Health Policy Summit 
20 DC12f David Cameron [URL] 12/08/2012 
Hunger Summit, 10 Downing 
Street, London, UK 
21 DC12g David Cameron [URL] 10/10/2012 ICC, Birmingham, UK 
22 DC12h David Cameron [URL] 05/11/2012 
Zayed University, Abu Dhabi, 
UAE 
23 DC12i David Cameron [URL] 12/11/2012 
Lord Mayor’s Banquet, 
London, UK 
24 DC12j David Cameron [URL] 19/11/2012 CBI, London 
25 DC13a David Cameron [URL] 17/01/2013 Unspecified domestic 
26 DC13b David Cameron [URL] 20/01/2013 Unspecified domestic 
27 DC13c David Cameron [URL] 24/01/2013 
World Economic Forum, 
Davos, Switzerland 
28 DC13d David Cameron [URL] 15/03/2013 EU Council, Brussels, Belgium 
29 DC13e David Cameron [URL] 04/04/2013 Thales UK, Govan, Scotland 
30 DC13f David Cameron [URL] 07/05/2013 
Somali Conference, London, 
UK 
31 DC13g David Cameron [URL] 08/06/2013 
G8 Nutrition for Growth, 
London, UK 
32 DC13h David Cameron [URL] 15/06/2013 
G8 Open for Growth, 
Lancaster House, UK 
33 DC13i David Cameron [URL] 06/09/2013 G20 Summit, Russia 
34 DC13j David Cameron [URL] 02/10/2013 Manchester, UK 
35 DC13k David Cameron [URL] 02/12/2013 China 
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36 DC13l David Cameron [URL] 05/12/2013 Unspecified domestic 
37 DC14a David Cameron [URL] 25/04/2014 Unspecified domestic 
38 DC14b David Cameron [URL] 09/06/2014 
International festival for 
business 
39 DC14c David Cameron [URL] 10/07/2014 10 Downing Street, UK 
40 DC14d David Cameron [URL] 25/09/2014 UN General Assembly 
41 DC14e David Cameron [URL] 09/10/2014 10 Downing Street, UK 
42 DC14f David Cameron [URL] 24/10/2014 
European Council, Brussels, 
Belgium 
43 DC14g David Cameron [URL] 13/11/2014 Australia 
44 DC14h David Cameron [URL] 28/11/2014 JCB, Staffordshire, UK 
45 DC15a David Cameron [URL] 21/05/2015 10 Downing Street, UK 
46 DC15b David Cameron [URL] 19/06/2015 GLOBSEC, Bratislava 
47 DC15c 
David Cameron [URL] 
URL 
27/09/2015 Unspecified international 
48 DC15d David Cameron [URL] 08/10/2015 Manchester, UK 
49 DC15e David Cameron [URL] 10/11/2015 Chatham House, London, UK 
50 DC15f David Cameron [URL] 11/11/2015 HMS Bulwark, Malta 
51 DC15g David Cameron [URL] 16/11/2015 
Lord Mayor’s Banquet, 
London, UK 
52 DC15h David Cameron [URL] 09/12/2015 Bucharest, Romania 
53 DC16a David Cameron [URL] 23/02/2016 
O2’s Headquarters, Slough, 
UK 
54 DC16b David Cameron [URL] 03/03/2016 Amiens, France 
55 DC16c David Cameron [URL] 18/03/2016 Brussels, Belgium 
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56 DC16d David Cameron [URL] 22/04/2016 
Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office, London, UK 
57 DC16e David Cameron [URL] 09/05/2016 British Museum, London, UK 




Python Code to Extract Sentences 
This appendix contains the Python code written and used to extract sentences, as described 
in Chapter 4. The code was run on Jupyter Notebook (Version 5.7.4), Python (Version 3.6), 
NLTK (Version 3.4.4).  
 
The real-world use of this code is:  
1. Determine which prime ministers’ speech corpus to analyse; 
2. Edit lines 16-19 to reflect the chosen prime minister (commenting out those not needed 
in this run); 
3. Determine the list of keywords to select (history, security, morality or economy), 
checking the python list in lines 28-31; 
4. Select the correct keyword list in line 40; 
5. Modify the name of the output file to reflect the above choices in line 67; 
6. Run the code; 








1. # coding: utf-8   
2. # In[1]:   
3. from nltk import sent_tokenize, word_tokenize   
4.    
5. # In[2]:   
6. Cameron = open("speeches/David Cameron Speech Corpus.txt","r", encoding="utf8")   
7. Brown = open("speeches/Gordon Brown Speech Corpus.txt","r", encoding="utf8")   
8. Blair = open("speeches/Tony Blair Speech Corpus.txt","r", encoding="utf8")   
9. Major = open("speeches/John Major Speech Corpus.txt","r", encoding="utf8")   
10.   
11. # In[3]:   
12. print(Cameron.read())   
13.   
14. # In[4]:   
15. # select the speech to use, via # comment   
16. #speech = Cameron.read()   
17. #speech = Brown.read()   
18. #speech = Blair.read()   
19. speech = Major.read()   
20.   
21. # In[8]:   
22. # keyword list 1   
23. africa = ['Africa','African','Algeria','Angola','Benin','Botswana','Burkina Faso'
,'Burundi','Cabo Verde','Cameroon','Central African Republic','Chad','Comoros','C





 Tome and Principe','Senegal','Seychelles','Sierra Leone','Somalia','South Africa
','South Sudan','Sudan','Tanzania','Togo','Tunisia','Uganda','Zambia','Zimbabwe']
   
24.   
25.   
26. # In[9]:   
27. #keywords to compare   
28. keywords1 = ['history', 'historical', 'common values', 'common language', 'Common
wealth', 'Empire', 'colonial', 'colonialism']   
29. keywords2 = ['security', 'conflict', 'extremism', 'extremist', 'stability', 'inst
ability', 'peacekeeping', 'terror', 'terrorism', 'terrorist', 'threat', 'war']   
30. keywords3 = ['economy', 'economic', 'trade', 'investment', 'export', 'China']   
31. keywords4 = ['moral', 'morality', 'corruption', 'duty', 'values', 'rights', 'Chri
stian', 'Christianity']   
32.   
33. # In[14]:   
34. sentences = sent_tokenize(speech.lower())   
35.   
36. # In[15]:   
37. #sentence_number = 0   
38. selected_sentences=[] # initialize a list to contain selected sentences   
39. for index, sentence in enumerate(sentences):   
40.    for keyword in keywords3: # select keyword lists 1-4 as necessary    
41.        if keyword.lower() in word_tokenize(sentence):   
42.            for word in africa:   
43.                if word.lower() in word_tokenize(sentence): # search same sentenc
e   
44.                    #sentence_number+=1   
45.                    #print(sentence_number, sentence)   
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46.                    selected_sentences.append(sentence)   
47.                if word.lower() in word_tokenize(sentences[index-
1]): # search preceding sentence   
48.                    #sentence_number+=1   
49.                    #print(sentence_number, sentence)   
50.                    selected_sentences.append(sentence)   
51.                if word.lower() in word_tokenize(sentences[index+1]): # search su
cceeding sentence   
52.                    #sentence_number+=1   
53.                    #print(sentence_number, sentence)   
54.                    selected_sentences.append(sentence)   
55.   
56. # In[16]:   
57. print(selected_sentences)   
58.   
59. # In[17]:   
60. # select unique sentences from list   
61. print(set(selected_sentences))   
62.   
63. # In[19]:   
64. # write selected sentences to a .txt file   
65. # modify manually based on the above   
66.   
67. with open('extracted_sentences_major','w') as file:   
68.    for item in set(selected_sentences):   
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